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Measuring the impact of e-Diplomacy social media tools like Twitter or Facebook is a notoriously contested area. On the one hand, there is a friendly crowd of free-services, such as Klout.com that purport to tell me precisely how signficant (or, mostly, insignificant) I am on the web. On the other there is a constantly renewing pool of free data aggregation services, like Keyhole.co, which display a compelling, best-case picture of how a campaign or event is registering on the web.

I mention Keyhole because the figure quoted in the title comes from a dashboard set up to track the social buzz around a recent event (the ICT4Ag conference organised by MinAgri, Rwanda, and CTA). To be clear, there was a huge online buzz around the event, in large part the result of careful and detailed preparation. There was an onsite team of young social reporters from ACP countries, who’d been trained in using digital media immediately before the event. This is a well-worn strategy – Diplo has been doing similar training with Diplo fellows at events, since the 2009 IGF – and can be supplemented these days by networking before and during events. The ICT4Ag social reporting coordinator, my friend and colleague, Pier Andrea Pirani, had connected with 250+ people online before the event, people who couldn’t attend but were interested in following and sharing with their friends and followers material published online (also something Diplo does for events, as with the IGF13 aggregator site). And of course there were many habitual social media users reporting out from the event.

He doth protest too much, methinks1

The problem is that nonsense numbers get in the way of analysing properly the impact of our communication. For example, the ‘reach’ calculation is based on an algorithmic calculation of how user’s networks of followers interact. Although the sites won’t publish their formulas, it’s a calculation that takes some account of the ‘echo chamber’ effect. In other words, calculating reach simply by adding together Pirani’s and my followers, for example, would miss the fact that we have many followers in common (192 in our case), and indeed, many of those followers also overlap (figures from Twiangulate.com) This overlap is characteristic of any thematic or sector group, very evident in the diplomatic community, where, for example, embassies and MFA re-tweet each other and the output of colleagues in alliance ministries. It’s a powerful online campaigning tool, analogous to chanting in a football crowd, to drown out the opposition. But in the bounded diplomatic community  – as in the similarly, though less distinctly bounded, ICT for Agriculture (ICT4Ag) networks  – it makes a mockery of claims about reach.

Even more remarkable is the claim that the social content from ICT4Ag13 generated 4,099,190 impressions. That is to say, the combination of people who were reached and the number of times each of them tweeted. Keyhole, like most similar sites, acknowledges that impression numbers is a theoretical maximum, but then why publish it? The second problem with this kind of smart, well presented data is that the figures are as seductive and dangerous as pure, refined white sugar. Sugar coated numbers, large enough to generate a positive ROI on communication investment costs, are hard to resist, albeit hedged about with qualifications. And I’d bet a kilo of unrefined best Barbadian that it’s the mega-figures that stay in the memory.

Andreas Sandre, the increasingly influential communication specialist at the Italian embassy in the US, blogged on this site about influence and what it means. His pieces (links available below) underline what matters in reality, which is the amount of engagement generated by social media output. It is much harder to measure engagement, in the sense of conversation between people, and the extent to which any particular piece of content is trafficed on the web. There are a number of subscription services, such as Radian 6, which provide more sophisticated social listening services, including the ability to set paramenters that can generate analyses of the mood of the engagement, in terms of positive and negative. For everyday use the number of free or free-mium services continues to expand. Some that we have used include:

In terms of good practice, I think my own primary principle is that trend matters more than absolute numbers. It is essential to do some tracking and comparing, and the free/freemium services provide enough information for comparison purposes. And I spend more time doing than measuring: it remains true that if you feed the web it will feed you back. Spending time to connect with others on the web is not only valuable in itself – isn’t social media about being social – but also the best way to generate continuing conversation around the issues and content that matters.


1. Apologies to Mr Shakespeare

Improving GOV.UK on mobile devices

Mobile use on GOV.UK has increased significantly since launch in October 2012, moving from around 15% to 23% of the overall audience.

We are now starting to improve the experience for mobile and tablet users accordingly, so here’s an outline of a couple of simple initial changes we’ve made.

Prioritising content

Screen space is in short supply on small devices. So making good use of what’s available is really important.

One thing that had troubled me for some time was how little content was actually immediately visible in the view on a lot of pages when browsing on mobile. The navigation and titles dominated too heavily.

We’ve just deployed some changes that help tighten up this space and get more of what our users need in front of them — content.

It’s a subtle change, but an important one.

Testing our assumptions

Another thing that I think we’ve needed to address for a while is the ‘Not what you’re looking for’ link in mobile views seen above, and below in more detail.

Some background

On desktop screens, related links are shown to the right of the main body of content. This is to help users navigate to content that is associated with what’s in front of them (and in some contexts may be more useful). Though this depends of course on how they found their way to the page.

On small viewport screens however, there is no space to show these links in the same position, so instead they sit at the foot of the page.

The ‘not what you’re looking for’ link was originally added in the belief that it was still important to allow users immediate access to these ‘near-miss’ pieces of content on mobile.

What’s never sat right is how jarring it is to be presented with a statement ‘Not what you’re looking for’ as soon as you arrive on a page. It assumes a user is in the wrong place and second guesses their intentions.

Decisions based on data

We don’t like to remove things based on hunches. Our iterations are based on users’ behaviour and research.

So, we added click tracking to the ‘not what you’re looking for’ link at the end of last year with a view to waiting and letting the data do the talking.

The result was unanimously in favour of the redundancy of this link.

Just 0.352% of pageviews in mobile viewports resulted in the link being clicked.

So, we have removed this item, safe in the knowledge that it will not be missed and that the related links are still there at the foot of the page where they are still useful.

What’s next

We have more improvements in the pipeline to improve the experience of GOV.UK on different devices and will keep you updated as and when we ship them.

[Today in PD] The Age of Public Diplomacy: From Enmity to Amity

For the first session the keynote speaker, Kent Calder, was joined by Lily Gardner Feldman, senior fellow at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, and Watanabe Yasushi, professor in the faculty of environment and information studies at Keiō University.

From Enmity to Amity

Feldman, a specialist on German foreign policy and international reconciliation, remarked that there are two kinds of public diplomacy. The first is carried out by the government and aims at improving the national image. The second concerns activities in which NGOs and other nongovernmental actors play the leading role. These activities might be described as “paradiplomacy,” or “transnationalism” in the case of projects that transcend national borders. She said that for public diplomacy to be successful, a partnership between government and nongovernment actors was essential.

Feldman suggested that Germany’s successes since the end of the Second World War might serve as a useful point of reference as Japan considers the direction its own public diplomacy should take, allowing for obvious differences between the two countries’ systems, culture, and history.

Since 1949, Germany has made a determined effort to develop a positive image in the international community. The first priority was the country’s relationship with the newly founded Jewish state of Israel. Thanks to several decades of continuing efforts, over the past ten years Germany has built a relationship of trust with Israel such that it is now acknowledged that “for Israel, Germany is an ally second only to the United States.” For Germany to have built a close relationship of this kind just 70 years after the Holocaust, Feldman said, was “nothing short of miraculous.” She also spoke of Germany’s successful reconciliation with France, its “traditional enemy,” and the building of friendly relations with Poland and the former Czechoslovakia after the Cold War.

Dealing with the Past: The Need for Courageous Leaders

For Germany, accepting responsibility for past crimes and confronting historical issues face-on has formed the heart of the country’s public diplomacy efforts.

Feldman outlined several reasons why Germany’s postwar public diplomacy has been so successful. These were: consistency, so that public diplomacy efforts are not swayed by changes of government; a reciprocal approach to joint action with other countries; and the central role of civil society as a catalyst in building amicable relations with former enemy countries. After reunification, Germany was more active in its public diplomacy than ever in an attempt to dispel fears of a renewed threat from an enlarged Germany.

Of course, the road from enmity to amity was not always smooth. There were frequent instances of protest and resistance from within Germany. Feldman said this showed the need for a political and social leadership that could push through public diplomacy with “vision and courage.” As an example of courageous leadership, she mentioned Konrad Adenauer, who entered reparation negotiations with Israel in 1951, in spite of considerable resistance to the idea within Germany.

Important Points for Japanese Public Diplomacy

Next to speak was Watanabe Yasushi, a Keiō University professor whose publications include a book about culture and diplomacy. His remarks about points to bear in mind when thinking about public diplomacy were based on his experiences as a member of a committee of experts formed to discuss Japan’s PR and cultural diplomacy after the earthquake and tsunami disaster of March 2011. (Read some of his thoughts on public diplomacy in this article.)

First, he said, it was important not to rise to provocations. Although a rebuttal may sometimes be necessary, overreacting often ends up damaging the national interest. Public diplomacy should aim above all to build a basis for developing mutual understanding and closeness. Only once this foundation is in place can policy and publicity function. At the moment too much attention is given to these aspects before an adequate foundation has been put in place. This means that important aspects of public diplomacy like learned dialogue and cultural exchange are often neglected.

He also pointed out that a government cannot control the national image. For this reason, the government should not be the single player in any public diplomacy efforts. In the case of the hate speech that is an increasing problem in Japan at the moment, for example, images of what is happening will spread via YouTube and similar media regardless of how Prime Minister Abe Shinzō criticizes them.

He stressed that it was important not to think of the national and international as two mutually opposed categories. In public diplomacy, the objective should not be to “compete” with other countries, he said, calling for a mechanism to transform competition into collaboration. Particularly in the case of Northeast Asia, he said, where Japan’s relations with neighboring countries continue to be tense, it is vital to move away from zero-sum thinking and seek a positive-sum, win-win type of public diplomacy.

Civil Society in Japan: Still on a Learning Curve

The discussion was followed by comments from Kent Calder and Andrew Horvat, who acted as moderator. Calder spoke about the European Community mentioned by Feldman in her remarks. Although the EC had grown out of specific circumstances unique to Europe, he said, Japan could do more to consider the potential of a similar multinational organization in East Asia. Such a framework might go some way toward resolving the paralysis in bilateral relations through more multilateral exchanges, noted Calder.

Horvat suggested that Japanese civil society still lacked sufficient cohesiveness to provide effective help in pursuing public diplomacy. Watanabe responded by saying that since the Meiji Restoration there has been a deep-rooted feeling in Japan that diplomacy and foreign policy were the proper business of the government. There is also the fact that the government does not completely trust civil society. In the reviews of government spending carried out under the Democratic Party of Japan government a few years ago, many projects relating to sister cities projects and international exchange programs had their budgets drastically cut. This was largely because politicians tend to demand short-term results, he said.

At present, he said, civil society in Japan was still at the “learning stage” in terms of dealing with policy, but the reality was that the basic capacity was already in place. The need now was to think about how to channel that energy effectively into public diplomacy, he said.

Sister Cities and Educational Exchanges: Room for Improvement

During the discussion that followed, all the panelists emphasized the importance of close cooperation through twin cities schemes, something touched upon by Kent Calder in his keynote presentation. It was suggested that by twinning cities not just between Japan and the United States but also across the Sea of Japan with Korea, China, and Southeast Asia would be an effective way to bring new vitality to exchanges on a regional level, without becoming tangled up in the historical problems that tend to complicate bilateral relations. Calder said he believed this would be a useful contribution to improving international relations in Northeast Asia.

Finally, Horvat spoke about an educational exchange program that has been running in Kyoto since 1989, which he suggested was a good example of a Japanese public diplomacy success. Many Japanese universities could do more, he said, to encourage applications from students from underprivileged backgrounds in countries like China and South Korea.

Photo by Itabashi Yūichi

Belgrade tonight: Kalemegdan

Although the temperature measured tonight in Belgrade was -1 degree Celsius, according to the thermometer located in Knez Mihajlova Street, the center of the city was full of people.

 

Our team took a walk to the Kalemegdan fortress, which, unlike Knez Mihajlova Street, was not full of people, but mostly couples in love.

What it was like tonight at Kalemegdan, you can see in the gallery below.

The Daily: Accidental Cultural Exports

Our round-up of news, notes, tips, and Tweets exhibiting how public diplomacy affects the world each and every day.

Ambassador Victor H. Ashe posted his four proposals for reforming the BBG.

As a former three year Board member, I fully agree with Secretary Clinton’s criticisms. The BBG suffers from a lack of focus, insufficient accountability and management, poor morale and a complete lack of presence on both Capitol Hill and among policymakers such that it is often – except when a problem arises – the forgotten stepchild of American foreign policy. But as often as not, while Secretary Clinton was free with her criticisms she was remarkably silent when it came to offering solutions and never attended a Board meeting. This was surprisingly unfortunate given that, by law, the Secretary is a voting member of the Board. So while she would have been free to attend all meetings of BGG as well as the Boards of RFE, RFA and MBN and thus would have been in an ideal position to impose order and reform to the organization, Secretary Clinton, like all of her predecessors, never did. She sent the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy which office has been vacant one third of the time since its creation. It is vacant even today on January 27, 2014. [Ambassadors Perspectives]

 

Compelling historical narrative and public diplomacy lesson of how public speaking is more about the listeners than the speaker.

Where the two countries’ diplomats organizing this event get things wrong? Basically, neither the Ministers’ respective offices nor their Embassies in Sarajevo had devised a formula to make sure the event would work as an event. I suspect that most of the clever effort before their visit had been devoted to crafting the words of the speech, ignoring the fact that what makes a speech successful is (of course) the words themselves but also the way in which they are delivered to the audience. Thus an audience that (perhaps for good practical reasons) is standing up needs a short, punchy speech; an audience sitting down is more comfortable and can cope with something longer and more thoughtful. [Diplomatic Courier]

 

 

 

Why was so Kosovo so successful in its digital diplomacy efforts for recognition in 2013? It outsourced to its people.

Rather than utilize social media as a series of platforms for politicians to expound upon, Selimi and his digital diplomacy team enlisted their community to spread the word of the country’s personality, accomplishments and promise. “We don’t try to keep it inside and promote our political agenda using the internet,” he said. “That’s fishy. People don’t like that. Maybe people don’t like you as a member of a certain political party, but they want to get engaged. So we outsourced everything. We gave civil society a role.” [BIDD]

 

The Obama Administration has utilized economic statecraft as a way of building its relationship with Indonesia.

The Obama administration understands Indonesia’s potential as a strategic stakeholder with significant political and economic clout in an area of increasing geostrategic importance. Its economy averaged a GDP of $878.2 billion and a growth rate of 6.2% in 2012 (World Bank). The democratic government transition in 1998 advanced economic growth, lowered trade barriers, and advanced foreign investment opportunities. Since 2004, President Yudhoyono has consistently worked towards implementing economic reforms to eradicate corruption, diminish nepotism, and remove bureaucratic hurdles. Indonesia has joined the club of Southeast Asia’s rising “tiger economies” alongside Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Indonesia now constitutes an economic steam engine in the Asia-Pacific and should be regarded as a centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy in its proclaimed pivot towards Asia. [CPD Blog]

 

 

Interesting wording in this article pointing to an economic diplomacy focus for Iran in the coming year.

A propaganda campaign launched against Iran managed to restrict the country’s “maneuverability” in its foreign policy and international relations for a short period of time, said Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Morteza Sarmadi on Sunday. However, he said, the new Iranian administration opted to crush the anti-Iran campaign and not allow a tarnished image of the Islamic Republic to be used to serve hegemonic powers’ interests, the official underlined. Sarmadi also underscored the importance of economic diplomacy in Iran’s foreign policy and pointed out that Iranian embassies are seriously tasked with expanding economic ties with other countries in order to “make optimum use of economic opportunities” to boost national development, reduce the costs related to progress and development, and procure basic goods as well as the technology and machinery required for production in the country. [Press TV]

 

Speaking of economic diplomacy (a new year theme, it seems), Sri Lanka is going the same route.

Economic diplomacy was at the forefront of Sri Lanka’s foreign relations and the country’s envoys across the world had been given explicit instructions to accord the highest priority to developing trade, investment and tourism, External Affairs Minister Prof. G. L. Peiris said in Colombo recently. He was speaking as Chief Guest at the Diplomats’ Evening, organised by the Chamber of Young Lankan Entrepreneurs (COYLE), for the third consecutive year at Colombo Hilton. [The Island]

 

Nancy Snow is proud of Caroline Kennedy’s controversial tweet that some criticized as a public diplomacy misstep.

This cultural context may help explain why Kennedy’s tweet caused such a furor among some Japanese. All was well as long as Kennedy tried out calligraphy, high-fived school children, and practiced some Japanese vocabulary. Celebrating Japan for being Japanese is great when you enthuse over sushi and soba, but tweeting an officialese comment on the Taiji hunt? Well now, lady, that’s going too far for some. One reporter asked me if the dolphin tweet were a “rookie mistake” for the U.S. Ambassador to Japan who has held her post just a few months. No. A rookie mistake is throwing to the wrong receiver or sliding too early. [Huffington Post]

 

 

China and India talk up how culinary diplomacy is improving relations along their shared border.

As part of the bilateral, cultural exchanges between the two neighbours, there should be more cuisine ties between India and China, Chinese Consul General Wang Xuefeng said today. The Tagore enthusiast, who informs a cultural troupe from his country will perform at the ‘Spring Festival here, few months from now,” is all for “Your Macher jhol (fish curry) and posto” invading his country and aid in culinary diplomacy. [Business Standard]

 

Here is a quick summation of Grand Challenges Canada, a science diplomacy program sponsored by the Canadian government.

Grand Challenges Canada, which is funded by the Government of Canada, supports bold ideas with big impact in global health. Our core objective is to solve critical health challenges in low- and middle-income countries. What we have found is that engaging with other countries through science diplomacy has great potential to enhance this core objective. Bold ideas for saving and improving lives can be found everywhere, and by collaborating with governments in low- and middle-income countries we can stimulate those local ideas and increase their chances for success. [Grand Challenges Canada]

 

 

photo credit: Cho Woohae / New York Times

 

2014 Will Be a Tumultuous Year for Sports Diplomacy

2014 promises two gigantic venues for sports diplomacy. Will it be a landmark year for the field, or a tragic one?

The 2014 Winter Olympic games begin in a little less than a month at the time of writing this article. They will be located in Sochi, Russia, which is a tiny Russian resort town on the Black Sea. Also this year, the 2014 World Cup kicks off this June. It will take place across Brazil in a multitude of cities across the country. Both of these events are significant because they are two of the largest (if not the largest) worldwide sport events. People from Albania to Zimbabwe will tune in to watch and cheer for their country. Both of these events are also embroiled in controversy.

Sochi is controversial because the Russian government is passing anti-LGBT laws and discriminating against the Russian LGBT community. At the same time, multiple teams coming to the Olympics either support LGBT rights or have LGBT athletes on the team. Brazil, on the other hand, is controversial for economic reasons. Brazil won the bid for the World Cup and has invested billions of dollars into building stadiums, increasing infrastructure and facilitating future tourism. All the while, the Brazilian economy has stagnated. It is no surprise that the Brazilian people are increasingly anxious about how the government is investing so much money into the World Cup when it would be better served to help the people of Brazil find relief and jobs.

These events are raising the international awareness of sports diplomacy, the use of sports, athletes, or sporting events to communicate or to help build relationships in situations where politics would be considered too controversial. For example, North Korea and South Korea play international friendly soccer matches against each other. They even mix up the rosters so that there are North Korean and South Korean players on each team. This allows for spectators to cheer for players of both Koreas, hopefully building personal bonds in the process. Sports diplomacy is not always handshakes and backslaps though; there are also negative consequences to using sports as a vehicle for communication.

Sports events take place in real time. That means the ability to censor and properly frame messages are limited. If a terrorist organization, for example, hacked the television feed or planted a bomb at a sporting event, the holders of that event are almost powerless to stop a highly publicized disaster from happening. Then, of course, there are the participants themselves: if an athlete celebrates with an obscene or offensive gesture, event planners are more-or-less helpless from preventing that sort of message of hate from filtering out into the world. You can add to that the reframing potential of messages. What may be a symbol or message of peace in one country can be misconstrued as racist or hateful in another. Clear, consistent and dependable messaging is a risky proposition at sports events. That has high implications for sports diplomacy.

Tangential to this concern is the risk for the organization hosting the event as well as those participating. Take for example incidents involving anti-Semitic gestures made by soccer players after scoring a goal. (This has happened twice in the last year.) When this happens, the player making the gesture is rightfully condemned by the press and public. It does not stop there though. Often, the team that employees the player as well as the overarching organization hosting the game receives part of the blame. The implications of a similar incident happening during a sports diplomacy event, when eyeballs from specific and often conflicting audiences are closely watching, are obviously huge.

Sporting events are also supposed to be apolitical. Even if an event is placed in the context of sports diplomacy, for much of the audience, it is just sport. This is evident in the fact that it is so hard to measure the effectiveness of sports diplomacy to any degree of accuracy, unless it is aimed at a specific and focused communication breakthrough. At the same time, using sports diplomacy can have a negative backlash. The war between El Salvador and Honduras in 1969, dubbed the “football war” nonetheless, was a sparked by a soccer game. Tensions were already high at the time, and the sports diplomacy aimed at diffusing the situation backfired.

These negative aspects of sports diplomacy are subjective though. Take censorship. If an athlete wants to support LGBT rights at the Sochi Olympics, it would be very easy to make a gesture during a real-time broadcast. The Russian government or the Olympic Committee would have a tough time censoring the gesture before it is broadcast throughout the world.

In addition, sports diplomacy can provide a global audience to an issue that may not be well known. Minorities, the oppressed, and the downtrodden can create an environment with a global audience they can speak to directly. This is obviously positive. It allows for groups who do not typically get put into the limelight of international news to get exposure and, hopefully, international support.

Then there is the politics problems. Sports, as I mentioned earlier, is supposed to be apolitical. Sports diplomacy, though, is in its essence political. Yet, if there is any environment that can take a political topic and subdue those tensions just enough to bring two parties together, it’s sports. The athletes and coaches at the center of the event are not government-controlled. The audience does not have to tune in for political reasons either. Yet, sports diplomacy allows a government to direct two disparate audiences to the same focus point. That can be a powerful tool.

Finally, sports diplomacy events can be a coming out party to the world. Nelson Mandela used South Africa’s win at the Rugby World Cup; China used the 2008 Olympics; and Brazil will most definitely try to leverage the 2014 World Cup. There are multiple examples of people using sports diplomacy to announce themselves as a global power to the world. It gives countries a massive platform to really show what the country has to offer in the way of culture, infrastructure, business, and tourism.

2014 is going to a hell of a year for sports diplomacy. It is going to be fun to watch.

 

photo credit: REUTERS/Alexander Demianchuk

The Daily: The Kennedy Tweets

 

Our round-up of news, notes, tips, and Tweets exhibiting how public diplomacy affects the world each and every day.

Dear gastrodiplomacy addicts, you’re welcome.

As part of a promotion for the Sydney International Food Festival, the advertising agency WHYBINTBWA designed 18 national flags using foods each country is commonly associated with and that would also match the colors of the flag. [Marvelous]

 

Caroline Kennedy may look the role of a traditional ambassador, but public diplomacy issues (both pursued and thrust upon her) have greatly affected her short time in office.

The comment, coming soon after her embassy issued a rare criticism of the prime minister for visiting a controversial war shrine, indicated that the often reserved Ms. Kennedy might be more of an outspoken envoy than many expected, willing to take on subjects the Japanese prefer to discuss behind closed doors. And she is doing so using a social medium that allows for little of the nuance that shapes formal Japanese diplomatic communication; Ms. Kennedy is an active Twitter user, posting in English and Japanese for her more than 75,000 followers. [New York Times]

 

 

Speaking of ambassadors, Gary Locke’s accomplishments as U.S. ambassador to China would make any public diplomat proud.

In a recent interview, he pointed to the waiting period for interviews for Chinese applying for U.S. visas: less than five days on average, down from as high as 100 days a few years ago. He noted that in the past two years, more Chinese investment has poured into the United States than in the previous 11 years combined. His theory as ambassador, Locke said, is that by focusing on the details — such as the visa process — you can move the needle on much bigger goals, like exposing more Chinese visitors to American-style democracy and values. “It’s not just the numbers, but what those numbers represent,” he said. [Washington Post]

 

 

Estonia has gone all in on a digital government, and now they are sharing the lessons learned with other countries.

What makes this tiny country interesting in terms of governance is not just that the people can elect their parliament online or get tax overpayments back within two days of filing their returns. It is also that this level of service for citizens is not the result of the government building a few websites. Instead, Estonians started by redesigning their entire information infrastructure from the ground up with openness, privacy, security, and ‘future-proofing’ in mind. [The Atlantic]

 

 

The Institute for Cultural Diplomacy posted an interesting list of cultural diplomacy initiatives that have fostered sustainable economic development and growth in Africa over the last 20 years.

The United Nations post-2015 Development Agenda underlines the need to transform economies for jobs and inclusive growth. Innovation, human creativity, and technology have the potential to improve the state of national economies and to ensure a long-term sustainable economic development. Most of all, innovative non-resource-based activities encourage economic and social inclusion of youth and women by providing them with equal opportunities to take an active part in economic activities. In addition to that, a non-traditional approach towards economy fosters sustainable consumption that builds a long-lasting bridge between the needs of the present and the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. [Institute for Cultural Diplomacy]

 

“Soft power” used four times in this short article about the diplomatic relationship between China and France.  Perhaps a bit of revisionism as well.

Jan 27 marks the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of France. Being the first between China and a Western power, China-France ties have developed beyond ordinary bilateral ties. The two countries’ soft power and interactions have played a key role in the development of this bilateral ties. Both have rich cultural histories and made huge contributions to political thought, literature, art and technology. [Xinhua]

 

 

Michael Barr, a lecturer from Newcastle University, says the key to China leveraging its soft power is coming to terms with the modern Chinese identity.

China needs to understand more about its own identity and values in order to develop effective soft power abroad, says Michael Barr, lecturer in international politics at Newcastle University, England. Barr, who wrote the 2011 book Who’s Afraid of China? The Challenges of Chinese Soft Power, says a key challenge to Chinese soft power lies in the discrepancy between the traditional Chinese values it promotes and modern values emerging from its society. “Because the Chinese identity is changing, China is having a hard time deciding what is the positive contribution of Chinese soft power,” Barr says. [China Daily Africa]

 

 

Interesting polling conducted to gauge the perceptions of Turkish citizens.

TESEV a Turkish think tank have been doing polls  on The Perception of Turkey in the Middle East for the past 5 years and I’ve just come across their latest version.  The fieldwork was conducted in August and December last year and covers 14 countries across the Middle East and North Africa.  Although there are lots of questions about Turkey the poll covers other regional issues. Lots if interesting stuff here including data on media use but a few highlights. [Public Diplomacy, Networks and Influence]

 

 

Brief, general overview of cultural diplomacy in Burkina Faso.

An opportunity and agreement for Burkina Faso to export local products that were pleasing also materialised from the pre-festival talks. This illustrates the effectiveness of dialague, exchanging of ideas and willingness to open up cultures for stakeholders beyond the country and the continent. Furthermore, Burkinabe artists are to be invited to Germany by the cultural promoters of this country through hoteliers, airlines and restaurants as there are expectations that Burkina Faso that will host a larger FESTICO event next year in 2015. The German delegation impressed by the Burkinabe promised to return with more men and women next year according to the Burkina Faso in Switzerland. [Ecowas Tribune]

 

 

 

photo credit: WHYBINTBWA

 

Are phones still phones? [Guest blog]

A twenty-first-century behavioural culture shock often experienced is that of the difference in screening phone calls as opposed to picking up the phone, regardless of the setting.  I am used to playing ‘phone tag’: exchanging voice messages until I am able to reach the other person.  In my travels overseas, however, I have been in countless instances where we could be engaged in deep discussions during a meeting and my counterpart would momentarily excuse themselves to answer their phone, even if only to inform the caller that they were in an important meeting and would call back later.

Either approach has its respective advantages, particularly in terms of a work function.  While it can be unpleasing to be repeatedly interrupted during meetings, at the same time there is an appreciation for receiving someone’s phone call regardless of the setting, implicitly assuring them of their importance.

This difference comes up often in the business context, with situations similar to what a Canadian company, Metro Guide Publishing, was experiencing with their sales staff; they were sending emails to clients with their pitches rather than calling them on the phone (the employees all happened to be under the age of 35).  Other entrepreneurs lament their relatively younger HR staff’s preference for email interviews with potential hires, which has not yielded favourable results.

These experiences contrast with other companies who find phone calls are disruptive and burdensome and prefer to use emails, text messages, or social media as their primary forms of communication.  It is difficult not to notice that my conversations, be they in person or on the phone, are increasingly concluding with ‘just text me’.  With the advent and exponential popularity of social media, an increasing amount of socialising is being done through machines, particularly mobile handsets.  This begs the question whether the term ‘cell (mobile) phone’ – or even ‘phone’ – is now obsolete.

A 2011 Pew Research Centre study found that a clear majority of American adults own a cell phone and use it for text messages, particularly in the case of younger users.  According to the CTIA, wireless data traffic in the United States almost doubled to 1.468 trillion megabytes in a span of twelve months in 2012, whereas the annual minutes of use nudged slightly to 2.30 trillion during that period.  The Cisco VNI Global Mobile Data Traffic Forecast Update reported significant increases in mobile data traffic in Korea, China, Japan, Australia, and Italy in 2012, as well as globally, with mobile data traffic on our planet being almost twelve times the size of the entire global Internet in 2000.  With this trend expected to continue, global media traffic should be about 75 exabytes annually by 2015.

Social media and mobile technology are excellent tools for diplomats to advance their capacity of networking and maintaining relationships and should be used as such.  However, speaking on the phone continues to retain its own value as well, whether in developing relationships, facilitating commercial deals, or gathering intelligence.  Of course, nothing trumps a face-to-face meeting, especially while sharing some delicious edibles; it may be traditional, but as the adage goes, if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.

 

[This is a guest blog by Dr Shujaat Wasty, a Senior Learning Advisor with the Canadian Foreign Service Institute at the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada.}

 

The Khobragade Fiasco and the State of Diplomatic Immunity

The Khobragade incident has brought to the fore once again the larger issue of diplomatic immunity. The India-U.S. spat arose essentially out of differing interpretations of ‘diplomatic immunity’. The concept of diplomatic immunity is enshrined in the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic Immunity of 1961 and on Consular Relations of 1963 though it has a history going far beyond the 20th century. It is now considered part of customary law. The concept is essentially meant to enable diplomats to do their jobs, protect their rights and defend themselves from hostile actions or pressure from the host country. In addition to the conventions, diplomatic immunity and privileges today are based on the principle of reciprocity. For instance, Russia and the U.S. have given blanket diplomatic immunity for all their diplomatic and consular staff. Some countries have bilateral arrangements with other countries according to which their diplomats enjoy visa-free travel in each other’s countries.

However, countries and diplomats have often misused diplomatic and consular immunity to escape local laws. For instance, the U.S. attempted to invoke diplomatic immunity for Raymond Davis after he killed two Pakistani men, even though he was only a contractor for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Similarly, countries often do not respect diplomatic immunity. A recent example is that of India, which refused to let the Italian Ambassador leave the country until the two Italian marines accused of killing Indian fishermen returned to India to face trial. The U.S. has therefore been found to have misused the diplomatic immunity clause on a number of occasions. There is a feeling in many countries that while the U.S. refuses to honour diplomatic immunity for foreign government officials when they allegedly breach local laws, it expects other countries to give its diplomats (as well as non-diplomats) diplomatic immunity when they are caught in a similar situation in other countries.

The latest is the Devyani Khobragade incident, where the manner in which the U.S. treated the Indian official was clearly in breach of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR) of 1963. Article 41 of the Convention says, “Consular officers shall not be liable to arrest or detention pending trial, except in the case of a grave crime and pursuant to a decision by the competent judicial authority.” However, it adds that if at all “criminal proceedings are instituted against a consular officer…the proceedings shall be conducted with the respect due to him by reason of his official position”.  The U.S. position has been that as a Consular staff, Khobragade enjoyed immunity from prosecution for acts performed in the exercise of consular functions but did not have full diplomatic immunity. This was challenged by India, which claimed that she had full diplomatic immunity. The issue was finally resolved with India transferring the official to its UN mission and claiming full diplomatic immunity, to which the U.S. agreed after a few days.

In the meantime, India had revoked several unilateral privileges to American diplomats and consular staff. For instance, it has issued new identity card to U.S. consular staff which does not accord them protection against prosecution for serious crimes. It revoked several unilateral diplomatic immunities granted to U.S. diplomats and consular staff, removed security barriers around the U.S. Embassy and brought in new restrictions for the functioning of the American Center, among other things. All of these actions still fall within the ambit of reciprocity since the U.S. does not grant these privileges to the Indian Embassy or consulates in the U.S.

Having resolved the diplomatic spat, India and the U.S. are currently negotiating the issue of diplomatic immunity. But it is unlikely that India will reinstate the privileges that it has taken away from the American diplomats unless the same privileges are provided to the Indian diplomats and consular staff in the U.S. So, the state of diplomatic immunity between the two countries is likely to remain the same. However, this might be a good time for revisiting the Vienna Convention of 1963 and giving the same immunity and privileges to consular staff as diplomats. This is necessary because the nature and scope of consular functions has significantly changed and widened over the last couple of decades; in fact, these days consular staff often perform the duties of diplomatic staff. The Consul General today acts as a mini-ambassador in the area under his/her consular jurisdiction. He/she is in constant touch with political leaders like governors, congressmen, etc in his/her jurisdiction and has to play a huge role in attracting investments and promoting trade with his/her country. This is a far cry from earlier times, when consular duties only involved issuing passports, visas and looking after their citizens in their juridical territory.

At the same time, diplomats and consular staff must also follow local laws and not flout them just because they have immunity. After all, for the representative of his/her country, following the host country’s laws is the first step towards gaining respect for one’s own country in the host country. In the unlikely event (after all most diplomatic and consular staff are law abiding) of a diplomat or consular official flouting local laws, they must be accorded diplomatic and consular immunity. Their own country can take action against them, but not the host country. At the most, if it is a serious enough crime, the host country can ask for the offending diplomat to be withdrawn.

The whole unseemly incident is a case of mismanagement by both the U.S. (which acted in unseemly haste) and India (which acted slowly, not realising the power of the humanitarian lobbies in the U.S.). On a more optimistic note, the episode should prompt the U.S. to treat India as an equal partner. One must keep in mind that, while the diplomatic row between the U.S. and India was occurring, much of the international community was quietly cheering on India for standing up for a principle over which the U.S. has ridden roughshod many times in many countries. The issue is also reflective of the fact that while the India-U.S. relationship has been pushed forward by the Indian and American political leaders, the bureaucracies on both sides are yet to fully shake off their Cold War era misgivings about each other despite the 30 plus annual dialogues that the two sides engage in. And that is an unfortunate fact about a relationship that will be crucial in shaping the Asian, and also the global order, in the years to come.

[Today in PD] China’s Stadium Diplomacy In Africa

Mozambique’s new national stadium, Estádio Nacional do Zimpeto, is on the outskirts of Maputo, not far from the Chinese-built international airport. The Chinese have also overseen the construction of the new parliament building and a new “Palace of Justice” in the last few years. The main institutions through which a sense of Mozambican national life is constructed—the laws of the nation, international departures and arrivals, and its most spectacular public moments of heroism—now take place in Chinese-built structures.

If you want to see the heart of China’s soft-power push into Africa, you’ll find it in the continent’s new soccer stadia.

China completed its first stadium construction project in Africa in 1970 with the opening of the 15,000-seater Amaan stadium in Zanzibar, Tanzania. That modest structure marked the start of four decades of so-called “stadium diplomacy” by China across Africa, the Caribbean, Asia and the South Pacific. Today there are few countries in Africa that don’t have stadiums built by the Chinese government as gifts or with concessionary loans. There was a noticeable acceleration in construction in the late 1980s and early 1990s, as Senegal, Mauritania, Mauritius, Kenya, Rwanda, Niger, Djibouti and the Democratic Republic of Congo (then Zaire) all got shiny new stadiums. But the real boom has come in the last ten years. Three recent host nations of the African Cup of Nations—Angola, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea—have had all their tournament stadiums built for the purpose by China. All three happen to be nations with significant off-shore oil reserves ruled by autocrats and small elites structured around a ruling family. But countries with more modest natural resources and more democratic structures of government—Ghana, Tanzania, Zambia and Malawi for example—have also found room for new Chinese-built stadia within the last decade, as part of China’s much-documented program of economic expansion.

In return for stadia, China gains an entrée into the highest circles of government.

The impact of this most concrete form of soft diplomacy is difficult to assess in terms of hard cash. But there’s little doubt about how it’s supposed to work. For relatively small outlays—usually well short of $100 million—China constructs a sterile national arena that can be opened with long speeches and presidents in tailored suits kicking balls for the cameras, in return for sweetened access to natural resources, votes at the United Nations and the marginalization of Taiwan. Domestic politicians point to highly visible new infrastructure as evidence of their success as managers of the national development agenda; China and Chinese businesses gain, at the very least, an entrée into the highest circles of government.

All of this is officially carried out in the name of friendship, of course—there’s one Stade de l’Amitié, in Libreville, Gabon, and another Stade de l’Amitié in Cotonou, Benin. Fortunately, the pious fraternal rhetoric attached to the openings of these stadiums has on occasion been punctured by moments of mutual cultural befuddlement. In 2007, for example, it was gleefully reported that at the opening of the new cricket ground in Grenada in the Caribbean, the Chinese ambassador Qian Hongshan and assorted dignitaries displayed visible discomfort as they sat through the Royal Grenada Police Band’s stately rendition of the national anthem of the Republic of China—a country more commonly known as Taiwan. The bandmaster took the rap. “This unfortunate error breaks my heart,” said the Grenadian Prime Minister.

 

Stade de l’Amitié Sino-Gabonaise, in Libreville, Gabon

By 2010, over 50 stadia had been built with Chinese government support across the continent, and despite the always-repeated insistence that another new stadium is “needed” we are now approaching stadium saturation point. If there was a Millennium Development Goal for stadia per capita, Jeffrey Sachs would probably turn up one morning at one of his Millennium Villages and find that the Shanghai Construction Group had knocked up a 55,000-seater next to one of his newly dug wells, christened it Le Stade de la Fraternité, and carted off all the hardwood trees from the forest.

If the “agenda” of stadium diplomacy has been concealed, it hasn’t really been hidden very far from view. Yet all the focus has been on the not-especially-mysterious question of what it is that China expects in exchange for all these stadia, rather than on what this addition to virtually every African capital city means culturally and historically, let alone whether or not they’re actually enjoyable places to watch a soccer match.

On the plaque: “The friendship between China and Mozambique will last forever like the heavens and the earth.”

It took three separate minibus rides from downtown Maputo to reach Zimpeto. I had arrived from Scotland the previous day and was finding Mozambican Portuguese tough going, but this was match-day, with Mozambique hosting neighbors Tanzania, and it was easy enough to find my way by following the crowds of people in bright red shirts and scarves wrapped around their heads, and the constant parping of vuvuzelas. Inside a vast paved complex ringed with a chain-link fence, a huge grey concrete bowl rose up. When I first saw the new home of Os Mambas, I thought those aliens from District 9 must have finally got their spaceship working and parked it in Maputo. Inside stood a suitably intergalactic prophecy, in Mandarin and Portuguese, written in red letters: “Amizade entre a China e Mozambique irá prevalecer como o céu e a terra.” Translation: the friendship between China and Mozambique will last forever like the heavens and the earth.

With five minutes to go until kick-off, there was virtually nobody inside the stadium complex. Outside the perimeter fence, the crowd thronged through bars and shebeens, in and out of minibuses, picking up cold beers from sellers carrying coolers along the roadside and others in leather jackets flogging knock-off Mambas merchandise. From the street, Zimpeto and its arid concrete approach had the feel of a mausoleum.

The atmosphere in Zimpeto was so subdued, drowned by the vastness of the place

Once inside, the Mambas fans sat stiffly together high up in one huge uncovered stand of plastic seating. It was a significant match, with Mozambique’s hopes of making it to the 2013 African Nations Cup resting on the result, but the stands at either end of the pitch were completely empty. In the town center, I’d seen motorists screaming their devotion to their team out of car windows, pounding their horns at one another and piling fellow supporters into their backseats. The atmosphere in Zimpeto was so subdued, drowned by the vastness of the place, that I could hear the players calling out at each other down on the field. A huge athletics track circled the pitch, and far off in the distance, in the covered stand for VIPs and the away supporters, we could see a small cluster of Tanzanian fans clad in blue whose cheers reached our ears once or twice, muffled by the great gulf of empty space between us. The Mambas drew 1-1, but eventually won the tie after a very tense penalty shoot-out. The celebrations in the stadium were noisy but brief, as jubilant fans dashed back out into the street where the real party had already started.

A couple of weeks after the game I met up with Tico-Tico, Mozambique’s record goalscorer, recently retired. He told me that while he hoped the team would win the next round and make it to the African Nations Cup to be held in neighboring South Africa, he feared such success might give the false impression that the game in Mozambique was being well-run at the national level. Likewise, the new stadium gave a misleading picture of an ambitious and competent national association, when in fact the Mozambican governing body was in need of radical restructuring and reform if the country was to make the most of its footballing talent. A couple of months later, Mozambique traveled to Marrakech and were soundly beaten 4-0 by Morocco.

 

Eusébio da Silva Ferreira, Mozambican soccer legend who died this month, played at many of the great pre-Chinese stadia of Africa. Photo by Alface.

By and large, the venues that were replaced as national stadiums during the great wave of stadium diplomacy were those that had been built or repurposed after decolonization in the 1960s. Many of these had hosted national independence celebrations. And there was legendary soccer that took place in them. The original Estádio Salazar (renamed Estádio da Machava after independence from Portugal in 1975) had been inaugurated in 1968 with a friendly match between Portugal and Brazil. Portugal was captained by a black player from Maputo—Mario Coluna. The Brazilian side included Carlos Alberto and Tostão. The great generation of Mozambican footballers of which Coluna was a leading light—Eusébio, Matateu, Vicente Lucas, Hilário da Conceição and Alberto da Costa Pereira were others—never played for the Mozambican national team (it couldn’t exist under colonialism and so instead they forged Portugal’s greatest ever team) but at least some of them played right in front of their countrymen at Machava that day in 1968.

Sad that I had come to Maputo too late to see the Mambas play at Machava, I wrote a friend shortly after the Tanzania match who had been to a World Cup qualifier there some years previously. I’d heard a rumor, incorrect as it turned out, that the old stadium was to be demolished. “I’m not sure that Machava can actually be ‘torn down’,” wrote my friend, “since it was just a hole in the ground to begin with. Perhaps it can be filled in.”

The replacement of venues whose crumbling terraces are layered thick with national history by soulless flat-pack “friendship” stadiums is not unique to Mozambique. In the 1960s, Lusaka got Independence Stadium. Nowadays, Zambia’s Chipolopolo (copper bullets) play their games at the new Levy Mwanawasa Stadium, which looks an awful lot like Zimpeto and happens to have been built in Ndola, an industrial town close to many of the country’s most important mines.

From this year, Malawi’s national team, the Flames, will play home matches in Lilongwe, a gridded city of embassies and fenced-off NGO headquarters, rather than the commercial capital Blantyre, where the national team has always played since Malawi’s independence.

Nowadays, nobody would design a sports venue that looked remotely like Kamuzu stadium.

Lilongwe’s Kamuzu Stadium was named after Kamuzu Banda, the eccentric Chicago-educated family doctor who ruled Malawi as a one party state for thirty years. The Rangeley Stadium constructed in the 1950’s took its name from a British colonial administrator. For a few brief years following independence in 1964 it was known as the National Stadium, before Banda purged all political opposition and set about transforming the country into his personal fiefdom: major highways, hospitals, schools and of course the national stadium were all named after him. After Kamuzu was voted out and multiparty democracy installed in 1994, the new president Bakili Muluzi renamed everything that had borne Kamuzu’s name as a way of exorcizing the decades-long cult of personality that had set in. But Muluzi himself liked having institutions named after him, and soon the re-christened Chichiri Stadium was the home ground of the Bakili Bullets. When Muluzi was replaced by Bingu wa Mutharika, who liked to style himself as a kind of second Kamuzu, the venue was renamed Kamuzu Stadium after the self-professed “lion of the nation” and the Bakili Bullets became the Big Bullets.

The old stadium is formed by a low grandstand and six gently sloping massive concrete slabs with large steps cut into them, and it holds anything from 50,000 to 100,000 people, despite having one end where there is no kind of structure at all, just a large rusty billboard and a few trees. There are no seats, except in a small VIP section stacked with pricey-looking chairs and sofas that index the relative potency of the backsides sitting on them by the quality of their upholstery. Nowadays, nobody would design a sports venue that looked remotely like Kamuzu stadium.

Канцеларија за јавну и културну дипломатију