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Autor knjige „Spin diktatori”: U mnogim zemljama spin diktatori se vraćaju nasilnoj represiji

Lideri u drugim zemljama su usvojili tehnike spin diktature, manipulišući medijima iza kulisa, zauzimajući sudove i marginalizujući opoziciju, sve dok čuvaju demokratsku fasadu. „Spin diktatura je privlačan model vlasti za lidere koji žele da konsoliduju svoju moć kao autoritarne vođe, ali da zadrže modernu ekonomiju i međunarodni ugled. Spin diktatori žele da ih svi vide kao kompetentne, efikasne i dobronamerne javni službenike, ali im je u redu ako se mali deo nezadovoljnih intelektualaca ne slaže sa tim, sve dok nisu promovisani u masovnim medijima. Krize koje podstiču građane da se okupe iza svog lidera su korisne u svim sistemima. I spin diktatori često ih iskorišćavaju – ili stvaraju”. Ovo su neke od odlika modernih dikatatura opisanih u knjizi „Spin diktatori” koja je nedavno objavljena i na srpskom jeziku u izdanju izdavačke kuće „Arhipelag”. Danijel Trajsman, jedan od autora knjige, u razgovoru za Istinomer objašnjava u kojim i kakvim društvima postaju i opstaju spin diktatori, u čemu se razlikuju od „tradicionalnih autokrata”, ali i koliko je tanka linija između spin i teror diktatura.
Danijel Trajsman, jedan od autora knjige "Spin diktatori"Danijel Trajsman, jedan od autora knjige “Spin diktatori”, Foto: Stefani Diani

Nakon prvog izdanja knjige „Spin diktatori” globalna politika je doživela velike promene. Pre svega, svedoci smo rata u Ukrajini koji je započeo jedan od spin diktatora opisanih u vašoj knjizi. Sa početkom rata, Putin se vratio na „tradicionalnu” diktaturu straha. Slično tome, lideri Venecuele i Turske, takođe su „skliznuli” u teror represije. U isto vreme, čini se da se recept za uspešnu spin diktaturu proširio, pa se povećava broj lidera koji svoju moć genererišu uz pomoć spina i manipulacija. Da li i dalje verujete da diktatori vide budućnost svoje vladavine u spin diktaturi ili je verovatnije da ćemo doživeti masovniji regres ka teroru straha na globalnom nivou?

Da, videli smo da se spin diktatori vraćaju na nasilnu represiju u mnogim zemaljama – Rusiji, Venecueli i Turskoj, na primer. U suštini, lider gubi veru u svoju sposobnost da održi kontrolu kroz sofisticirane taktike. To nije tako iznenađujuće. Uspešno obmanjivanje i manipulisanje društvom, dok njegovi članovi postaju obrazovaniji, veštiji u korišćenju medija i međunarodno povezani, veoma je teško. Jedino mesto gde su lideri uspeli da to održe u dužem vremenskom periodu, a da je u pitanju visoko modernizovana zemlja je Singapur. Povratak na diktaturu straha je poslednje sredstvo, kada sve ostalo izgleda kao da je propalo. To znači da se mora pokušati blokirati ili obrnuti modernizacija. A pošto ljudi obično ne žele da se vrate unazad, da izgube slobodne medije, da vide kako ekonomija postaje primitivnija, to vodi ka masovnoj emigraciji – kao u Venecueli i u Rusiji od početka rata. I, iako nafta može pomoći neko vreme, to obično vodi ka ekonomskoj stagnaciji ili čak krizi. Njihova prava podrška postaje sve uža, pa se moraju sve više oslanjati na čistu silu. U isto vreme, kao što primećujete, lideri u drugim zemljama su usvojili tehnike spin diktature, manipulišući medijima iza kulisa, zauzimajući sudove i marginalizujući opoziciju, sve dok čuvaju demokratsku fasadu. Ovo ostaje privlačan model za lidere koji žele da konsoliduju svoju moć kao autoritarne vođe, ali da zadrže modernu ekonomiju i međunarodni ugled. Da li bismo mogli videti veći regres na globalnom nivou? Definitivno je moguće jer će vremenom više spin diktatura imati teškoća kako njihova društva postaju više modernizovana. U trenucima krize, stvari mogu krenuti u jednom od dva pravca – ka više demokratskom sistemu, ako diktator izgubi kontrolu, ili ka većoj otvorenoj represiji.

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Tim Istinomera 14. 2. 2024.

Koja društva imaju predispozicije da postanu spin diktature? Da li su države koje su u prošlosti imale autokratske, represivne režime podložnije tome? Sa druge strane, da li su tradicionalna demokratska društva potpuno otporna na spin diktaturu?

Spin diktatura je oblik autoritarne vladavine koji može biti kombinovan sa relativno modernom ekonomijom i otvorenim međunarodnim odnosima. Kada su zemlje izolovane i na niskim nivoima ekonomskog razvoja, diktatori imaju malo podsticaja da koriste spin umesto straha. Sa poljoprivrednom ekonomijom, ili čak industrijskom koja se bavi masovnom proizvodnjom – strah se može koristiti da se obični građani drže van politike. Ali sa ekonomijom zasnovanom na inovacijama, idejama i međunarodnim razmenama, teror ima mnogo veće ekonomske troškove.

U državama koje su do nedavno bile autokratske, građani mogu zadržati elemente latentnog straha koje diktatori mogu reaktivirati ako odluče da se vrate na otvorenu represiju. Takođe će biti ljudi koji i dalje znaju kako da upravljaju represivnim mašinerijama. I vidimo da su demokratije koje su u prošlosti propale verovatnije da će ponovo propasti u budućnosti. S druge strane, društva koja su uvek bila pod autokratama su sklonija da se zadovolje lažnom demokratijom ako im se ponudi. Fokusiraće se na površnu sličnost između vrste izbora koje održava spin diktator i autentičnijeg tipa koji se odvija u pravim demokratijama.

Sve je manje istine, sve je više spina

Da li je fabrikovana (medijska) produkcija kriza u spin diktaturama zamena ili uvod u diktaturu straha?

Može biti i jedno i drugo. Krize koje podstiču građane da se okupe iza svog lidera su korisne u svim sistemima. I spin diktatori često ih iskorišćavaju – ili stvaraju. Ali, kao što vidimo sa Putinom, spoljna „pretnja” takođe može biti korišćena da opravda prelazak na otvoreno nasilje. U svim sistemima, ratovi obično vode ka centralizaciji moći i porastu domaćih kontrola. Spin diktatorima nisu potrebni ratovi da ostanu popularni. Tako da pokretanje rata često označava da režim regresira.

Da li možemo očekivati da će se spin diktature u bliskoj budućnosti proširiti na neke zapadne zemlje? Na primer, da li možemo očekivati da će Donald Tramp, ako pobedi na drugom mandatu, pristupiti načinu upravljanja manipulacijom sličnim spin diktatorima?

Postoje dva načina na koji nastaju spin diktature. Neke nastaju kada autoritarne države evoluiraju u lažne demokratije. Druge su rezultat nazadovanja u demokratijama. Čini se veoma verovatnim da će, ako Donald Tramp pobedi na predsedničkim izborima u SAD-u u novembru, ponovo pokušati da potkopa kontrolu nad svojom moći, politizuje pravosuđe, oslabi štampu i promoviše iskrivljenu sliku sveta svojim pristalicama – sve tehnike spin diktatora. Da li će uspeti da konsoliduje moć i podriva demokratiju zavisiće od otpora na koji će naići. U ekonomski razvijenim demokratijama sa dugim iskustvom, snage civilnog društva su moćne. Takve zemlje imaju milione visoko obrazovanih, međunarodno povezanih pojedinaca sa organizacionim i komunikacionim veštinama – u novinarstvu, pravu, državnoj službi, civilnom sektoru i mnogim drugim profesijama. To je ono što čini takve demokratije otpornim.

Koja je najbolja barijera za razvoj i uspon spin diktature u društvu?

Najbolja barijera protiv spin diktature je postojanje velike zajednice visoko obrazovanih, društveno aktivnih, međunarodno povezanih građana sa organizacionim resursima i komunikacionim veštinama – što u skraćenici nazivamo „obavešteni” deo društva. To su ljudi koji predvode pokrete za izlaganje i otpor spin diktatorima. Druga barijera su ustavne kontrole i ravnoteže i ustav koji je teško izmeniti. Viktor Orban u Mađarskoj, Redžep Tajip Erdogan u Turskoj, Ugo Čavez u Venecueli i Vladimir Putin u Rusiji, svi su relativno lako mogli da promene ustav svoje zemlje na načine koji su konsolidovali njihovu moć. U SAD-u, promena ustava je mnogo teža. Između ostalog, zahteva saglasnost tri četvrtine federalnih jedinica.

Možete li objasniti ulogu medija i medijskih manipulacija u spin diktaturi i koji je mehanizam za stvaranje jedinstvene, kolektivne istine u društvu, što je jedna od karakteristika spin diktatura?

Spin diktatori ne stvaraju uvek jedinstvenu, kolektivnu istinu. Žele da se svi slažu da su oni kompetentni, efikasni, dobronamerni javni službenici. Ali im je u redu ako mali deo nezadovoljnih intelektualaca veruje u nešto drugo, sve dok nisu promovisani u masovnim medijima. (U ovome se oni razlikuju od klasičnih diktatora straha). Često, spin diktatori su zadovoljni širenjem sumnje umesto uspostavljanjem jedinstvene istine. Nude razne razloge za nepoverenje prema opoziciji i nije im važno koji od njih svaki građanin izabere.

Ko još, osim medija, igra ključnu ulogu u izgradnji kulta ličnosti?

Tvrdimo da su kultovi ličnosti karakteristični za stare diktature straha. Spin diktatori ne nameću rigidnu zvaničnu ideologiju, ne zahtevaju da deca uče njihove izreke, ne naručuju masivne statue i murale sebe, niti podstiču neprijatno javno laskanje. Umesto toga, oni gaje „slavu”. Žele da ih građani doživljavaju kao zanimljive i kul. Naravno, žele da budu fotografisani, predmet tračeva, da prodaju robu – nešto poput modernih rok zvezda, ili čak nekih zapadnih političara kao što su Obama ili Kenedi. Možete reći da je ovo moderni ekvivalent starih kultova ličnosti, ali je zapravo prilično različito od konstruisane javne slike, recimo, Sadama Huseina ili Predsednika Maoa.

Opisali ste u svojoj knjizi da izbori služe kao rejting banke za spin diktatore, to jest, sredstvo za konsolidaciju moći. Da li države gde se manipuliše izbornom voljom građana (neregularni izbori) i dalje mogu biti nazvane spin diktaturama?

Manipulacija izborima je jedna komponenta modela koji nazivamo spin diktatura. To ide zajedno sa drugim elementima kao što su prikrivena manipulacija medijima, tolerisanje opozicionih političara i medija (ali uznemiravanje) i međunarodna otvorenost.

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U predgovoru najnovijeg izdanja koje je na srpskom jeziku objavila izdavačka kuća „Arhipelag”, pominjete predsednika Srbije, Aleksandra Vučića, za koga kažete da koristi mehanizme spin upravljanja. Na koji način vlast Aleksandra Vučića odgovara opisu pravila spin diktature?

Mi nismo eksperti za Srbiju, ali zagovornici slobode štampe su primetili da je Vučićeva stranka uspostavila kontrolu nad mnogim TV stanicama i tabloidnim novinama u zemlji, i one pružaju laskavu sliku režima. U međuvremenu, opozicioni mediji se žale na uznemiravanje. I kompanija Meta je nedavno rekla da je zatvorila više od 5.000 „lažnih naloga” koji su se pretvarali da su pristalice Vučića i njegove stranke i objavljivali pozitivne poruke o njima. Sve ovo otežava da zaboravimo da je trenutni predsednik služio kao ministar informisanja pod Slobodanom Miloševićem devedesetih godina.

Milena Popović 21. 3. 2024.

Autor knjige „Spin diktatori”: U mnogim zemljama spin diktatori se vraćaju nasilnoj represiji

Vlast naredila Google-u da otkrije identitete YouTube gledalaca

Ako vam je stalo do privatnosti vaših ličnih podataka, možda bi bilo najbolje da bacite svoj pametni telefon i druge uređaje i preselite se u kolibu u šumi. Više nema prave privatnosti. Jer velike kompanije za obradu podataka poput Googlea sve znaju o nama. Čak i šta posedujemo, šta radimo, pa čak i šta bismo mogli raditi u budućnosti.

Udobno je misliti da ove informacije ne dele s nikim, uključujući i vladu, osim ako postoji dobar razlog, zar ne? Pa, razmislite ponovo. Ispostavilo se da američka vlada može narediti Googleu da im preda sve vaše informacije samo zato što ste gledali video na YouTubeu. Evo detalja…

Prema nedavnim izveštajima, američka vlada nedavno je zatražila od Googlea da podeli lične informacije o nekim svojim korisnicima. Možda biste pomislili da su ovi korisnici umešani u kriminal nakon čitanja ovoga. Međutim, nemoguće je sa sigurnošću znati jer vlasti nisu znale tačno koje osobe ciljaju.

Umesto toga, želele su lične informacije od svih koji su gledali određene video zapise objavljene između 1. i 8. januara 2023. Ove informacije uključuju imena, adrese, telefonske brojeve, šta su korisnici radili na Googleu, pa čak i njihove IP adrese. Ceo razlog za ovu situaciju je da uhvate nekoga na internetu pod korisničkim imenom “elonmuskwhm”.

Ova osoba je osumnjičena za pranje novca i vođenje nelegalnog poslovanja s prenosom novca. Da bi ga pronašle, vlasti su podmuklo poslale agente da putem YouTubea šalju tutorijale o mapiranju putem dronova i softvera za proširenu stvarnost. Možda mislite da je ovo normalno za hvatanje kriminalaca. Ali, video zapisi su bili javni i jedan od njih je gledalo preko 30.000 ljudi.

To znači da su podaci potencijalno desetina hiljada korisnika bili izloženi putem ovih video zapisa, koji su bili dostupni bilo kome, uključujući i vas. Ova taktika postavlja pitanja o ravnoteži između online istraga i privatnosti korisnika. Nažalost, Google je morao da otkrije te podatke. Zbog toga, ako vam je stalo do privatnosti ličnih podataka, jedino što možete učiniti je da živite u kolibi duboko u šumi.

Evolucija tehnologije na digitalnoj diplomatiji

Digital Diplomacy and the Beautification of War

digital-diplomacy-and-the-beautification-of-war

Susan Sontag famously argued that photography was violent in nature. Photographs, according to Sontag, are violent as they fracture linear time. Each photograph is like an atom torn from linear time and forever frozen. The more photographs one takes, the more he or she rips linear time into fragments that can longer form a coherent whole. Moreover, photography is violent as the photographer makes the world subservient to his or her worldview. Photographs do not depict the world, but the photographer’s view of the world. Most importantly, photography is violent as all photographs have an aesthetic dimension, even those photographs that capture scenes of violence and destruction. In this way, photography beauties wars, weapons of war and the victims of wars. For Sontag, photography’s violent nature is manifest in the language used by photographers who “load” their cameras, “aim” at their objects and take “a shot”.  

In recent years visuals have become central to the practice of digital diplomacy. Given that social media are visual mediums, and given that visuals can summon the attention of social media users, diplomats and foreign ministries (MFA) now incorporate images in most of their posts and tweets. In fact, diplomats have become visual narrators as they use images to convey elaborate and complex foreign policy messages. Moreover, diplomats have learned to speak through visuals as never before have so many diplomats created and published so many visuals daily.

The rhetoric of the diplomatic image may vary, and while some visuals serve an evidentiary purpose in that they “prove” that certain events did in fact take place. Other visuals are used to elicit an emotional response and influence the worldviews of digital publics. As the cliché goes, an image is worth 1000 words and one image of a bombed and dissolute Aleppo is more powerful than 1000 harshly worded tweets.

The past two years have seen the emergence of a new visual trend among diplomats and diplomatic institutions- visuals of war and weapons of war. What is unique about these visuals is their beautification of wars and weapons of war. Indeed, diplomats, MFAs and International Organizations increasingly publish images in which the subject is an instrument of war and destruction. Consider for instance the two visuals below posted by NATO and the British Ministry of Defense.

In both images the subject is a weapon of war. And in both images the weapon is beautified. In the first image the Northern Lights, or Aurora Borealis, seems like a coat of majestic armor surrounding a luminescent fighter jet. In the second image, the green colors of the Northern Lights are juxtaposed with the vibrant colors of the tricolor or France’s national flag. What is most important about the two images is that they both de-contextualize the subject. The British fighter jet and the French ship are not depicted in battle or during a military exercise. Both images capture the weapons of war in nature, amidst a stunning natural phenomenon. The jet and the ship are thus re-contextualized as part of nature and as natural objects or objects that are natural to our world. In this instance, the beautification of weapons of war casts them as natural rather than options of last resort or as part of humanity’s innate tendency towards violence and destruction.

Ukraine has also taken to publishing visuals that beautify war itself. Some of the visuals, shown below, capture Ukrainian forces preparing for battle set against natural beauty such as snow. These visuals depict war itself as something natural and beautiful.  Other visuals focus on warriors or soldiers such as that of a lone soldier walking down a snowy patch of land. Shot against a wintry landscape, the composition of the image and the snow tracks create a sense that the soldier is walking towards something, towards some manifest destiny. Yet, once again, nature and war are joined, and war becomes the continuation of nature by other means.

In another visual, shown below, Ukrainian forces are shot while wearing camouflage. Here, war and nature are not just joined together but they finally merge to create a single object. Much like a photographer, the Ukrainian soldier aims his or her weapon to take a shot. The soldiers’ eyes are the only body part that is exposed. And yet this image, which could have been taken mid-battle, is not menacing or alarming. It is simply beautiful, as beautiful as the soldiers’ eyes.

As noted earlier, many MFAs and International Organizations publish such images which beautify war and weapons of war. This is an alarming trend given that today’s world is one that is prone to conflict and war. Such images are violent as they rip soldiers and weapons of war from their actual surroundings and transport them to natural settings. In doing so, these images and visuals suggest that war is natural and beautiful and not a costly exercise that leads to immense human pain and suffering.

These images and visuals also negate one of the primary functions of diplomacy- to resolve disputes and crises without resorting to war. As these images populate the social media feeds of users across the world, they promote the view of war as something “good, natural and necessary” to quote scholar Susan Jackosn. These images may diminish opposition to wars and to mass investments in weapons of war leading the world closer to armed conflict while undermining the very function of diplomacy.

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Monday’s Must Read List

monday’s-must-read list

Each week, I publish a list of interesting articles, essays and reports that may be of interest to the digital diplomacy community. This week-

  1. What the future holds for driverless cars (BBC News)
  2. Resistance Is Futile, But Maybe Not With AI (Bloomberg)
  3. It’s Time to Give Up on Ending Social Media’s Misinformation Problem (The Atlantic)
  4. Pentagon Technology Officials Focus on Maintaining U.S. Edge (US Gov)
  5. Technology Alone Won’t Break the Stalemate in Ukraine (Foreign Policy)
  6. Musk’s Neuralink hosts livestream showing quadriplegic playing online chess (AJ)
  7. EU funding drone technology used by Israel in Gaza war, claim monitors (EuroNews)
  8. US Catching Up With Hypersonic Missile Technology (Kyiv Post)
  9. Nvidia announces Project GR00T AI technology for human-like robots (Yahoo)

Some light reading- The Internet Is Not What You Think It Is: A History, a Philosophy and Warning by Justin Smith-Ruiu

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The Drone Wars: How Ukrainian Drones Are Reshaping War Coverage

the-drone-wars:-how-ukrainian-drones-are-reshaping-war-coverage

In the early 1990s, scholars coined the term “The CNN Effect” referencing the impact that CNN had on American foreign policy. Scholars asserted that issues which rose to prominence in CNN were soon addressed by American policy makers. In this way CNN shaped the priorities of the White House and the State Department. CNN was so influential that former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali remarked that CNN was the 16th member of the Security Council.

Yet CNN also impacted news coverage of wars. The Atlanta-based news station first rose to prominence during the 1991 Gulf War when its journalists were the only ones to offer live coverage of American airstrikes on Iraqi targets. While other journalists sought refuge in shelters and underground basements, or left Iraq all together, CNN journalists stayed on the air offering eyewitness accounts of the fierce attacks by US and other Coalition forces. For several days, CNN’s live coverage of the War went uninterrupted and unchallenged by other news stations. Slowly, this coverage attracted a captivated audience.

The Gulf War was unique as it was the first time that television viewers had access to live, 24-hour coverage of a war. Previous wars, such as the one in Vietnam, entered the homes of millions of Americans during edited evening newscasts. Conversely, the Iraq War became a permanent fixture in American homes, one that could be viewed at any time and one that was not edited. Live coverage meant that far away audiences could experience a war as it unfolded. This was another “CNN Effect”.

Digital technologies disrupted the coverage of wars. The main reason being that social media users had become accustomed to consuming news in near-real time. Social media users did not wait for evening newscasts or morning papers to learn about events shaping their world. As such, the speed with which Wars war reported on accelerated. Social media did not offer live coverage of Wars but real-time coverage of Wars. This meant more than just greater speed but simultaneous coverage of dozens of events taking place all over the globe. The real-time coverage of Russian annexation of Crimea included real-time news reports from Crimea, Moscow, Washington, Beijing, London and Kyiv. Social media also brought with it real-time analyses of the Crimean annexation and a non-stop barrage of statements on the annexation by world leaders and diplomats ranging from Russian President Putin to NATO’s Secretary General and US military leaders. 

Yet perhaps the greatest impact of social media was that people did not seek war coverage anymore. Rather, war coverage sought out audiences and was inserted into the feeds of millions of users. Even more importantly, war coverage was tailored to the interest, beliefs and opinions of social media users thanks to the work of algorithms. News coverage was thus fragmented, and different people experienced the same war in very different ways. According to the feeds of some social media users, Russian peacekeeping troops had entered Ukraine to stop a bloody civil war that was spiraling out of control. According to the feeds of other users, Russia had mounted a stealth and illegal invasion of Ukraine bringing Europe to the brink of war. Similarly, some social media users learned about the brutality of the Russian soldiers, others saw videos of alleged Ukrainian brutality against Russian minorities.

Ukraine’s use of innovative technologies has once again re-shaped war coverage. This is thanks to the growing use of drones by Ukraine. Indeed, drones have played an important role in Ukraine’s war effort and the country now operates an Army of Drones that was created through a global crowdfunding effort. This Army of Drones is used to strike Russian tanks, infantry and even ships. Throughout the day, videos captured by drones are spread across social media platforms by official Ukrainian accounts, by foreign ministries and diplomats, by military experts, OSINT specialties (open-source intelligence) and average social media users. 

It could be argued that the Russia-Ukraine War is the first Drone War or a war that is mediated through drones. Much of the footage shared online from Ukraine is not captured by intrepid journalists, daring citizen-journalists or global news agencies who are able to dispatch reports to the front lines. Rather, this electronic footage is captured by drones on their way to a target.

Drone Wars may be unique in three ways. First, they offer wartime footage that is entirely independent of human intervention. There is no human in the loop anymore. The raw footage recorded by drones is not the result of human intervention nor is it subject to human editing. Second, in Drone War the coverage of wars goes beyond the front lines. Drone footage offers real-time footage of bases and positions deep within the enemy’s territory. Indeed, Ukraine drone footage takes viewers deep into areas held by Russian troops, sometimes as far as Moscow itself. Third, Drone Wars no longer obfuscate the nature of war. Drone footage captures the carnage, death and pain that accompanies War. Drone footage shared by Ukraine includes not only attacks on Russian tanks but also the death of Russian soldiers. Other footage depicts Russian soldiers fleeing their positions while under attack.

Drones also linger, in air and on air. They continue to record and transmit videos even when faced with harrowing scenes, the kind of scenes that human reporters would have failed to capture due to their emotional intensity. A drone lingers in the air while below people are burnt alive. The drone does not flinch, or shy away or close its eyes. It is these harrowing videos that trend online, that capture audiences’ attention and are shared extensively all day long and transmitted across multiple networks arriving in peoples’ feeds and offering a new form of news coverage.

Thus, we have moved from the “CNN Effect” and live coverage of wars, to the “Twitter Effect” and real time coverage of wars, to the “Drone Effect” of constant wars mediated by drones all day long across multiple platforms and accounts. 

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Is Digital Diplomacy Disruptive?

is-digital-diplomacy-disruptive?

In a classic episode of the television show “Yes Prime Minister”, the Civil Servant Humphrey Appleby explains the logic of British diplomacy saying:

“The Foreign Office is pro-Europe because it’s really anti-Europe. The civil service was united in its desire to make sure that the Common Market didn’t work. That’s why we went into it. Britain has had the same foreign policy objective for at least 500 years: to create a disunited Europe. In that cause we have fought with the Dutch against the Spanish, with the Germans against the French, French and Italians against the Germans, and the French against the Germans and Italians. Divide and rule, you see. Why should we change now, when it’s worked so well?”

These remarks are important for two reasons. First, when we think about disruption we often think about digital disruption, or how digital technologies cause upheaval and transform diplomats’ norms, practices, and working routines. Yet diplomacy can cause disruption even without digital technologies as demonstrated by Appelby. It is also important to remember that disruption can also stem from ideas, concepts, and metaphors. The concept of “statehood”, the metaphors of “Alliances” or the “Global Village”, all disrupted the practice of diplomacy leading to the creation of new diplomatic entities and new diplomatic practices.

Second, disruption is never limited to one domain, arena, or market. Disruption sends ripple effects that transform other domains. Consider the iPhone that not only disrupted the cell phone market but also transformed how we communicate, how we manage personal relationships and how we document or record our daily lives.  This means that digital disruption in diplomacy is not limited to diplomacy, nor does it necessarily originate in the realm of diplomacy. Digital technologies which disrupt society send ripple effects which lead to changes in diplomacy. Similarly, diplomats’ use of digital technologies can result in societal disruption.

As such, to examine the disruptive nature of digital diplomacy is really to examine the relationship between diplomacy and society.

Consider for instance how digital technologies have disrupted news consumption. In the social media age, individuals want to learn about events in near-real time. No one waits for the evening newscast or tomorrow’s front page to learn about important events. Social media disrupted news production as it forced journalists to cover events as they unfolded. This phenomenon of “real time journalism” sent ripple effects through foreign ministries. For if they wanted to shape news coverage, diplomats also had to narrate events in near real-time. Thus, “Real Time Journalism” has led to “Real Time Diplomacy”.

This is a prime example of disruption as the practice of “Real Time Diplomacy is at odds with the routine practice of diplomacy which requires time. A relevant example took place a year ago when social media users reported that a Russian rocket aimed at Ukraine hit Poland. This was a major event as such an attack could ignite a war between Russia and NATO. Within a few minutes traditional news outlets began to tweet about the alleged rocket. Within 45 minutes of initial reports diplomats and world leaders also began tweeting about the Russian rocket.

But what they all did was buy time. Diplomats tweeted “we are aware of these reports, we are gathering information, and we are conferring with our allies”. This demonstrates how the digital disruption of society leads to new practices and norms amongst diplomats specifically, balancing between the need to comment on events in real-time and the need for time to gather intelligence and make informed decisions.

Another relevant example is the digital disruption of governments. In a digital world, governed by the metaphors of “networks” and “connectivity”, more and more government ministries face the world and collaborate with their foreign peers. Ministries of health, the environment, energy, and culture all engage with peers from other countries.

This digital disruption of governments means that foreign ministries have lost their monopoly over managing a state’s external affairs. To counterbalance this loss diplomats now communicate with their own citizens and demonstrate how diplomats contribute to national interests thereby safeguarding their remaining territory within governments. “Domestic Digital Diplomacy” has expanded and includes diplomats’ use of social media to narrate world events for their citizens, to rally domestic support for foreign policies and to shape how citizens view their nation and their nation’s role in the world.

The digital disruption of governments has sent ripple effects downwards to foreign ministries. But the practice of “Domestic Digital Diplomacy” is in itself disruptive and has sent ripple effects upwards to society. The reason being that diplomats are now powerful discursive agents. they engage with their citizens online; they shape citizens’ worldviews and impact citizens beliefs about a nation’s role in the world. In this sense diplomats have become like journalists, editors and opinion makers that have traditionally shaped public opinion.

To summarize, digital diplomacy is both the result of disruption and the cause of disruption. Tech-induced disruption of society trickles down and reshapes diplomats’ norms, values and working routines. But diplomats’ innovative use of digital technology trickles upwards disrupting and reshaping societies.

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Monday’s Must Read List

monday’s-must-read list

Each week, I publish a list of interesting articles, essays and reports that may be of interest to the digital diplomacy community. This week-

  1. White House will fight deepfakes with cryptographic verification (Cyber News)
  2. Russia using Elon Musk’s Starlink on Ukraine front line, says Kyiv (Financial Times)
  3. France uncovers a vast Russian disinformation campaign in Europe (The Economist)
  4. Biden campaign joins TikTok despite administration’s past security concerns (ABC News)
  5. ‘Lol hey guys’ – Biden joins TikTok despite security concerns (BBC News)
  6. North Korea and Iran using AI for hacking, Microsoft says (The Guardian)
  7. The Biggest Technology Trends In The Next 10 Years (Forbes)
  8. Five ways Imran Khan’s party used technology to outperform in Pakistan’s elections (Atlantic Council)
  9. China is quietly reducing its reliance on foreign chip technology (The Economist)

Some light reading- The Call of the Wild, by Jack London

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Biden State Department Funds Training of 2,500 LGBT ‘Allies’

The Biden administration is using the State Department to fund LGBT activism abroad — again. According to federal spending database USASpending.gov, the U.S. State Department awarded a $15,000 grant to Washington State University (WSU) for a “public diplomacy program.” The government website explains that the program is designed to train 30 “master trainers” to become “LGBTQI+ allies, followed by these master trainers training another 2500 individuals on this theme.” WSU hosted its three-day “train-the-trainer workshop” in India at the end of September.

According to WSU’s official new site, the program’s “priority” was “promoting a better understanding of diversity and inclusion and LGBTQIA+ rights…” The three-day program included sessions on “LGBTQ+ ally training,” “What it means to be an ally,” “Evolution of language/Defining LGBTQ+ language,” “LGBTQ+ history: Worldwide, in the United States, and in India,” “LGBTQ+ individuals and faith,” and others. The workshop concluded with the U.S. Consul General of Hyderabad awarding participants with certificates of completion. The program’s stated goal was to “[i]ncrease the comfort levels of all participants regarding issues faced by members of the LGBTQI+ community and work toward a more equitable company, university, and society for all.”

Meg Kilgannon, a senior fellow at Family Research Council, commented to The Washington Stand, “Hardly a day goes by without a revelation about talent or treasure being spent on perversion by the U.S. State Department. It’s the worst kind of colonialism — sexual colonialism.” She continued, “And don’t think that promotion abroad means the home front is safe from these manipulations. American school children and college students are offered the same content. Unrest at home and abroad is exacerbated by the Biden administration’s maniacal push to normalize the dangerous and abnormal.”

This is not the first time that the Biden State Department has used American taxpayers’ money to fund LGBT activism abroad. Last year, Family Research Council published a report detailing the Biden State Department’s commitment to LGBT ideology in foreign nations, including hundreds of thousands of dollars in grant money to LGBT organizations and programs. The U.S. Mission in Botswana, for example, offered $300,000 in grant money to “carry out a program to promote greater social acceptance of LGBTQI+ persons, including among influential religious groups and traditional groups…”

Another grant was awarded to an Ecuadorian group to finance drag shows and produce LGBT films and documentaries. A similar State Department grant in Portugal was used to fund a film festival called “Queer Lisboa,” which featured drag queens and media centered on incest and pedophilia. Other instances of State Department funds going to LGBT causes include supporting “queer Muslim writers in India, paying for classes for “transgender women makeup entrepreneurs” in Nepal, and promoting puberty blockers for children in Poland.

In some cases, the State Department’s LGBT activism has strained or jeopardized diplomatic relations with other nations. Promotion of Pride month and same-sex marriage has landed U.S. diplomats in trouble with the Foreign Ministers of nations like Kuwait and Hungary, where same-sex marriage is illegal. When U.S. Ambassador David Pressman, who openly identifies as homosexual, criticized Hungary’s laws, Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó fired back, “[I]f he wishes to use his stay in Hungary to criticize the actions of a government elected by a clear majority of the Hungarian people and legitimized by the Hungarian people, he will have a very difficult job in working effectively to improve cooperation between the two countries.”

The Biden administration has also funneled funding into LGBT causes abroad via the U.S. Agency for International Aid (USAID). Through USAID, the White House has often partnered with other governments and private firms to sink further millions into LGBT activism in foreign nations. According to the Washington Free Beacon, the Biden administration has spent nearly $5 million promoting LGBT ideology in foreign nations as of June, 2023.

S.A. McCarthy serves as a news writer at The Washington Stand.

https://washingtonstand.com/news/biden-state-department-funds-training-of-2500-lgbt-allies

LGBT Issues and Public Diplomacy

100 years of radio in Africa: from propaganda to people’s power

Radio is thriving across Africa. Exact figures are difficult to come by because audience research differs across countries. But studies estimate radio listenership to be between 60% and 80% of the continent’s 1.4 billion population.

In contrast to many western countries, where there has been a shift towards streaming and podcasts, traditional radio continues to be widely embraced in Africa. Because of poor literacy levels and uneven access to the internet and technological infrastructure, old-fashioned radio remains a reliable and inclusive medium.

This year’s celebration of the 100-plus years of radio offers us an opportunity, as African media scholars, to reflect on the historical significance, cultural relevance, political power and social impact of the medium on the continent. We home in on examples from the regions we’ve studied to demonstrate this rich history.

Early years

The story of radio in Africa starts with its introduction to serve colonial interests. Cameroonian scholar Francis Nyamnjoh argues that as soon as it had established itself as a mass medium in the 1920s,

European states were quick to realise the part radio could play in realising their desire to swallow up weaker cultures around the globe.

Historians note that it also allowed Europeans in the colonies to connect to home, their culture and their languages.

In the early 1920s amateur radio enthusiasts had already begun tinkering with the technology. The first official broadcast seems to have been on 18 December 1923 in Johannesburg, South Africa.

In east Africa, radio was first introduced in Kenya in 1927 and in west Africa to Sierra Leone in 1934.

UK media scholar Graham Mytton writes that the arrival of radio in west Africa’s British colonies – The Gambia, Sierra Leone, Gold Coast (now Ghana) and Nigeria – marked a turning point.

Until then radio had been broadcast by wireless transmission. When it was introduced in Sierra Leone, Ghana (1935) and Nigeria (1936), it was “via wired services – subscribers had loudspeakers (linked by wire to the radio station) installed in their homes to receive the service … these were created with native African listeners in mind”.

Then, in 1936, the British colonial administration decided to develop radio broadcasting throughout its African colonies.

Propaganda

Colonial powers such as the UK and France upped their radio transmission efforts after the outbreak of the second world war in 1939. The 1940s were marked by the introduction of indigenous language broadcasts by colonial powers wanting to influence public opinion and garner support for their war effort. While the British broadcast to Africa in some African languages, France broadcast only in French.

This laid the groundwork for future developments. After the war, the British officially adopted a policy of extending broadcasting services across most of its African colonies.

In Kenya, for example, the first broadcast service for Africans began in 1953, transmitting in local languages during the state of emergency declared in 1952 to suppress the Mau Mau uprising.

Academics have argued that despite being designed mainly for propaganda, radio in Africa

was always far more multifaceted and slippery than was intended by colonial powers.

It also offered the “ability to create new and sometimes unruly publics”.

Resistance radio

The 1950s saw the expansion and transformation of radio in Africa. Radio stations across British, French and Belgian colonies rapidly increased as people under colonial rule increased their efforts to achieve independence.

In the mid-1950s the oldest liberation station in Africa, Radio Freedom, was established as an underground station in Zambia by South Africa’s resistance movement. It would air its first formal broadcast in 1963.


Read more: Radio as a form of struggle: scenes from late colonial Angola


In Angola, radio expanded with the outbreak of war in 1961 between liberation movements and the Portuguese colonial state.

Liberation movements in neighbouring countries used radio for war reporting amid colonial censorship. For their part, colonial state radio fostered the emergence of local artists’ music as part of their colonial propaganda.

Independence and state control

From the late 1940s to the early 1960s the number of radio-receiving sets increased fivefold, from 90 sets per thousand people in Africa to 450.

In some respects the 1960s was a golden era for African radio. A wave of independence movements birthed new nations as radio technology was becoming more affordable.

Graphic: Gary Oberholzer, CC BY

Many newly independent countries established national broadcasting services, like The Gambia in 1965. This expanded the reach of radio and the opportunity to embrace local languages, music and cultural programming. In Nigeria, the Broadcasting Corporation expanded to cover the whole country.

But some newly independent countries that had inherited state-controlled broadcasting systems also censored content deemed critical or threatening, restricting freedom of expression.

With independence in Angola in 1975, for example, the new leaders saw radio as a tool for nation building, but tightened their grip after a coup attempt in 1977.

In many African countries, Angola included, post-colonial state control of radio continues. Zimbabwe’s radio sector, for example, is thriving. But state control remains strong, with biased licensing for national radio and restrictive laws for community radio stations.

The Mauritius Broadcasting Corporation was established in 1964 and still operates as a state broadcaster. Despite funding through public licence fees and advertising, it’s perceived to promote government agendas.

Radio has also been used to promote nefarious political ends. The 1994 genocide in Rwanda stands as a painful example. The infamous Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines disseminated hate speech and incited violence against the Tutsi minority.

Private commercial stations

Over the last 40 years many African countries have liberalised their economies and their media regulations, issuing commercial and community radio licences.

In Ghana, for example, radio primarily served elite interests until the 1990s, when private ownership diversified the industry. By 2022, Ghana boasted 513 radio stations, ranging across public, commercial, community, campus and foreign broadcasts.


Read more: Radio in South Africa turns 100 – and collides with podcasting and streaming


An essential development has been the emergence of indigenous language radio. This has produced culturally resonant content and prioritised community issues. But challenges persist. Some stations are affiliated with political or business interests and increased attacks on journalists pose risks to media freedom and diversity.

In recent decades, Kenya’s radio landscape has transformed to over 200 stations. Private commercial stations now dominate, broadcasting in local languages.

In Mauritius, airwaves were liberalised in 2002, introducing private stations. Talk shows, especially in the Mauritian Creole language, have revolutionised radio. Private radio has expanded to digital platforms, engaging audiences through live streams and social media, creating both competition and sensationalist coverage.

Radio now

Digital convergence is reshaping radio consumption, blurring audience patterns.

This isn’t happening uniformly across the continent. Digital platforms face challenges, such as the digital divide and economic inequality.

Radio’s influence is likely to endure, with podcasts complementing rather than replacing traditional broadcasts. A 2022 survey across 34 African countries found radio was “overwhelmingly the most common source for news”. This is a testament to its enduring influence and unique ability to connect with diverse audiences – even a century after its introduction.

France Points Finger At Russian Propaganda Network

A French government agency charged with defence against foreign online threats on Monday said it had discovered a network of Russian websites designed to spread Kremlin propaganda in the West.

The Viginum agency said the network, which it called “structured and coordinated” was targeting Europe and the United States.

Code-named “Portal Kombat”, the network comprises 193 websites, Viginum reported after investigating between September and December of last year.

The information portals closely resemble each other, it said, and were “spreading pro-Russian content destined for an international audience”, especially in countries backing Ukraine.

France has been delivering arms and aid to Ukraine, which was invaded by Russia in February 2022.

Several of the sites share “pravda” — “truth” in Russian — as their domain name, carrying different extensions according to their languages, such as pravda.en.com for English or pravda.fr.com for French.

Between June 23 and September 19, 2023, the portals published more than 150,000 items between them, typically re-posts from content published by Russian or pro-Russian personalities or Russian media.

Another 180 sites, linked digitally to the pravda network, were spreading similar content in Russian, the French agency discovered.

A French diplomatic source told reporters that Portal Kombat’s main objective was to justify Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Its content had a “strong ideological bias”, the source said, with “narratives that are clearly untrue or misleading”.

Last month, France accused Russia of starting a new disinformation campaign after Moscow claimed that France was funding mercenaries fighting in Ukraine.

The dispute began when the Russian defence ministry said on January 17 that it had carried out a “precision strike” on a temporary base for foreign fighters in the eastern Ukrainian city of Kharkiv, saying the bulk of them were “French mercenaries”.

The claim was later dismissed by French fighters on the ground.

While this and other narratives generated by the Russian sites appeared to have little impact on French social media debates, “some of the content could damage the fundamental interests of the nation”, Viginum said.

There was a chance that the Portal Kombat sites could boost activity in the future, a military source warned.

One future strategy could consist of flooding western networks with doubtful content with the aim of exhausting fact-checking journalists employed by western media, according to experts.

https://www.barrons.com/news/france-points-finger-at-russian-propaganda-network-d78fe751