Jerome Polin and New Diplomacy in The Modern Era

4th July 2022

Rooted in the expansion of the two diplomacy pathways, the concept of citizen diplomacy is known as a way for ordinary citizens to contribute in international diplomatic interactions. Citizen diplomacy was born due to Joseph Nye’s adoption of the soft power concept and one of the essential diplomacy concepts in the current era of globalization. In the practice of citizen diplomacy, a citizen can promote and engages in interactions that are not only based on politics but also have a role in the broader focus or topic of international diplomacies, such as peace, education, culture, language, culinary, economic cooperation, and so on. The practice of citizen diplomacy is not always tied to the state’s interests, but a citizen diplomat can also represent his interests.

In contrast to public diplomacy, non-state citizen diplomacy actors tend to stand alone. This means that these non-state actors are not bound by the participation space provided by the state. Citizen diplomacy actors can voice their opinions, participate, and be responsible for international diplomacy efforts. They—citizen diplomacy actors—can be artists, musicians, YouTubers, speakers, motivators, business people, teachers, students, and ordinary citizens. Meanwhile, Paul Sharp divides the roles of each actor through his activities. The division consists of actors former professional diplomats, actors as representatives of economic interests, actors with roles in changing specific government policies, actors capable of building global awareness to create a new order, and actors acting as autonomous agents—these actors do not represent any party, but himself. By using the concept of the role of a non-state citizen diplomacy actor as an autonomous agent, this paper will explore the practice of diplomacy carried out by an ordinary citizen named Jerome Polin.

Jerome Polin is a young man born in Surabaya on May 2 1998. Five years ago—through his personal YouTube account—Jerome started actively sharing his daily and motivational video blog. Until now, there have been hundreds of videos that he has uploaded on his YouTube channel. Jerome, who is currently known as a YouTuber to many people, is also a Mitsui Bussan scholarship awardee and studied at Waseda University, Japan, with a major in applied mathematics. Since childhood, Jerome has been enthusiastic about participating in math olympiads and strongly desires to study abroad. Thanks to his perseverance and persistent determination, Jerome is now widely known among young people, especially GenZ and Millennials.

Starting his career as a student in Japan made Jerome even more challenged to continue his interest in producing videos. Until now, the number of YouTube subscribers for this young man is 9.5 million subscribers. Through his creative, educational, and entertaining content, Jerome has a desire to provide exclusive benefits to his loyal audience. Jerome’s specific content at the beginning was famous for being related to mathematics. Still, now he produces much more diverse video content, such as cultural, culinary, and travel themes. Jerome is also not alone when making videos. He was accompanied by four native Japanese friends named the ‘Waseda Boys’. Together with Waseda Boys, Jerome introduced a lot of cultures, food, and the Indonesian language. Not infrequently, they also exchange knowledge about their respective countries.

Currently, Jerome Polin can be classified as an autonomous agent of a non-state actor. Departing from the five roles of non-state citizen diplomacy actor by Paul Sharp, this actor’s role is not tied to the interests of other parties or the state. He acts to represent his interests. Jerome can make efforts and international diplomatic interactions related to his status as one of the recipients of the Mitsui Bussan scholarship, which Japan pioneered.

As we know, Indonesia and Japan have gone through unpleasant and tense times due to colonialism decades ago. One of Jerome Polin’s content on his youtube channel entitled “August 17th Contest with Japanese Friends! Special for the 76th Indonesian Independence Day, Independence!” showed the enthusiasm of his friends who are Japanese citizens to take part in celebrating the birthday of Indonesia, one of the countries that their country had colonized. Through the content “Ask the Japanese”, Jerome also shared information and education about colonialism in the past. In addition, Jerome actively introduces Indonesian food, such as tempeh, pop chicken, nasi padang, fried duck, Indomie, and so on. This, of course, is a form of branding for Indonesian products and culinary specialities in the international arena.

In the last few months, Jerome and Waseda Boys visited Indonesia. They toured several provinces. Jerome introduced the area’s culture, traditions, language and social environment. The provinces they visited were Bali, Yogyakarta, Central Java, Jakarta and Papua. Through this visit, Jerome invited his friends to try the unique cuisine of each province. Guess what? The Waseda boys really like Rusa Rica-Rica from Papua! They also try traditional clothes, watch art performances, and make local handicrafts. In fact, The Waseda boys—some of them—are pretty fluent in Indonesian.

Currently, the young man who was born in Surabaya 24 years ago is spreading his wings even more. Activities that can be classified as diplomatic interactions are not only channelled by Jerome through his content, but he has started to build a talent agency business that houses international talent and influencers. He founded Mantappu Corp in 2018 with his older brother, Jehian Sijabat. This talent agency contains content from international creators and influencers who aim to maximize digital communication and digital marketing in the era of globalization. Currently, Mantappu Corp has managed Japanese talents and influencers, such as Erika Ebisawa, Hitomi, Ryoma Otsuka, Takuya Ohsawa, Tomohiro Yamashita, Yuzuke Sakazaki. There is also Jang Hansol, who is a content creator from South Korea. In addition to diverse talents and influencers, Mantappu Corp has collaborated with many large companies from Indonesia to abroad! Thus, the presence of Mantappu Corp is a form of a diplomatic effort to strengthen Indonesia’s cooperative relations in the international system.

The presence of non-state actors in international relations allows for different diplomatic practices. The concept of diplomacy can go hand in hand with the convenience of information and communication technology in this era. Like what Jerome Polin did, science and technological advances were used to carry out efforts that were classified as diplomatic interactions. In this case, every non-state actor with the capacity within himself can actively participate in diplomatic exchanges in international relations. They—international relations actors—can represent themselves or other parties and interests. However, the diplomacy carried out, of course, remains focused on common interests.

By

Galuh Anissa Sekar Ayu

https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2022/06/20/jerome-polin-and-new-diplomacy-in-the-modern-era/

Networked Democratic Diplomacy

22nd June 2022

A democratic Europe needs a new kind of public diplomacy

Bernd Hüttemann

For several years, media outlets and independent democratic organizations have come under systematic pressure in many European countries. Minority rights are under attack. Even the independence of the judiciary is now open to question. The belief in self-correction in democratic societies continues to wane. The troublesome situation in Hungary and Poland is not just a national matter of European Union law being misapplied in specific member states. Various regulations and sanctions do offer some hope in the situation, including Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) with the EU framework for strengthening the rule of law as well as the rule of law mechanism. But will stricter monitoring and more consistent enforcement be enough? Perhaps what is missing is a consistent commitment to democratic checks and balances? In this context, Germany’s foreign and European policies need to do more to support cross-border democracy.

Disregard for Democratic Processes

Since the 1980s, the old Western European model—corporatist, pluralist, with strong trade unions and civic associations—has been eroded. Deregulation and the “neoliberal” agenda have led to the weakening of organized civic participation, as well as frustration with small-scale democratic processes. An entire generation, both in business and broader society, was tired of having to seek out compromise. Companies, foundations, and non-profits replaced the “old-fashioned” landscape of representational bodies and civic associations. This change was the result of a hope for more efficiency.

Clumsy democratic representation was to be replaced by a lean technocratic policy apparatus. But it was not just the “committee busybodies” who had a bad reputation. Since the 1980s, the popularity of parliamentary democracy has also declined across Europe. Citizenship is often reduced to a one-dimensional role: being a voter. Citizens are no longer seen as valuable actors, capable of influencing politics through representative instruments.

This societal development was clearest in the United Kingdom, where the influence of trade unions and civic associations slumped. Charity organizations, led by corporate-style CEOs, gained in importance. Unsurprisingly, non-profit organizations were forbidden by law from taking a political position on Brexit. It is not only in the United Kingdom that politicians have systematically thwarted social opposition, as society’s democratic core comes under strain in many places in Europe. State funding of democratic infrastructure has given way to project-based funding, which has no responsibility to be representative. Lille demokrati, the Danish term for small-scale democracy, has neither benefitted in the EU accession process, nor in the everyday life in Western countries.

The Framing of a Congenial “Civil Society”

From the 1980s on, the political philosopher Jürgen Habermas worked out a normative, deliberative alternative to representative democracy, making new definitions of “civil society” (Zivilgesellschaft) socially acceptable throughout Europe. Separation from the state and the market was the key criteria for Habermas’ “civil society counter-public sphere.” Representativeness and democratic self-organization became secondary. He posited new concepts opposed to old notions of “bourgeois society”, which were based on an artificial division between state, market, and civil society. But this artificial separation can often be deceptive. Institutions and organizations can change their appearance, chameleon-like, depending on interests and strategies.

Government and public administration continue to use this division between state, market, and civil society. One German chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, went so far as to use ideas of civil society commitment to encourage the privatization of social functions. Later interpretations of the “Copenhagen criteria”—used to judge if a country is fit for accession to the EU—also made use of Habermas’ framing. What the state (and the rule of law) required, these criteria suggested, was less a democratically-organized citizenship. Instead, the emphasis was on project-based commitments to non-profit organizations, defined of course by the executive. Neither the EU accession process nor other EU initiatives seek to particularly reward democratic self-organization.

The normative separation of market, state, and civil society has not stopped state and economic actors from using “civil society washing” in order to conceal their own interests. The Foundation for Climate and Environmental Protection, a non-profit based in the eastern German state of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, shamelessly uses the framework of “civil society” on its website, although in fact it promotes the economic interests of the state government. Its main function was to clandestinely complete the building of the US-sanctioned, now defunct Nord Stream 2 pipeline.

However, some leaders use the term “civil society” in less eye-catching ways. The German Foreign Office has consistently posited civil society as something quite separate from markets, striving to avoid open rivalry between the interests of business and non-profits. The German foreign policy establishment does not reward democratically constituted organizations. The German-Russian “Petersburg Dialogue” was conceived as a “forum of civil society”. Nowadays we know well that it was never a structured democratic dialogue. “Civil society dialogue” became a tool of the Russian state and of particular German interests. Democratic reform of the dialogue failed, long before Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine in 2022. The role of diplomacy and interests remained opaque, whether intentionally or not.

The Limits of German Diplomacy

This has led to some insights among the diplomatic community. Writing in Internationale Politik in 2013, Thomas Bagger, then the head of policy planning at the German Foreign Office, put it like this: “network-oriented foreign policy [is] the best chance to ensure early warning, planning, exchange, and coordination, and to ensure complex interactions between all relevant state and non-state actors.” Although this holistic approach to socially-responsible diplomacy was the correct one, within a year it would reach a dead end.

In 2014, Frank-Walter Steinmeier—the then German foreign minister—launched a large-scale review. It ended in failure. The major crises confronting Berlin’s European and foreign policies were not addressed in a democratically-networked way. German foreign policy had ever closer relations with the business community, but it marginalized other social forces, in keeping with its faulty framing of “civil society”.

To cite some examples: during the failed EU-US negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) agreement, civic associations and social partners were brought into the process so late that they were turned into antagonists. As the political scientist Cathryn Clüver Ashbrook has shown, diplomacy has entirely underestimated internationally-networked interest groups. When it came to Brexit, trade unions, representative consumer associations, and environmental groups were only brought into the process at a very late stage. Conversely, the possibility of using business to promote independent media, for example in Hungary or Serbia, went unexplored.

In national policy areas and in diplomatic affairs, action is increasingly taken within a European framework. By pursuing their own European policies, government departments and, of course, EU institutions have contacts with cross-border interest groups as a matter of course, within the process of developing law and regulation. This entangled, Europeanized process has increasingly corporatist aspects. Here, too, there is often simply no use for classic diplomacy as such.

Back in 2013, Bagger complained that “the various internationalized specialist policies do not yet add up to a foreign policy”. This is very much the case with European policy in Berlin. Bagger suggested the Foreign Office should function like a platform within a network. This came to nothing. German diplomacy continues to steer clear of democratic spheres of action that function beyond the scope of classic politics, both domestically and in other European countries. Any expertise the Foreign Office has on how democracy works in other societies is random, constantly at the mercy of the rotation of diplomats. This is not a sustainable process of knowledge production. Time and again populist movements crop up, and German diplomacy is caught clueless. As a consequence, Germany understands less and less about the societies and politics of our immediate neighbors.

A New Approach

However, there is an approach that seems tailor made for the various actors enmeshed in German and European diplomacy. Public diplomacy was developed within US diplomacy in the 1960s, during the Cold War. This approach offers a field of action beyond that of official state diplomacy, incorporating non-state actors. This Cold War approach is in keeping with our sense of pluralistic liberal democracy. It offers a flexible counter-model to the kind of technocratic action favored by totalitarian systems. Moreover, public diplomacy combined with “soft power”—a connection made above all by Joseph S. Nye—is not merely raison d’état power politics legitimized by shallow PR campaigns.

Representative pluralistic democracy is at the heart of the European Union itself. For this reason, member states require a great variety of cross-border expertise. There are simply too many different interests, which themselves do not necessarily coincide with government action. Those in power need allies; for this reason, they need a deep knowledge of existing interests, and the way in which these interests are organized.

Anyone who understands German European policy as more than just government action must take full advantage of all possible democratic relations with European partners. This includes building contacts and absorbing expertise from parliaments, from social partners, and from associations and organizations in other countries. This should be done in a structured way. For example, the outreach foundations run by the German political parties can serve as a key democratic anchor. Foreign chambers of commerce also have a role in holding together a holistic and pluralist society.

“Little Democracy”

The detail of this picture is filled in by the dense institutions of German civic life, including the federated leaderships of youth councils, municipal interest groups, and trade unions. They are all common actors of lille demokrati, small-scale democracy. For their part, European umbrella organizations deserve at last to be made part of the formal frameworks of European law. Finally, a new European Law of Association is required, something recognized by the Conference on the Future of Europe, but also included in the coalition agreement of the current German government.

In Brussels, Berlin, and other capitals there are now functioning registers of lobbying interests. These can be used to map out existing interests within the multilevel European political system, and to understand how they can boost liberal democracy across the continent. Embassies and permanent representations in Brussels and Strasbourg can serve as networked platforms, undertaking coherent, structured action so as to promote pluralist democracy across Europe.

By incorporating public diplomacy, diplomacy could promote cross-border workshops of democracy. It could use public diplomacy to better protect us all against attacks from authoritarian systems. Because ultimately this is about freedom and democracy in Europe. The democratic state on its own cannot win the battle against populism, the force undermining the rule of law in Europe. The state alone cannot strengthen and protect the European model of freedom and the European basic values. To boost and protect our model of freedom and our fundamental European values we need a diplomacy of democratic networks.

Bernd Hüttemann is Secretary General of the European Movement Germany and teaches at the University of Passau and at the Berlin School of Economics and Law.

https://ip-quarterly.com/en/networked-democratic-diplomacy

Some thoughts on why and how we should think about the future of the European Union

16th June 2022

The task of the institutions and the member-states of the EU is not only to defend liberal democracy against strong external threats but also to prevent it from dying from within. As evidenced by a recent survey by the Bertelsmann Stiftung, more than 54% of respondents stressed that their voice does not count, and 32% that their participation would not make a difference. To address this gap, citizen participation must become an integral part of democracy in the EU.

The pandemic crisis and the Russo-Ukrainian war have shown that European societies are extremely vulnerable. It is important to recognize this. Only in this way will the EU be able to introduce aimed at the sustainability of Europe integration and the resilience (that is, the capacity to absorb shocks and stress) of the European citizens, their economies, and societies.

The birth and development of the EU were and are based on a simple idea: the connection of nations with the goal of peace. Brexit, the election of Donald Trump, as well as the behavior of other countries – from China and Russia to Turkey and Brazil – point to a direction in which nationalism and power politics may prevail over interdependence and dialogue. Interdependence does not only connect the world but also divides it. New technologies of communication and information polarize societies. Powerful states and governments also manipulate what binds them together – using, for example, sanctions, boycotts, export controls, or import bans (Mark Leonard,2021, The Age of Unpeace, Transworld Publishers).

The EU responded to the Russian invasion of Ukraine with coherence and determination. The fact, however, is that the European Union has entered a period that will highlight many problems that require difficult decisions. Should “soft power” be abandoned? Is it time for “hard power”?

The mistake that the EU must not make is to eradicate the identity it has cultivated for itself and its role in the world. The Russian invasion of Ukraine threatens to push the EU into a new bipolar condition (the USA in the West and China in the East). Worrying also is the use of terminology that is based on the “West” and the “Free World”. This is an ideological setback. The world is not bipolar, but multipolar. Globalization has also created realities whose rupture can prove to be chaotic and overemphasis on absolute ideological positions leads to divisions that are hard to bridge.

In recognizing this, the EU should defend what it had created since the 1950s: prosperous and thriving liberal democracies based on the rule of law and accountability. It is important to make clear that the EU will not give up its fundamental values, especially when they are threatened by member-states (Hungary, Poland). The end of the EU will not come because its member-states will not be able to agree on policies to curb climate change. Compromise on such issues is difficult, but it is achievable. The end of the EU, as in any political community, will come when its core values are not shared by all of its member-states.

The EU should also proceed with a strategy that is guided by the logic that “power with others” is more important than “power over others” (Joseph Nye 2021, Do Morals Matter, Oxford University Press). The EU must respond to the multipolarity and rise of forces outside the West and reflect on how it found itself in its current predicament. How has overconfidence in its own charm and its own model undermined the EU’s perspective for itself and the rest of the world? Self-confidence and overestimation of the superiority of “European culture” is not always a virtue. The exercise of humility would be useful.

It is also very important for the EU to support the weak countries/regions of the world – and in particular through an initiative to set up a global program to combat the negative effects that the pandemic and war in Ukraine will have on developing countries. Entering the third year of the pandemic, and without the resources, the EU has used to protect itself from the effects of the pandemic, the developing countries, already financially and socially vulnerable, have been hit hard. Times are certainly difficult, but when the developed EU only cares about “its own”, how sure is it that it will be safe if not everyone is safe?

In dealing with the above, the EU also seriously needs to ask and answer the following question: where does it want to direct its public policies? This requires reflection on (a) the correction of wrong choices (overemphasis on the financial sector and individualism, and (b) the pressures that member-states will face from the complex and successive crises that characterize today’s world. The pandemic seems to have worked as a turning point in this regard. Indicative is the decision of the European institutions in 2020 to go ahead with the Conference on the Future of Europe (2021-2022), a pan-European exercise of participatory and consultative democracy, which enabled citizens to make proposals for the priorities the EU has to set. Regaining citizens’ trust is a major challenge.

The task of the institutions and the member-states of the EU is not only to defend liberal democracy against strong external threats but also to prevent it from dying from within. As evidenced by a recent survey by the Bertelsmann Stiftung, more than 54% of respondents stressed that their voice does not count, and 32% that their participation would not make a difference. To address this gap, citizen participation must become an integral part of democracy in the EU.

Only in this way will the EU be able to inspire. And the EU has all the “qualifications” needed to draw up this strategy. The thousands of pages of the acquis communautaire, which governs everything from gay rights and the death penalty to sound emissions and food safety, are the EU operating system. Thus, it is necessary to reassess the situation in an environment that has already changed and will change to a more competitive, aggressive, and uncertain one. If this is not a serious reason for rethinking the EU, then no other will be found.

Some thoughts on why and how we should think about the future of the European Union

US Senators Consider Former VOA Director to Head US Agency for Global Media

10th June 2022

If confirmed, Bennett would lead USAGM, the federal agency with an $840 million annual budget that oversees VOA, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, Office of Cuba Broadcasting, Middle East Broadcasting Networks and the Open Technology Foundation.

U.S. President Joe Biden’s nominee to head the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM) pledged Tuesday to advance the agency’s mission of objectivity and balanced reporting at a time when disinformation is on the rise globally.

Former Voice of America director Amanda Bennett told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee she would be a pragmatic leader willing to adapt news delivery to whatever suits audiences best.

During the hourlong hearing, senators questioned Bennett on her record at VOA, how she would handle challenges facing the free press amid a global trend of disinformation, and USAGM’s ability to deliver news to audiences under authoritarian regimes.

USAGM is currently led by former VOA director of programming Kelu Chao, who holds the CEO position in an acting capacity. Chao was assigned the position after Michael Pack, the last presidential appointee, resigned at Biden’s request.

In her opening remarks to the committee, Bennett spoke of the role journalism plays in society. “We’re at a critical moment in history,” she said. “Journalism and public diplomacy alike are targeted as never before by authoritarian regimes using myths and disinformation to undermine those seeking credible, fact-based and unbiased coverage of the world around them.”

FILE: The White House has nominated Amanda Bennett, former director of the Voice of America, to be the head of the U.S. Agency for Global Media.

Bennett said she would work with all USAGM entities to maintain high journalistic standards and protect the safety and privacy of journalists and audiences.

Senator Tim Kaine, a Democrat from Virginia, who presided over the hearing and cited Russia’s crackdown on opposition to its war in Ukraine and the threats to media globally, said, “It’s clear that [USAGM’s] mission of providing balanced and objective media to societies without a free press has never been more important.”

Senator John Barrasso, a Republican from Wyoming, said Bennett’s nomination comes at a time when press freedom and democracy are declining around the world.

“U.S. international broadcasting has a very important role to play with authoritarian governments [that] shut down the news and censor their people; this agency can give credible and timely and accurate information,” he said.

Senators also examined Bennett’s record while VOA director between 2016 and June 2020, when she resigned before Pack took over. During the Trump administration, the agency came under criticism from the president for using Chinese government data on coronavirus infections and deaths, implying the agency was “soft” on China, an accusation VOA vigorously disputed at the time.

Trump’s VOA Criticism Shows US-Funded News Doesn’t Mean US-Approved

Senator Bob Menendez, a Democrat from New Jersey, said he backed Bennett’s journalistic track record leading the federal agency’s news coverage during her VOA tenure.

Bennett denied the agency had provided uncritical coverage of China, saying, “My entire journalistic career has been devoted to giving truthful news and information and not advocating for any position whatsoever, especially not a repressive regime.”

Outside view

Bennett’s nomination is expected to pass the Democratic-controlled committee in the coming weeks before moving to a full floor vote in the U.S. Senate.

Her journalism experience and her experience as head of VOA were cited as reasons for her suitability for the role.

The Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist has a long career in U.S. media, including as executive editor at Bloomberg News and managing editor of The Oregonian newspaper. She was a reporter for the Wall Street Journal for more than two decades, including in Beijing.

Ambassador Karen Kornbluh, a former member of the USAGM’s governing board, told VOA that Bennett’s media background and knowledge of USAGM from her time as VOA director make her a strong candidate. She said Bennett could set “the standard for all who follow.”

“Her leadership is essential at a time of resurgent authoritarianism around the world — to ensure that people living under repressive regimes not only have access to accurate information but also can see models of excellent journalism in practice.”

Members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee staff, speaking on background, highlighted to VOA key areas they believe the next head of the agency should focus on.

As well as closely tracking the increased funding provided under the latest spending bill, priorities include the creation of an advisory board to ensure objective news coverage without bias; ensuring robust coverage in Russia, Ukraine and surrounding countries, including via RFE/RL; and pro-American coverage of Iran and China.

Other issues include examining the rehiring of staff who were dismissed under Pack’s watch; and details, including the cost, of an investigation into allegations of Pack’s wrongdoing at the agency.

Critics also question Bennett’s decisions to cut a live interview broadcast by the network’s Mandarin service with a prominent critic of Beijing, and to dismiss Mandarin Service head Sasha Gong and others over the incident.

VOA says no wrongdoing has been proven in that decision.

“In no instance has any court or other adjudicative or administrative body found that the Agency failed to prove its allegations,” VOA’s Public Relations said Tuesday. “Third-party reviews of this matter concluded that the decision to curtail the live interview was based solely on and consistent with journalistic best practices.”

Committee hearings for presidential nominees take place after a White House vetting process. Candidates are also investigated by the FBI, IRS and Office of Government Ethics.

During nomination hearings, senators question the candidate to determine their suitability for the position and seek evidence of partisanship. The committee members eventually vote on whether to recommend the nominee for consideration by the full Senate.

Editor’s note: The 19th paragraph of this article has been updated to correct the attribution of background from House Foreign Affairs Committee minority staff. VOA regrets the error.

Secretary Antony J. Blinken With Maria Ressa on Digital Diplomacy and Human Rights Online

10th June 2022

QUESTION: Hello, everybody. Thank you so much for joining us. I’m Maria Ressa from the Philippines. What an honor to have U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken with us today at a crucial moment for all of us working for a better digital rights world. Secretary Blinken, thank you for joining us.

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Maria, great to be with you and great to be with everyone. This is really a pleasure for me. I’m thrilled to be hosted by RightsCon to be talking to you. I want to say greetings to everyone from the 360/Open Summit and from around the world who is in one way or another logged on, tuned in, and joining this conversation.

It’s so important from our perspective that the United States, likeminded governments, but especially with civil society, with NGOs, with think tanks, with the private sector, work to protect human rights online, work to demonstrate that our democracies can deliver for people as we navigate this extraordinary digital transformation that is having an impact on the lives of virtually everyone on this planet.

One thing I wanted to say at the outset before we get into a conversation is I am very pleased to announce that for the first time the United States will become chair of the Freedom Online Coalition in 2023. We want to strengthen the coalition. We want to bring more members onboard. We want to make it a center of action for ensuring a free and open digital future.

And this, in part, is going to be building on Canada’s terrific work as the current chair and really trying to carry it forward. So I’m really pleased to do that, to be able to announce that. And Maria, it’s great to be with you. You have been – you are – an extraordinarily courageous champion of freedom of speech, freedom of press and media, and freedom for a digital future that we all want and we hope to build together. So thank you for being willing to have this conversation today.

QUESTION: Well, that’s really great to hear from you, Mr. Secretary, exactly at this moment in time when it seems at times hopeless, and you never want to be hopeless, right? So let me ask you. You’ve been very outspoken about the way digital authoritarians have used tech to abuse human rights, a growing trend that people like us on the front lines increasingly defenseless. I mean, what have you seen globally, and what can you do about it?

SECRETARY BLINKEN: So you’re right. Unfortunately, that’s exactly what we’re seeing. Look, I think as in so many ways when we saw the emergence of a lot of this technology, starting mostly in the 1990s, the early 2000s, I think there was great hope that it would be inexorably a force for openness, transparency, freedom. And of course, in many ways it is.

But we’re also seeing, of course, the abuse of this technology in various ways, including by repressive governments trying to control populations, to stifle dissent, to surveil and censor. We see that, of course, in the PRC with technology being used, for example, for mass surveillance, including of the Uyghurs and other minorities.

So the question is what is to be done. What do we do about it? And there are a number of things that we need to do and in fact that we are doing. One is to start by calling things out. That’s the – often the basis for everything. We have to call out the abusive technology, including digital authoritarianism.

Second, as I mentioned, we’re going to be taking on the chairmanship of the Freedom Online Coalition. We’re working to strengthen it. And this is an important vehicle to try to protect and advance internet freedom and to push back against digital authoritianism.

Very practically speaking, there are a number of things that we – countries, NGOs, and others – are doing to, for example, get anti-censorship technology into the hands of people who need it so that they have the tools to push back against the misuse of technology in an authoritarian way. We set up a multinational fund to do that at the Summit for Democracy that we hosted last year.

And then, for example, putting export controls on surveillance technology to make sure that technology that we and other countries are producing that could have a dual use and be misused for the surveillance of populations, that doesn’t get into the wrong hands. That takes working together. One country alone can’t do it. And in fact, governments alone can’t effectively do it. We need to build these coalitions to make sure that we identify where technology should not go because it’s being misused, and then work together to make sure that it doesn’t get there.

QUESTION: No, I agree with working together. Mr. Secretary, you know that early on I said that the tech platforms that took control of – became the gatekeepers from journalists abdicated responsibility for protecting the public sphere, and in some ways it’s taken so long to get government regulations that in a way governments have also abdicated responsibility. We’re just starting to see the beginning of these roll out in the spring from the EU, right?

And yet we know the impact of disinformation. In the Philippines, we have seen disinformation repeatedly change our history. It’s that Milan Kundera quote, the struggle of man against power. Well, we’ve forgotten really quickly, and disinformation is being used to manipulate our biology.

Where do you see, what can you do about this? And how do we fight back, given that there are more than 30 elections this year and you can’t have integrity of elections if you don’t have integrity of facts?

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Couldn’t agree with you more. And this has been one of the other changes that we thought was going to be totally for the good, but of course, that hasn’t been the case.

In the United States a few decades ago, information that most people used on a – in their daily lives, there was a common foundation, because there were actually a fairly limited number of sources of the information that people got. We had three television networks back then, we didn’t have cable, we didn’t have an internet, we didn’t have talk radio, et cetera, et cetera.

And the hope, of course, was that the democratization of information would be a good thing overall. And fundamentally, I believe that’s still the case. But as a result of this, as a result of this disaggregation, you’ve lost exactly what you said, which are sort of the trusted mediators who can make sure that information, to the greatest extent possible, is actually backed up by the facts. And at the same time, that technology itself has allowed the abuse and the spreading of misinformation and disinformation in ways that we probably didn’t fully anticipate or imagine.

So we see authoritarian governments using this. We see it, for example, right now in the Russian aggression against Ukraine. We saw it in 2014 when Russia initially went at Ukraine and was using information as a weapon of war. So in that particular instance and in this instance, we’ve actually reversed this on them precisely by using information, real information, to call out what we saw them preparing and working to do. And being able to do that and to bring to the world everything that we were seeing about the planned Russian aggression and to lay out exactly the steps they were likely to take, and which unfortunately they did, I think has done a profound service to making sure that credible information is what carries the day and disinformation is undermined.

But there are a number of things that we can – here again – and we are doing to combat the misuse of information. Again, we start by exposing it and we start by sharing the information that we have; working with others, again, in a coordinated way. We have at the State Department something called the Global Engagement Center, which is focused intensely on finding, exposing disinformation, the techniques that are used by those who are propagating it, and, in a coordinated way, working with other countries, pushing back on it and giving people the tools to do it.

It’s critical for us that we also build the capacity of partners around the world, both governments but also journalists, NGOs, civil society. There are a number of things that we’re doing. We have initiatives to help give people fact-checking tools to make sure that the information that they’re getting actually is backed up by the facts and to show when it’s not. Digital literacy training, which is so critical to understanding what people are consuming and being able to separate the wheat from the chaff, the true from the misinformation and disinformation. Bolstering independent media – this is so critical. The single best check and balance against misinformation and disinformation is an effective, independent media, and we have initiatives to do that, including as appropriate financing and other things.

We see that there’s a deliberate attack to take down independent media, to take down NGOs that are operating in this space, so we’re putting in place protections. For example, countries actually try to use legal means – or I should say “legal” in quotation marks – “legal” means through lawsuits, as you know very well, and through regulatory challenge. Well, we’re putting in place programs, funding to enable people, institutions, media organizations to actually push back on that.

All of these things together are part of what we need to do. And finally, it’s so critical that we and you, this entire community, work with the platforms to find ways to more effectively ensure that they’re not being abused and used as a means of propagating misinformation, disinformation. Of course, it’s primarily on the platforms themselves to take the steps necessary to push back against that. I hope very much that we can continue to do that in a collaborative fashion. And sharing the information – what we’re seeing, for example – with the platforms, we’ve found that when we’ve been able to point them to malicious actors using the platforms in abusive ways, they’ve been responsive in making sure those actors can’t do it.

But of course, it’s a moving target, and for every bad actor that you take off, maybe it comes back under another guise or something else pops up. So we have to be vigilant; we have to be relentlessly focused on this. And I hope that we can do this in a cooperative, collaborative way.

QUESTION: Well, that’s certainly what we’re trying to do. But what we’ve seen in the last – and you mentioned 2014 until now, right? The disinformation that splintered reality, that allowed Russia to invade, to annex Crimea, and then eight years later to invade Ukraine — those metanarratives were seeded, the platforms were told about it, not much was done. And the question, of course, is would we be at this place if more was done, right?

But I guess this is – this goes to the last – the crucial question, which is: We have had impunity in the virtual world, and that impunity – you have a thousand-page document from the Senate that outlines what Russian misinformation did in 2016 in the United States. That impunity has filtered into the real world and really severed the checks and balances that are there. I guess the – and here, to quote Shoshana Zuboff, where she just says we live in one world, and if you don’t have rule of law in the virtual world, how can you have rule of law in the real world.

And this goes back to what is your democratic vision. I think that’s what’s been missing is that we don’t have a democratic vision for the 21st century with this technology that we have. What is it that you have?

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Yeah, Maria, you’re – I think you’re exactly right. And first let me say, look, we’ve been awoken to this challenge over the last years, and I think for me it certainly started particularly in 2014 with the initial Russian aggression against Ukraine and the use of misinformation and disinformation as a weapon of war as critical to their campaign. And then, of course, we saw the interference in our elections. And all of that has created a – I think an increasingly greater consciousness of the challenge and the need to do something about it.

But doing something about it starts with exactly what you said, which is advancing a positive vision, an affirmative vision of what this future should look like – a vision of an open, free, global, interoperable, secure, reliable internet. One of the ways we’ve done that is with this Declaration for the Future of the Internet that now some 60 countries have joined onto that actually lays out what this positive vision is. We’re working in concrete ways, though, not just to put out the vision but to realize it.

QUESTION: So what are the concrete steps that you’re taking?

SECRETARY BLINKEN: So much of the work that we’re doing is to make sure that we and other likeminded countries are at the table when so many of the rules and norms that are going to shape the future of the internet are being decided. And we’re doing that in a variety of ways. We’ve come together with the European Union, through something we’ve stood up called the Trade and Technology Council, to make sure that we’re working together to advance these different norms and standards. There’s growing convergence between the United States and the European Union on this vision for the future. Now we put that in practice by bringing our combined weight together everywhere these rules and norms are being shaped.

We’re making sure that we’re investing in our own capacity to do that. Here at the State Department, over just six months, we stood up a new Bureau for Cyberspace and Digital Policy. We will soon have a senior envoy to deal with emerging technologies to make sure that, to the extent values are infused in technology, they’ll be liberal values, not illiberal ones, and making sure that technology is used for the good and to advance democracy, not to undermine it.

We’ve been working to make sure that after last year’s Summit for Democracy, we make this year a year for action in terms of implementing many of the concrete initiatives that were announced at the summit, including some that I mentioned a short while ago, in terms of supporting independent media, giving people the tools they need to combat censorship, making sure that journalists and other organizations under siege can fight back and have the tools and the means to do so.

We, as I mentioned, have initiated a Declaration for the Future of the Internet with 60 countries so far, making sure that we’re all aligned in a shared vision and trying to advance it.

And finally, the institutions that are actually doing this work, that are deciding how all of the technology that we share is being used – it’s usually important that people who share this vision, share these values, are running these institutions. There’s a hugely important election for the head of the International Telecommunications Union coming up, and the candidate we support, Doreen Bogdan-Martin, is someone of vision and of value who can help advance this shared perspective that we have.

So it’s one of those things where probably 99.999 percent of people have no idea what the ITU is or how important this election is, but we’re very focused on it and making sure that someone with a shared vision can drive this forward.

The last thing I’ll say, Maria, is this: I think everyone present today is at the heart of this effort – civil society, NGOs, the private sector, independent media working together, holding governments to account, and then ideally, all of us joining forces. When you put all that together, it’s a very powerful force, and it’s one that I am convinced can carry the day in making sure that the future of technology and the future of the internet is one that actually advances freedom, that advances democratic principles, and that makes sure that together, we can build a future that reflects the values that we share.

So the work that every single one of you is doing in ways big and small, that’s what really counts, and I’m just pleased for the opportunity to spend a few minutes talking about how we see it, how we think about it, especially, Maria, with you. So thank you.

QUESTION: No, thank you so much, Secretary Blinken. Can I quick – get to one quick question?

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Of course.

QUESTION: Because you – so you mentioned leading in. Sheryl Sandberg just said that she would be leaving Meta this – at the end of this year. These are American companies that did have values that were infused into their design – and again, probably not by their design, but encouraged the death of democracies in many parts of the world. In Norway just last week, I kind of thought the next two years will be critical for the survival of democracy, and there were people from Kyiv, from Ukraine, who really said that they’d received the most help from ordinary people. You’ve just asked us all to work together. I guess is there a timetable even though – long-term, yes. Education, medium-term – yes, lost in the short term. How can we stop what Anne Applebaum called Autocracy Inc. from taking over in this period of chaos?

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Maria, I think we all have to be seized with the fierce urgency of now. And yes, many of the things that we’re talking about will play out over time. Much of this is not flipping a light switch or turning on or off a computer. It does take time. But if we bring to it together a sense of urgency and a sense of determination, that’s usually important, and if this entire community is galvanized, I think we can make a real difference. But that requires day-in, day-out vigilance; it requires day-in, day-out action.

And I think what we’ll see if we do it right and do it in a sustained way is you take a step and you look, and it doesn’t look like you’ve traveled very far; but my hope and expectation is that over the next few years, we will take many steps together and we’ll actually recognize that we’ve traveled a great distance.

The hard reality that we face – and it’s a cliche, but it’s profoundly true – technology itself isn’t inherently good or bad. How it’s used determines whether it’s for the good or for the bad. And if we marshal all of our forces together, I think we carry a great weight into this fight to make sure, to the best of our ability, that technology is used for the good, that it’s used to advance a more open, more free, more democratic world, and that it’s not misused and abused to undermine those basic principles.

But I think we have to have exactly what you said: a real sense of urgency about that, a real sense of vigilance, a determination to call out misuse and abuse, the determination on the part of NGOs and civil society to hold governments and hold the private sector to account. And I’m – I remain optimistic that marshaling all of these forces together with that sense of urgency, we can make a difference and we can shape a future that is more open, more tolerant, and actually supports and defends freedom and democracy and doesn’t undermine it. That’s the objective.

But look, we have to show, all of us in different ways, that we can actually deliver on this. So I recognize declarations are good, calling things out are good, but what really counts is action that makes a change, action that deals with the problem. None of that is easy, but we’re determined to do it, and we’re determined to do it together.

QUESTION: Fantastic. Thank you so much for your time, Secretary Blinken. Good luck.

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Thanks, Maria. Great to see you.

QUESTION: Bye-bye.

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Thanks. Bye-bye.

Secretary Antony J. Blinken With Maria Ressa on Digital Diplomacy and Human Rights Online

State Department establishing new IT governance body

US Cyber diplomacy bureau opens for business

2nd June 2022

FIRST IN MC: A NEW ERA FOR CYBER DIPLOMACY — The State Department’s Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy is today kicking off the Biden administration’s effort to enhance its digital aid to allies and accelerate the U.S. role in setting global cyber standards.

The long-awaited new agency “will address the national security challenges, economic opportunities, and implications for U.S. values associated with cyberspace, digital technologies, and digital policy,” the department said in a statement shared first with MC. As Eric writes in, the bureau’s formation — the result of combining and reforming three existing teams, with plans to hire 50 additional staffers — comes amid heightened fears of Russian cyberattacks as part of the war in Ukraine, a conflict that has highlighted the importance of the cyber aid that the U.S. has been giving other countries for years.

Given the need for an international collective response to Russian aggression, “there has never been a time when State’s leadership on these issues has been more important,” Chris Painter, who served as the United States’ top cyber diplomat from 2011 to 2017, told Eric.

The new bureau will comprise three divisions. The International Cyberspace Security team will coordinate cyber aid to allies and represent State in cyber discussions between U.S. agencies. The International Information and Communications Policy team will represent the U.S. in meetings about technology standards at the International Telecommunication Union, the U.N. and other global bodies. The Digital Freedom team will promote technology that supports civil society and democracy, especially in repressive regimes.

President Joe Biden still needs to nominate a bureau leader — who will have the rank of ambassador-at-large — for Senate confirmation. For now, career diplomat Jennifer Bachus is leading the bureau as a principal deputy assistant secretary, according to the department press release. Michele Markoff, a State cyber diplomat since 1998 and Painter’s deputy during his tenure, is leading the cyberspace security team. Stephen Anderson is leading the communications and information policy team, a role he held under State’s previous org chart. And Blake Peterson, a State Department policy adviser since 2010, will serve as acting digital freedom coordinator.

Each of these officials will have plenty of challenges on their plates. Bachus will need to build the bureau’s stature inside the government and with foreign allies while waiting for Biden to name her permanent replacement. Markoff will need to coordinate increased cyber aid to countries likely to be targeted by Russia, China and other U.S. adversaries. Anderson will need to counter Chinese influence in the creation of standards around 5G, quantum computing and other cutting-edge issues. And Peterson will have to find ways to combat the internet restrictions and tech censorship of authoritarian countries like Hungary and Belarus.

But the bureau could also create new opportunities for tech experts at State, according to Lauren Zabierek, the executive director of the Harvard Belfer Center’s Cyber Project. “I would love to see the State [Department] expand the Foreign Service career tracks to include science and technology as a standalone track,” she said. The bureau could give mid-career tech and cyber professionals a new way to use their skills for global good, she added.

Encryption

NATSEC OFFICIALS BACK APPLE — Nearly two dozen former national security officials made a familiar argument in an amicus brief filed late last week in the ongoing antitrust battle between Epic Games and Apple: allowing iPhone owners to download mobile apps outside of Apple’s App Store — something Epic is fighting for and Apple is resisting — could make their phones more vulnerable to hacking and espionage.

The group, led by former DHS official Paul Rosenzweig, argued in an amicus brief filed Thursday that allowing app downloads outside of the App Store will make it harder for Apple to prevent customers from accidentally downloading spyware, malware and other malicious apps onto their phones. That argument is similar to what Apple and other tech giants have been saying in recent months, as both U.S. and European lawmakers push to toughen their competition laws.

Rosenzweig organized the brief with his lawyers at Robbins Russell, who then circulated it among the other signatories. Rosenzweig told your MC host that the brief’s goal was to educate the courts on the ways these antitrust cases could possibly weaken the country’s cyber and national security landscape.

Signatories include a consortium of former officials at CISA, Cyber Command, the CIA, the NSA, the Pentagon, the White House and more. They don’t hold back, warning in the brief that “the world in which Epic prevails also immediately places individuals and the country at risk.”

“There’s some concern among antitrust advocates that this is all just sort of blown up by the tech companies and that this is a concern that only they hold,” said Tatyana Bolton, a former CISA official who also signed onto the brief, in an interview. “What we’re trying to do here is really signal that it’s not just tech companies. These cybersecurity concerns are real.”

— Counterpoint: Those on Epic’s side, advocates for changing the law to reign in “Big Tech,” have argued that these cybersecurity concerns have been blown out of proportion and that the companies’ current method of protecting user data still leaves much to be desired. And regulators and lawmakers continue to push forward plans to allow sideloading and other changes to services that have worried cybersecurity experts.

— Not the only group: The amicus brief is just the latest show of public support from former national security officials for the tech giants’ cybersecurity and national security arguments. In September, a group of about a dozen former national security leaders sent a letter to House leadership making similar arguments. (According to a POLITICO analysis, each of the signatories to that House letter had connections to the tech industry.)

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On the Hill

MARK YOUR CALENDARS — Before lawmakers head out for their two-week recesses next week, they’re planning to cross plenty of cyber items off their to-do lists. Here are the events to watch this week:

— Hearings: Gen. Paul Nakasone, head of both the U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency, will testify before Congress twice on Tuesday — before the Senate Armed Services Committee in the morning and then with the House Armed Services’ cyber subcommittee in the afternoon. During both appearances, Nakasone will discuss the state of his agencies’ cyber capabilities and ongoing operations in cyberspace.

Later in the week, the House Homeland Security Committee’s cyber panel will hold two hearings: On Tuesday, it’ll host a rescheduled hearing on Russian cyber threats posed to U.S. critical infrastructure. On Thursday, members will then discuss the progress of ongoing public-private partnerships in defending critical infrastructure with officials from CISA and the Office of the National Cyber Director.

— Nominations heading to the floor: The Federal Trade Commission could also get its fifth commissioner this week, after the Senate teed up the last two procedural votes on Alvaro Bedoya’s nomination last week. While a final nomination vote hasn’t been scheduled so far, confirming Bedoya this week could let the FTC — which has been stuck in a 2-2 party line split since June — weigh in on more consumer data breach and privacy cases.

— Capitol hackathon: Lawmakers and congressional staff will also have an opportunity Wednesday to take on the feds’ own cybersecurity challenges firsthand at a hackathon that afternoon hosted by House Democratic and Republican leaders. Participants will brainstorm solutions to current challenges in legislative workflows, constituent casework and hearing modernization.

Vulnerabilities

HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT — Researchers at Lab52 warned in a blog post Friday that they’ve uncovered a new spyware strain targeting Android devices that’s similar to a strain used by Russian state-sponsored hacking group Turla. The spyware, once downloaded onto an Android device, routinely sends information about the user’s actions back to the hackers. Researchers are hesitant to attribute the malware to Turla, but it appears the collected information is sent to an IP address based in Russia.

https://www.politico.com/newsletters/weekly-cybersecurity/2022/04/04/cyber-diplomacy-bureau-opens-for-business-00022622

China’s Cyber Diplomacy: a Taste of Law to Come?

Digital Diplomacy and the War in Ukraine

2nd June 2022

On Tuesday, March 15, the Oxford Digital Diplomacy Research Group, and the Department of Communications at Ben Gurion University of the Negev held a special panel discussion on how digital diplomacy is shaping the Russia-Ukraine War.

The horrid War in Ukraine has been accompanied by intense use of digital technologies. Ukraine’s besieged President has used Twitter to communicate with world leaders while employing Zoom to address global rallies. Through social media, Ukraine has created the world’s first “It Army” while Ukrainian ministers openly communicate with Tech CEOs and demand that Big Tech sanction Russia. At the same time, Russia has used digital technologies to spread disinformation and propaganda, while relying heavily on TikTok influencers. NATO’s digital activities have focused on debunking Russian allegations, while increasing the Alliance’s perceived readiness for combat.

This online panel discussed how digital technologies are shaping the Ukraine War. The panel examined the use of innovative technologies in the War as well as innovative usage of existing technologies. Moreover, the panel discussed the innovative use of digital technologies by the Ukrainian government, while also identifying the digital tactics employed by Russia. Among other, participants discussed

– Ukraine’s use of social media to challenge the policies of Big Tech companies

– Russian disinformation goals

– Ukraine’s strategic communications

– NATO’s digital response to the War

– How Wars play out on TikTok

– Gender and digital warfare

Panelists included: Prof. Corneliu Bjola, Dr. Jennifer Cassidy, Dr. Katherine Wright, Dr. Ilan Manor, Matthias Lüfkens, Elena Karacharova and Ukraine’s Ambassador to China.

View the recording of this panel discussion at the link below

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1wZnGcHjHc6V8ktkMNSqzzwtnqt7ih_7D/view?usp=sharing

55 UAE nationals complete ‘21st century diplomacy’ course

1st June 2022

Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy held course in partnership with foreign affairs ministry

Published: May 30, 2022 12:02 Abdulla Rasheed, Abu Dhabi Editor

During-one-of-the-Summer-Academy's-sessions-1653897755187 — During a session of the Summer Academy Programme Image Credit: Supplied

Abu Dhabi: The Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy (AGDA) in Abu Dhabi has successfully concluded the second ‘Summer Academy Programme’ in partnership with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (MoFAIC).

The academy welcomed 55 Emirati diplomats that joined the programme from May 23 to 26, both virtually and at its campus. The programme was exclusively designed for diplomats and was organised by the Academic Department. The participants took part in sessions taught by AGDA’s faculty members, as well as experts working in the field of 21st century diplomacy and foreign affairs.

The programme offered participants with a platform to discuss a variety of topics relevant to modern diplomacy, with experts and academics. The programme covered topics including Lessons Learnt from Expo 2020; China-Middle East Strategic Partnership; Negotiations; Space Diplomacy; Peacekeeping, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief; Russia-Ukraine Crisis and the Changing Global Order, as well as Geoeconomics.

Diplomats were also taken through theoretical and practical-based sessions in the fields of diplomacy and international relations, and discussed environmental challenges, during interactive sessions titled ‘Environmental Diplomacy and Road to COP 28’.

Dr Abdul Nasser Alshaali, Assistant Minister of Economic and Trade Affairs, and Head of Human Resources Diplomatic Committee at MoFAIC, said: “We are proud to continue our key partnership with AGDA and launch the second Summer Academy Programme that provides our world-class diplomats and elite ambassadors with insight, extensive knowledge and skills that are crucial for modern diplomacy, particularly during testing times, geopolitical shifts and global fluctuations.”

https://gulfnews.com/uae/55-uae-nationals-complete-21st-century-diplomacy-course-1.88243520

EU Public Diplomacy through the Partnership Instrument

1st June 2022

One of the main aims of EU external actions is to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries. The Partnership Instrument helps the EU achieve these goals abroad.

https://fpi.ec.europa.eu/stories/public-diplomacy-through-partnership-instrument_en

Jasna JELISIĆ Visiting professor, EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies Department (Bruges campus)

Digital Nativity and Digital Diplomacy: Exploring Conceptual Differences Between Digital Natives and Digital Immigrants

24th May 2022

The past decade has seen the accelerated digitalization of foreign ministries. In this study, we conceptualize digitalization as long term process in which diplomats adopt different technologies to obtain foreign policy goals. To date, only a handful of studies have investigated which factors influence digitalization. This study sought to address this gap by examining generational gaps within foreign ministries, while investigating how such gaps may prevent diplomats from obtaining communicative goals. The study thus employed the concept of digital nativity, while examining operational and conceptual gaps between digital natives and immigrants. Using a sample of 133 diplomats from six foreign ministries, the study finds there are few operational gaps between natives and immigrants. There are, however, substantial conceptual gaps between both generations. Specifically, digital immigrants use social networking sites (SNS) for one-way message dissemination and influence and are also less likely to interact with, or value follower feedback. The same is not true of natives. Conceptual gaps may thus prevent foreign ministries from successfully marketing new policies online or gaining valuable insight that may be integrated into the policy formulation process. The study includes a series of policy recommendation that may help ministries of foreign affairs (MFAs) overcome gaps between natives and immigrants.

Policy implications

The results of this study indicate that ministries of foreign affairs (MFAs) looking to leverage digital technologies towards the obtainment of foreign policy goals must address generational gaps. One way of doing so is through digital training that focuses not only on how to use technologies, but on how to increase returns on investment. For instance, in the case of social networking sites (SNS), training could elucidate the importance of listening to online audiences and valuing their comments, as a way of integrating public sentiment into the policy formulation process.
While this study focused solely on SNS, generational gaps may hinder the usage of other technologies. Indeed, the process of MFAs’ digitalization is far from over. In light of COVID19, and the emergence of 5G, MFAs may undergo a rapid process of digitalization integrating technologies for virtual meetings (e.g. Zoom), engaging audiences through virtual reality or using big data analysis. Senior diplomats who may view these technologies as ‘fads’ may hamper the successful utilization of digital technologies.
In this study, digital immigrants focused on managing their nation’s image. Yet SNS could also be used to strengthen ties with important journalists; cultivate relationships with travel bloggers and interact with diasporas. Digital immigrants may lack the vision required to employ digital technologies in innovative ways. Training is especially important for higher echelons who may not use digital technologies, but should still understand the rewards that can be reaped.

1 DOES DIGITAL NATIVITY IMPACT THE DIGITALIZATION OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY?

Over the past decade, ministries of foreign affairs (MFAs) have eagerly embraced digital technologies as part of their public diplomacy activities (Bjola & Holmes, 2015; Mazumdar, 2021). Scholars have yet to consider how generational gaps may impact diplomats’ ability to utilize digital technologies. Are younger diplomats, born into the digital age, more likely to interact with followers and stakeholders on social networking sites (SNS) as opposed to senior diplomats born into an analogue age? Conversely, are senior diplomats more likely to leverage digital tools towards mapping opposition to certain foreign policies when compared with younger diplomats? Conceptual and practical differences between generations may impact an MFA’s ability to reap the benefits of using SNS in public diplomacy activities.

This study addresses this limitation by asking: Do different generations employ SNS in different ways and can these differences limit an MFA’s ability to leverage digital technologies towards public diplomacy ends? To answer this question, we analyze a questionnaire disseminated among 133 diplomats. Our results demonstrate that there are important conceptual differences between generations.

1.1 The digitalization of public diplomacy

Twenty-first century definitions of public diplomacy exemplify a transition towards two-way models of communication. Melissen (2005) defined the ‘new’ public diplomacy as one that centers on engaging with ‘connected’ publics. According to Cull (2008), the term refers to obtaining foreign policy goals by engaging with foreign publics. Cowan and Arsenault (2008) argued that ‘new’ public diplomacy activities transition from monologue to dialogue and collaborations between diplomats and foreign publics.

By the beginning of the 21st century public diplomacy scholars and practitioners regarded SNS as the medium of the ‘new’ public diplomacy as these technologies enable organizations to transition from broadcast to communicative paradigms which are centered on mutual interactions (McNutt, 2014). Indeed, relationships are the foundations of SNS (Waters et al., 2009) as organizations and publics can discuss issues of mutual concern (Bortree & Seltzer, 2009). The initial adoption of social media by diplomatic institutions was intrinsically linked to the goals and logic of the ‘new’ public diplomacy (Manor, 2019). Recent studies have sought to identify which factors impact MFAs’ use of digital technologies (Mazumdar, 2021), as is explored next.

1.2 Digitalization as a process

In this article we assert that MFAs do not digitalize their public diplomacy activities overnight. Rather, the adoption of digital technologies is a long term process in which diplomats and their institutions experiment with different digital technologies. This process is impacted by both internal and external factors. Digital enthusiasm of senior policy makers is an internal factor. One of the earliest examples of digitalized public diplomacy was Sweden’s digital Embassy in the virtual World of Second Life. Launched in 2008, the Embassy served as a cultural hub exposing global publics to Swedish art (Pamment, 2013). Pamment asserts that this initiative was the result of active encouragement by Sweden’s foreign minister, Carl Bildt, a digital evangelist (Duncombe, 2018) who inspired Swedish diplomats to experiment with digital tools setting in motion a decade long process of digitalization.

Digitalization is also shaped by trial and error as was the case with the US State Department’s Digital Outreach Team (DOT) which was tasked with interacting with Muslim internet users following President Obama’s 2009 ‘New Beginning’ speech. Khatib et al. (2012) found that this experiment was hampered by rigid guidelines as all answers to online queries had to be approved in a dedicated DOT meeting. By the time an answer was posted online, there was no one left to read it. Yet this experiment had a profound impact on the State Department’s process of digitalization as, in its wake, diplomats were ‘set free,’ allowed to converse with online publics whenever they saw fit. Subsequently, the State Department institutionalized the use of SNS by drafting guidebooks and identifying best practices (Manor, 2019).

Digitalization can also be shaped by the experimentation of individual diplomats. Such was the case with Tom Fletcher who, as British Ambassador to Lebanon, used Twitter to communicate with hundreds of thousands of local users. Fletcher’s conversational style, and willingness to interact with average Lebanese Twitter users, was soon emulated across the UK’s Foreign Office (Collins & Bekenova, 2019; Manor, 2019).

Lastly, digitalization can also be shaped by external factors, such as crises. Following Russia’s use of bots during the Brexit referendum, the British Foreign Office launched a data science unit tasked with detecting fake SNS accounts (Rohaidi, 2019). Another external factor may be the limitations of offline diplomacy. For instance, Palestine launched a Facebook Embassy to Israel with the goal of promoting Palestinian statehood through interactions with Israeli Facebook users. Palestine opted for a digital Embassy as it has no physical diplomatic presence in Israel (Manor & Holmes, 2017).

While public diplomacy studies have begun to examine the process of digitalization, these studies suffer from two limitations. First, scholars often employ terms such as ‘engagement,’ ‘dialogue’ and ‘listening’ without clearly defining them. Melissen (2005) states that MFAs must ‘engage’ with foreign populations without articulating what constitutes an act of engagement. Is it a conversation between diplomats and SNS followers or any form of two-way interactions such as ‘liking’ a diplomat’s profile picture? Similarly, Cowan and Arsenault (2008) use the term dialogue without articulating its properties. Is dialogue the mere answering of a question or ongoing, online conversations over long periods of time? An additional limitation is that no study to date has investigated if generational gaps also influence an MFA’s process of digitalization? We address the aforementioned gaps through the concept of digital nativity.

1.3 Digital natives vs. digital immigrants

The term digital natives relates both to one’s environment and his/her ability to utilize digital technologies. Indeed, the central argument behind the concept of digital natives is that individuals born in the last four decades have interacted with digital technologies since birth. Prensky (2001) defined this younger generation, born circa 1980, as digital natives given that they are all ‘native speakers’ of the digital language of computers, video games and the internet (Helsper & Eynon, 2010; Palfrey & Gasser, 2016). Prensky refers to people born before 1980 as digital immigrants. While immigrants may learn to use new technologies, they will forever be trapped in the past, unable to fully understand the natives. Prensky likens this to the difference between learning a new language and being a native speaker. Characteristics of immigrants include: a reluctance to use the internet as a primary source of information, printing and correcting documents rather than editing on computers and reading manuals rather than mastering new technologies through trial and error (Barak, 2018).

However, a growing body of research has questioned the validity of the digital native concept (Dutton & Reisdorf, 2017; Hargittai, 2010). Studies indicate that there is a significant proportion of young people who do not have the level of access to computers or technological skills predicted by proponents of digital nativity (Helsper & Van Deursen, 2017; Wilkin et al., 2017). Additionally, such generalizations about a whole generation risk focusing attention on technically adept youngsters while ignoring the impact of socio-economic or cultural factors (Bennett et al., 2008; Hargittai, 2010; Kirschner & De Bruyckere, 2017). Thus, there may be as much variation within the digital native generation as between generations (Bennett et al., 2008). Scholars have also argued that with experience comes tech savviness. Digital immigrants who use digital technologies on a daily basis may therefore narrow operational gaps between themselves and natives.

On the other hand, scholars have also argued that there may be conceptual gaps between natives and immigrants. This argument is supported by three key findings. First, unlike immigrants, digital natives perceive the Web in terms of networks of individuals that generate content through two-way interactions (i.e., dialogue; Pekker, 2012). Second, natives perceive the Web as a space where information about life and work may be shared with clusters of friends (i.e., engagement). Finally, natives are more likely to perceive the Web as a space for opinion exchange (i.e., listening) (Pekker, 2012).

Differences between generations may have an important impact on an MFA’s process of digitalization. Specifically, such gaps may explain why some diplomats fail to use SNS towards relationship building. For example, if immigrants do not perceive the Web as a network for sharing information they may fail to foster two-way interactions with followers. Similarly, if immigrants do not perceive the Web as a platform for opinion sharing they may have little regard for comments posted by SNS users. As such, generational gaps impact the process of digitalization and even hamper digital activities.

This study analyzed the online activities of 133 natives and immigrants all of whom were responsible for managing their Embassy’s SNS activities. Through this sample, the study was able to examine if frequent and daily use of digital tools narrows operational gaps between generations and whether conceptual gaps still exist.

For the sake of clarity, the study explored three dimensions of the ‘new’ public diplomacy: dialogue, engagement and listening. Engagement, according to some scholars, refers to the need to communicate with publics assembled in various SNS (Metzgar, 2012). Listening may refer to the use of SNS to understand foreign publics and shape foreign policy accordingly (Metzgar, 2012). Dialogue refers to all forms of two-way interactions between diplomats and SNS users including online conversations, answering questions posted online, supplying request information or addressing criticism from followers (Hocking & Melissen, 2015; Pamment, 2013). Notably, this study focused on these three dimensions as they best capture conceptual and operational differences between digital natives and immigrants.

2 RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESES

This study sought to answer the following research question: Do different generations employ digital technologies in different ways and can these differences limit an MFA’s ability to leverage digital technologies towards public diplomacy ends?

Based on the literature review, and possible differences between Digital natives and immigrants, three research hypotheses were formulated:

H1.As opposed to immigrants, digital natives will perceive digital diplomacy and relevant practices in terms of social media engagement.

H2.As opposed to immigrants, digital natives will perceive digital diplomacy and relevant practices in terms of social media listening.

H3.As opposed to immigrants, digital natives will perceive digital diplomacy and relevant practices in terms of social media dialogue and two-way interactions.

3 METHOD

3.1 Measures

Participants were all asked to complete a questionnaire designed specifically for the purpose of this study and comprised of fifteen questions (see Figure 1). The first part of the questionnaire included questions used to differentiate between digital natives and digital immigrants according to existing literature. Previous scholarly work suggests that digital immigrants send less text messages than natives, print out and proof read a document before sending it, gather news from offline sources and send emails from their personal computer as opposed to other digital devices (Palfrey & Gasser, 2016). Questions also examined when respondents first created an SNS profile as with experience comes digital savviness.

Details are in the caption following the image — **FIGURE 1**

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Original study questionnaire

The second part of the questionnaire included 10 open ended questions that investigated differences in the conceptualization and practice of digital diplomacy. Each cluster of questions corresponded with a specific research hypothesis.

H1 (questions 1–3): conceptually, SNS have led diplomats to place an emphasis on creating relationships with online publics so as to facilitate the acceptance of their nation’s foreign policy (i.e., engagement). In practical terms, creating relationships necessitates that diplomats use SNS for two-way interactions with followers. To explore the conceptual dimension of SNS use, respondents were asked to define the terms digital diplomacy and online engagement. To examine the practical dimension, respondents were asked how often they engage in two-way interactions with connected publics.
H2 (Questions 4–7): digital diplomacy has been concetualized as consisting of two elements: listening and dialogue. To examine the listening component, respondents were first asked how they decide which topics to address online and how they identify MFA communications priorities. Both questions were meant to evaluate if, and how, respondents balance their MFA’s communication priorities with the informational needs and desires of their followers. Next, respondents were asked if they re-phrase MFA content and if followers’ comments impact future content. Both questions explored if respondents tailor online content to the informational needs of followers. Lastly, the questionnaire examined if respondents attempt to incorporate follower feedback into the foreign policy formulation by forwarding comments to an Embassy or MFA.
H3 (questions 8–10): examining two-way interactions was achieved by asking respondents if SNS interactions were an important component of their work. Relationships building was analyzed by asking respondents if they interact online with critics of their nation. Finally, to examine if respondents value their online followers, respondents were asked if SNS interactions enable a diplomat to understand how his nations is viewed by a foreign population.

3.2 Participants

The study sample consisted of digital natives and digital immigrants from six MFAs: Australia, Canada, India, Israel, New Zealand and Switzerland. These MFAs were selected for four reasons. First, all six MFAs migrated online nearly a decade ago and have thus undergone a process of digitalization. Second, all six MFAs extensively use SNS at the MFA and embassy level and they offer their diplomats digital training (Bjola, 2018; Manor, 2019). Thirdly, in all six MFAs there is a designated individual charged with managing SNS activities at the embassy level. It was thus assumed that participants from these MFAs would have acquired the skills and knowledge necessary to employ SNS in the practice of public diplomacy. Finally, these MFAs constitute a diverse sample with regard to geographic location, institutional cultures, communicative cultures and relative size of MFAs. This would enable some generalization of the study’s results.

In all six MFAs, directors of digital diplomacy units were contacted and invited to partake in a study that examines differences between digital natives’ and immigrants’ use of SNS. Directors were asked if their Embassies are active on SNS, if their diplomats undergo digital training and whether diplomats enjoy a level of autonomy with regard to selecting what information to post online, or when to interact with followers. Next, digital diplomacy directors were asked to recruit at least ten participants who manage Embassy SNS profiles, five below the age of 35 (i.e., digital natives), and five above the age of 35 (i.e., digital immigrants). The final sample consisted of 133 participants (see Table 1). Natives’ average age was 29, while immigrants’ was 44. The sample included both diplomats and locally trained staff.

TABLE 1. Study participants

Nation	Natives	Immigrants
Australia	39	18
Canada	1	4
India	9	6
Israel	12	8
New Zealand	11	10
Switzerland	8	8
Total	80	53

Participants were grouped based on year of birth (i.e., before and after 1980) given a desire to examine whether practical gaps between natives and immigrants have narrowed and whether conceptual gaps endure. The questionnaire was disseminated to all respondents via their respective MFAs. Respondents had three weeks to anonymously answer an electronic questionnaire.

It should be noted that the study’s sample suffered an over representation of Australian diplomats and under representation of Canadian diplomats. That said, the number of diplomats from the remaining four MFAs was similar. Given that this was an exploratory study, the authors felt that the sample was diverse enough and large enough to identify possible differences between natives’ and immigrants’ use of SNS.

3.3 Procedure

3.3.1 Data analysis

Respondents’ answers were analyzed using thematic analysis and following the roadmap offered by Braun and Clarke (2006). The first phase of analysis examined all the answers provided by digital natives to a single question. These answers were categorized based on overlying themes. For instance, when asked how they identify topics that are important to the MFA, many natives stated that they visit the ministry’s SNS profiles. Thus, a theme of ‘Ministry Social Media Profiles’ was created. Natives also argued that they rely on audience feedback to identify issues that should be prioritized. Thus, a theme of ‘Audience Feedback’ was created. In the second stage, all natives’ answers were reviewed yet again to identify themes that may have been missed. This led to the formulation of several additional themes.

Next, all answers provided by digital immigrants were reviewed and categorized into the themes expressed by digital natives. When immigrants’ answers differed from those provided by the natives, new themes were created. For instance, immigrants stated that they rely on Embassy meetings to determine which topics should be addressed online. Thus, a theme of ‘Embassy Working Routines’ was created. Finally, the themes identified in the answers of digital natives and digital immigrants were compared to identify differences in the conceptualization and practice of digital diplomacy.

3.3.2 Statistical procedures

The association between each of the four outcome variables and age was analyzed using a t-test (having a social media profile, sending texts, printing and emailing from multiple devices). The association between the four outcome variables and both age and MFA (e.g. India, Switzerland) were examined by logistic regression models.

4. RESULTS

4.1 Quantitative analysis

The sample consisted of 133 participants – 53 (41 per cent) digital immigrants and 80 (59 per cent) digital natives. The ages of participants ranged from 22 to 70 (mean 35.6 years, SD = 8.6 years). Ninety-five per cent of participants stated that they have a social media profile; 20 per cent stated that they send a high volume of text messages; 52 per cent indicated that they print a document before sending it while 95 per cent stated that they send emails from multiple devices.

A statistical analysis examined the association between age and four outcome variables (having a social media profile, number of texts sent daily, printing and proofing materials before sending them and emailing from multiple devices). The results of this analysis may be seen in Table 2, indicating that this association is significant for social media profiles and volume of text messages sent.

TABLE 2. Association between outcome variables and age

Outcome	Age Mean (SD)	t (df), p
Profile
Yes	35.3 (8.5)	2.09 (131) 0.018
No	43.0 (9.8)	2.09 (131) 0.018
High volume of texts
Yes	32.1 (7.3)	2.40 (131) 0.008
No	36.5 (8.8)	2.40 (131) 0.008
Print before sending
Yes	36.1 (9.8)	0.68 (131) 0.248
No	35.1 (7.1)	0.68 (131) 0.248
Email from multiple devices
Yes	35.5 (8.6)	0.63 (131) 0.264
No	37.6 (9.3)	0.63 (131) 0.264

In addition, a logistic regression model examined the association between age, respondents MFA (i.e., India, Switzerland) and each of the four outcomes. Regarding having an SNS profile, age still had a significant effect on the likelihood of having an SNS profile after adjusting for MFA (p = 0.049) whereas MFA did not have a significant effect. With respect to volume of texts, both age and MFA each had an independent significant effect on the likelihood of sending a high volume of texts (age p = 0.01; MFA p = 0.04). For printing and proofing materials and emailing from multiple devices no significant associations were detected.

In summary, no difference was found between digital immigrants and natives with regard to having SNS profiles, sending high volumes of text messages, printing and proofing a document and sending emails from multiple devices. Notably, the digital natives were younger than the immigrants when first joining SNS (mean age of immigrants was 32.1 and among natives 17.2 years). This was statistically significant (p = 0.049). Lastly, MFA (i.e., India, Israel) only influenced the number of texts sent by participants.

The aforementioned results demonstrate that the hard distinction between digital natives and immigrants as born before and after 1980 does not account for variance in the use of digital technologies. However, age does account for such variance. This suggests that the distinction between natives and immigrants based on year of birth may no longer apply. We postulate that in our sample, differences between natives and immigrants were reduced as all participants use digital technologies on a daily basis and belong to MFAs that have established a formidable digital presence. This hypothesis is strengthened by the finding that the MFA did not influence variable outcomes with the exception of volume of text messages sent daily.

4.2 Qualitative analysis

H1.As opposed to immigrants, digital natives will perceive digital diplomacy and relevant practices in terms of social media engagement.

To validate H1–H3, all respondents were asked ten questions. The following section presents the thematic analysis while using quotes from the questionnaire which best illustrate respondents’ answers.

Q1: How do you define the term digital diplomacy?

As can be seen in Table 3, when asked to define the term digital diplomacy the majority of digital natives emphasized the use of ICTs and SNS for ‘interacting’ or ‘engaging’ with publics (terms used by respondents) and building online relationships. Many natives also spoke of the ability to target and influence specific audiences, while emphasizing the open sharing of information with followers. Additionally, natives defined digital diplomacy as the use of various ICTs (internet, smartphone) in place of traditional face-to-face diplomacy. Lastly, only seven natives suggested that digital technologies are used to help manage a nation’s online image.

TABLE 3. How natives and immigrants define the term digital diplomacy

Thematic category	Prevalence	Example quotes
Digital natives
Engagement and relationship building	20 responses	Digital Diplomacy is the use of online tools and other ICTS to advance the diplomatic effort of the country and engage openly with a foreign public (Israel) Use of social media to promote a country and develop relationships (Switzerland)
More open and more targeted diplomacy	18 responses	It’s the shift from interpersonal diplomatic relations into the more open cyberspace with all its tools, not as elitist and accessible to more interested parties (Switzerland)
Leveraging full range of ICTs	12 responses	Public diplomacy through digital channels including TV, radio, websites, blogs and social media (Israel)
A substitute for face-to-face diplomacy	8 responses	Outreach to the public, and official persons, via online means rather than old-fashioned face-to-face means (Australia)
Using digital tools to manage national image	7 responses	The use of online platforms, particularly social media, to promote a country and its foreign policy agenda to key influencers as well as to the masses (New Zealand)
Digital immigrants
Use of social media to promote national goals and influence publics	22 responses	Use of digital media like internet and social media in propagating our point of view, creating good image of India and for disseminating information (India)
Using digital tools to manage national image	14 responses	The use of the internet and other technologies to inform about the activities of a government in order to have a better image and communication with other audiences (Israel)
Extending diplomats reach	6 responses	Using digital tools to extend the reach and influence of traditional diplomacy (New Zealand)
Engagement and relationship building	4 responses	Creating and maintaining relationships and the transfer of information using social media (Canada)
More open and more targeted diplomacy	2 response	Communicating an intended diplomatic message to a specific audience using digital tools (Australia)

By contrast, the majority of immigrants defined digital diplomacy as the use of SNS to influence publics or advocate in favor of their nation’s foreign policy goals. Immigrants’ definition also centered on the use of digital tools to manage the national image. Only two immigrants used the terms ‘engagement’ or ‘relationships’ in their definition, only two conceptualized digital diplomacy as a more open form of diplomacy and only four viewed digital diplomacy as resting on two-way interactions. Finally, unlike the natives, a minority of digital immigrants stated that digital technologies help extend the reach of diplomats’ messages. Only three thematic categories, identified in natives’ responses, were also identified in immigrants’ definitions. These are highlighted in italic.

Q2: How do you define the term online engagement?

A sizable majority of natives defined engagement as ‘interactions’ or ‘dialogue’ with online followers, with some emphasizing continuous interactions over long periods of time, as shown in Table 4. Digital natives were also likely to view the term engagement as a form of real-time communication that can vary on a scale from ‘likes’ to actual conversations. Another prevalent dimension was the ability to create connections with stakeholders. Finally, for natives, ‘engagement’ was a dynamic form of communications and a means of reaching digital publics.

TABLE 4. How natives and immigrants define the term online engagement

Thematic category	Prevalence	Example quotes
Digital immigrants
Dialogue and two-way communications (e.g. dialogue, discussions, queries)	20 responses	A two-way dialogue between content creator and audience (New Zealand)
A scale from likes to conversations	14 responses	Online engagement is the transition of consuming content online to interacting with it. It can take many forms including conversations, casual likes or shares (Canada)
Online interactions and connections	9 responses	The volume of audience interaction with digital products developed and promoted by our agency (e.g. blogs, social media platforms and website) (Australia)
Dynamic and active communications	9 responses	Dynamic and instant communication (Israel)
Continuous interactions with audience	8 responses	Conversing and participating in relevant online conversations, trends, and events (Israel)
Reaching digital publics	8 responses	The number of people who interact with the High Commission/Embassy/New Zealand Government through digital mediums (New Zealand)
Digital immigrants
Dialoguer and two-way communications (e.g. dialogue, discussions, queries)	17 responses	Direct engagement with clients on web-based platforms (Canada) Interaction using a web-based system with the possibility of two-way communication of some sort (New Zealand)
Resource intensive	8 responses	Amount of time and efforts spent on interacting and communicating via online platforms (Switzerland)
Dynamic and active communications	6 responses	Being active on FB, twitter, engaging with followers, fans (Israel)
Continuous interactions with audience	6 responses	Keeping ongoing interaction with an online audience on a regular basis to raise their interest and awareness of the brand you are representing (Switzerland)
Image management	6 responses	Building a brand image in the minds of online audience interactively (Australia)
Online interactions and connections	4 responses	Connecting with stakeholders and broader audiences through social media (Australia)

As was the case with digital natives, the majority of immigrants also defined online engagement as a form of ongoing, two-way interactions between diplomats and SNS followers. Yet unlike natives, immigrants stressed that engagement was resource intensive. Also, only a minority of immigrants defined ‘engagement’ as continuous interactions. Another distinction was that immigrants often spoke of engaging with ‘clients’ as opposed to ‘publics.’ Four thematic categories, identified in natives’ responses, were also identified in immigrants’ definitions. These are highlighted in italic.

Q3: How often do you find yourself engaging/interacting with followers (answering questions, supplying information, commenting on online content published by other social media users)?

The majority of digital natives stated that they engage/interact with followers on a daily basis, as shown in Table S1. However, natives also argued that these interactions amount to answering questions or responding to direct messages as opposed to continuously conversing with followers (21 responses). Crucially, nearly one quarter of the natives stated that they rarely engage/interact with followers be it due to limited resources or a fear of online trolls (21 responses). Finally, one quarter of natives stated that they engage/interact with followers on a weekly basis, while only four stated that they never engage/interact with followers.

Like natives, immigrants asserted that they answer followers’ queries or respond to direct messages on a daily basis (18 responses in total). Like the natives, digital immigrants also stated that they rarely engage/interact with followers (18 responses). Notably, all thematic categories identified in native’s answers were also found in immigrants’ answers.

The results presented in this section suggest that there are conceptual differences between natives and immigrants. While natives view SNS based-public diplomacy as a more open form of diplomacy that rests on two-way interactions, immigrants conceptualize SNS as mediums for one-way message dissemination and image management. While both generations conceptualize the term engagement as resting on ongoing, two-way interactions, natives believe that engagement also entails dynamic interactions. However, both generations practice engagement in a similar manner- responding to online questions and direct messages.

H2.As opposed to immigrants, digital natives will perceive digital diplomacy and relevant practices in terms of social media listening.

Q4: How do you decide what topics to address online? How do you know what topics are regarded as a priority by the ministry?

The majority of natives answered that they publish material that will be of relevance to their followers and that not all MFA communication will be of interest to local publics, as shown in Table 5 (23 responses). Relevant content could deal with issues discussed in the local news. Many natives stated that they rely on follower feedback to determine what topics to address online. Natives also actively search for, and identify MFA priorities by visiting MFA SNS profiles. A small number of natives stated that they rely on MFA instructions or Embassy meetings to identify topics to address online.

TABLE 5. How natives & immigrants decide what topics to address online

Thematic category	Prevalence	Example quotes
Digital natives
Relevance to followers (e.g. local news, current affairs)	23 responses	We check the national and international news… other pages of our representations abroad and select topics according to what we are currently working on, what the current interests are (Switzerland)
Follower feedback	17 responses	On social media we track our likes, reactions, shares we can see which are the most popular. We try and cater to our audience interests but to also articulate Government priorities (Australia)
Visit MFA sites	14 responses	The Ministry website and social media channels provide pointers on the topics that are regarded as priority (India)
MFA instructions	10 responses	We take our cues from the Ambassador, from ministerial media releases and Secretary’s messages (Australia)
Embassy meetings	7 responses	The Embassy has a concept note developed for Facebook. The topics are decided on the basis of the concept note (Switzerland)
Digital immigrants
MFA instructions	27 responses	We create a social media calendar that includes: events/visits; world event; DFAT upcoming priorities and work out how to leverage these to promote core messages (Australia)
Embassy meetings	14 responses	The Ambassador and the deputy head of mission are making the decisions (in what are the communication priorities) (Switzerland)
Visit MFA sites	3 responses	I follow the ministry website/twitter/FB carefully and am actively engaged with my colleagues & MFA Digital Diplomacy team constantly (Israel)
Relevance to followers (e.g. local news, current affairs)	2 responses	We usually address the issues that are under our pillars as guided by the ministry. The Ministry gives us the priority areas which we focus on and do the ad hoc postings as guided by the Ministry (Canada)
Follower feedback	1 response	Post priorities filtered by public interest (New Zealand)

Conversely, the majority of digital immigrants said that they rely on ministry instructions when deciding what topics to address online (27 responses). Moreover, only a handful of immigrants answered that they try to meet the interest of their SNS followers. Only one immigrant said that s/he considers follower feedback. As opposed to natives, only three immigrants stated that they actively use ministry SNS profiles to identify relevant topics. Moreover, only two immigrants said that they publish information about issues making local headlines. Many immigrants did, however, state that their priorities are set during Embassy meetings. All thematic categories identified in native’s answers were also found in immigrants’ answers.

Q5: Do you re-phrase Tweets or Posts formulated by the ministry or do you simply re-publish them? Why do you re-phrase them?

As Table S2 indicates, the majority of digital natives answered that they re-phrase content to tailor it to their SNS followers (49 responses) in three ways: natives translate tweets and posts to local languages; re-phrase content to make it more colloquial and re-phrase content to tailor it to local contexts by using local hashtags, adding local vernacular or addressing issues of local concern.

Interestingly, identical results were found among digital immigrants. However, unlike natives, immigrants also answered that they re-phrase content to ‘grab’ the attention of online publics. All thematic categories identified in natives’ answers were also found in immigrants’ answers.

Q6: Do comments you receive online impact future content? For instance, do comments on Tweets influence what Tweets you will publish in the future?

The majority of natives answered that followers’ comments influence future content, as exhibited in Table S3 (53 responses). Specifically, content which is well received is analyzed and repeated. Natives argued that followers’ comments can help embassies tailor content to the interests and needs of followers. This, in turn, can help an embassy foster closer relationships with online publics. Additionally, natives argued that by identifying followers’ interests, embassies can increase the reach of their online content. Natives also rely on the tone and volume of comments they receive from followers. Importantly, nearly a quarter of all natives stated that comments do not influence future content given that embassies have pre-determined what issues to address online (18 responses).

The answers of digital immigrants were markedly similar. First, a substantial number stated that follower comments do not impact future content (18 responses). Second, immigrants stated that content that is well received is likely to be repeated. Third, immigrants stated that the volume and tone of online comments enables one to tailor content to the interests of followers, thus extending his digital reach. All thematic categories identified in natives’ answers were also found in immigrants’ answers.

Q7: Are comments you receive online sent to relevant departments in the Embassy or the foreign ministry?

As Table 6 shows, many natives answered that they tend to forward online comments to relevant departments at the Embassy or the MFA with the hope that comments will influence the policy formulation process (35 responses). However, natives also stated that they tend to focus on negative statements and online criticism. Lastly, natives indicated that they are likely to send comments to the ministry when they encounter a large volume of comments on a specific policy.

TABLE 6. Do natives and immigrants send comments to embassy or MFA departments?

Thematic category	Prevalence	Example quotes
Digital natives
Yes, may impact policy formulation	35 responses	Comments received through our social media channels are incorporated into regular reporting. Comments pertaining to the activities or policies of other agencies and Departments are forwarded for their consideration (Australia)
Not applicable/don’t receive many comments	13 responses	There hasn’t been an occasion yet to do this (Australia) We haven’t had any comments that we’ve considered warranted telling headquarters (New Zealand)
No	11 responses	No. We handle almost everything locally (Israel)
Emphasis on negative comments	8 responses	Only negative comments are sent to the MFA. Internally, we discuss reactions to certain comments/questions (Switzerland)
Depends on volumes of comments	7 responses	Yes, when I see a trend on a specific issue/policy, I share the details with the diplomat at the mission who is in charge, and let him inform headquarter (Israel)
Digital immigrants
No	19 responses	Comments/criticisms aren’t that highbrow! Haven’t had to contemplate any worthy of forwarding…yet (New Zealand)
Yes, mostly consular	14 responses	Yes, but I must point out that over 90 per cent of comments pertain to visas and we have developed a set of standard responses on this in collaboration with our colleagues working in the immigration section of the embassy (Canada)
Not applicable/don’t receive many comments	6 responses	Have not experienced this (Australia)
Emphasis on negative comments	6 responses	Yes, if there was negative comment about government policy, we would notify the relevant area of DFAT (Australia)
Depends on volumes of comments	5 responses	The majority of comments are positive, and when we have received negative comments we have sent to the ambassador if these comments are too many (Israel)

As opposed to digital natives, nearly half of the immigrants stated that they do not send online comments to the embassy or the MFA as comments are usually not sophisticated enough (19 responses). Immigrants also asserted that comments will be sent to the ministry if they are of a violent nature. Thus, immigrants seem to focus their attentions solely on negative comments.

The results presented in this section suggest, yet again, that there are conceptual differences between digital natives and immigrants and not practical ones. As opposed to natives, immigrants do not rely on public feedback when deciding which issues to address online nor do they bother to tailor ministry messages to the informational needs of local followers. Additionally, immigrants do not view public comments as an important source of information nor do they transmit public comments to the MFA. This could suggest that immigrants do not hold digital publics in high regard. There are, however, similarities in how natives and immigrants practice online public diplomacy as both rephrase content to meet the needs of audiences, and both use follower feedback to increase the Embassy’s online reach.

H3.As opposed to immigrants, digital natives will perceive digital diplomacy and relevant practices in terms of social media dialogue and two-way interactions.

Q8: Do you think engagement/interaction with social media followers is an important component of your work? If so, Why?

As Table 7 demonstrates, the majority of natives stated that interacting with SNS followers was a crucial component of their work (66 responses). Natives’ answers did vary with regard to why interactions are important. One group stated that two-way interactions were a means of disseminating information about Embassy activities and national policies. Others answered that interactions are important as they constitute a form of ‘dialogue’ with online audiences. Some natives stated that it is through interactions that diplomats can influence the worldview of followers. Lastly, natives stated that interactions are important as they enable an Embassy to attract new followers and offer insight into how an Embassy is perceived by the local population. Only a fraction of natives stated that online interactions are unimportant (13 responses).

TABLE 7. Do natives and immigrants think engagement is an important component of their work?

Thematic category	Prevalence	Example quotes
Digital natives
Dialogue and relationship building	21 responses	Yes, engagement is the predominate reason to have a digital media presence. It serves as a surrogate for in person interaction as such we can only be successful by communicating directly (Canada)
Influence followers	18 responses	Yes. We have around 50,000 Followers on Facebook – this presents an amazing opportunity to spread messages and influence target groups – for example Brazil is the largest source country for international students outside of Asia, we can directly influence young people interested in studying overseas, and sell Australia as a top education destination (Australia)
Extend digital reach	14 responses	Yes, it is. It is a good barometer of how the Embassy’s efforts are being perceived by the local population. Praise as well as criticism is received in equal measure (India)
Information dissemination	13 responses	Yes, because users rely on social media more and more to get their information about the mission and to inquire about services we offer (Israel)
No	13 responses	At this stage, no. Our social media strategy is to be the platform for discussion rather than engaging in the discussion itself (Australia)
Digital immigrants
No	25 responses	If engaging is replying or conversing with Facebook followers’ comments, then no, I don’t think this is that important, mainly because comments generally aren’t that ‘high level.’ I see engagement at a micro level of posting an item that generates interest – the reach determines how well it has engaged followers (New Zealand)
Does not extend digital reach	9 responses	It can be but we do not see any major difference when it comes to the number of followers just because we engage with the extra during a few weeks (Israel)
Influence followers/image promotion	7 responses	I think it is very important. People feel flattered when the Embassy of another country entering into a dialogue with them, answering questions, informed them about to events. It is good for the image promotion (Switzerland)
Information dissemination	7 responses	Yes, it is. It allows us to connect with our clients, contacts and audience and enable us to provide them with instant information (Canada)

By contrast, the majority of immigrants answered that interactions were not an important component of their work given limited resources or their preference for face-to-face diplomacy (25 responses). Immigrants did not view interactions as a means for relationship building. Immigrants even viewed interactions as a method for making followers ‘feel important.’ Those immigrants that did place an emphasis on engagement viewed it as a tool for national image management.

Q9: Do you think it is important to engage/interact online with those who criticize your nations? If so, how often do you engage with them? (daily/ weekly/ never)?

Digital natives tended to state that interacting with critics was important (50 responses) so long as the criticism did not include verbal abuse, as exhibited in Table 8. Several natives argued that interacting with critics demonstrates that embassies are approachable and that nations can justify their policies (16 responses). Notably, natives also stated that interactions with critics enables embassies to correct misconceptions about their nations’ policies. However, when asked how often they interact with critics a large proportion of natives stated that they rarely do so as such exchanges can fuel negative debates (28 responses).

TABLE 8. Do natives & immigrants engage with critics?

Thematic category	Prevalence	Example quotes
Digital natives
Rarely	28 responses	I rarely engage with negative comments. I delete them if they are inappropriate or hide them if I think they do not bring anything valuable to the discussion – (Israel) Never. ‘Don’t feed the trolls’ (New Zealand)
Yes, correct misconceptions	19 responses	Yes, this is important, especially to clarify any misperceptions or counter any outright misinformation/disinformation (New Zealand)
Yes, justify policies and make embassy approachable	16 responses	Yes. Many times these critical views are highly entrenched and difficult to change, but at least engaging with such individuals gives us the feel of the pulse. Moreover, it shows the general public that Embassies are not inaccessible (India)
Yes, with the exception of hateful comments	15 responses	I think it is important if it is justified/ moderate criticism. I usually don’t react to extremist comments as I don’t believe I will convince someone who is already at the extreme 5 per cent of the anti-pro-spectrum (Israel)
Digital immigrants
Rarely	27 Responses	Tend to avoid this as don’t consider engaging with trolls to be productive or constructive (New Zealand)
No, does not lead to persuasion	10 responses	It depends on the way of ‘criticising.’ Sometimes it’s a waste of time as some just want to get it off their chests and are not willing to hear counter-arguments (Israel)
Yes, with the exception of hateful comments	6 responses	Whenever comments/remarks are posted and as long as the criticism is not inappropriate (Switzerland)
Yes, correct misconceptions	6 responses	We would weekly answer some negative comment to correct misconceptions (Australia)

As opposed to natives, the majority of digital immigrants stated that they do not ascribe importance to interacting with critics of their nation (37 responses in total). Some stated that they tend to distance themselves from political discussions online while others argued that they avoid critics given a desire to remain impartial. Immigrants were also likely to view critics as trolls. Unlike natives, immigrants felt that interacting with critics was unlikely to change people’s opinions. Only two immigrants stated that they engage with critics, while another two stated that engagement with critics can correct misconceptions about states and their policies. While the thematic category of ‘Justify Policies and Make Embassy Approachable’ was only evident among natives, that category of ‘No, Does Not Lead to Persuasion’ was only evident among immigrants. These are highlighted in italic.

Q10: Do you think social media enables you to understand how your country is viewed by foreign populations?

Table 9 demonstrates that digital natives tended to argue that SNS can offer insight into how one’s nation is viewed by a foreign population and that it offers an informal way of gauging public opinion (47 responses in total). Natives were aware of the fact that their SNS followers constitute a biased sample consisting of young and connected individuals who already have an interest in a foreign nation. Only eight natives stated that SNS does not offer such insight.

TABLE 9. Do natives and immigrants believe that SNS enables them to understand how their country is viewed by a foreign population?

Thematic category	Prevalence	Example quotes
Digital natives
Yes	34 responses	Yes, it’s a very good way to measure reactions in a considerable large scale (Israel)
Biased sample	17 responses	To a degree, yes. Our FB audience demographic are educated young adults18–35 years of age, so this wouldn’t give us an accurate interpretation of the older generation of Malaysian and/or those who are less fortunate to receive higher education (which is unfortunately is a high percentage of Malaysians) (New Zealand)
Comments/likes offer informal gauging of opinion	13 responses	Yes, I think this is very important and that it is one of the only direct and informal ways to know what people think about Switzerland. Social Media enables us to speak with people that we usually don’t meet at our events (Switzerland)
No	8 responses	Somewhat… we are still working on building our audience base, especially with the local population. I have a better understanding of how our country is viewed by the local population through traditional means and measures (Australia)
Digital immigrants
Yes	24 responses	Yes, it does. The benefit of social media is that it provides instant communication and feedback from the people of the host country. Analyzing the responses helps to understand the perception and views Indians have about Switzerland (Switzerland)
No	22 responses	Understanding the country you are in, and how you are perceived requires much more being involved with people as people in the country. Being involved with real people, real activities, real causes and in different parts of the country. Overreliance on social media can be a risk, in particular because it can be a favoured outlet for the grumpy, the anonymous and the disappointed- (New Zealand)
Biased sample	5 responses	To some extent; but it is not the primary measure by any means as use of social media is age biased (New Zealand)
Comments/likes offer informal gauging of opinion	2 responses	Yes. In Egypt, millions of young people are plugged into social media on a daily basis and their comments are indicative of how they view the country (Switzerland)

Unlike natives, nearly half of the digital immigrants stated that SNS cannot help gauge how one’s nation is viewed from abroad (22 responses). Some suggested that one must rely on traditional diplomacy for such insight. Others stated that SNS actually demonstrate how little people know about other nations. When immigrants did view SNS as an information source, they also viewed their followers as biased samples in terms of age, interest and digital capabilities (five responses). Only two immigrants viewed SNS as an informal way of gauging public opinion on other countries. Markedly, all thematic categories identified in native’s answers were also found in immigrants’ answers.

The results of this section demonstrate important conceptual differences between digital immigrants and natives. Digital natives viewed two-way interactions as an important component of their work and a means toward relationship building and influence. Moreover, natives stated that interacting with critics was especially important as it could help nations justify their policies, correct misconceptions about policies and gauge how one’s nation is viewed by another. Digital immigrants, by contrast, viewed online followers as trolls looking to be pleased and uniformed audiences whose input cannot offer valuable insight. However, both natives and immigrants rarely interact with critics de facto.

4 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This study sought to address an important gap in public diplomacy scholarship by examining if generational gaps influence MFAs’ processes of digitalization. The study employed the concept of digital nativity while focusing on the ‘new’ public diplomacy elements of engagement, listening and dialogue.

Results suggest that the hard distinction between digital natives and immigrants based on year of birth may no longer apply. The statistical analysis found that age did account for variance in personal use of digital technologies (e.g. high volume of text messages). However, there was no such variance between those born before and after 1980. Additionally, results indicate that there are few operational gaps between natives and immigrants practicing public diplomacy through SNS.

The study did, however, reveal important conceptual gaps between generations. While digital natives were more likely to view SNS as platforms for two-way interactions and relationship building, immigrants viewed SNS as tools for one-way information dissemination. They were less likely to value follower feedback or regard SNS as important diplomatic tools. Immigrants also focused more on national image management. Thus, this study finds that differences between immigrants and natives may now lie in their conceptualization of digital technologies rather than their use. By examining groups of educated individuals who utilize digital technologies daily, this study controlled for two variables associated with digital nativity – scope of digital use and education. Thus, the study was able to differentiate between operational and conceptual gaps.

This article’s contribution is three-fold. First, it provides empirical evidence that conceptual gaps can influence an MFA’s ability to utilize digital technologies. As they have little regard for online followers, immigrants are less likely to transmit local feedback to the MFA preventing the ministry from identifying contentious foreign policies. As they prioritize information dissemination over engagement, immigrants are less likely to amass a sizable following preventing the MFA form marketing new policies or influencing the perceptions of digital publics. Most importantly, immigrants do not believe that interacting with SNS followers is an important component of their work. This may prevent embassies and MFAs from building relationships with online stakeholders.

The article’s second contribution lies in ‘demystifying’ the terms engagement and listening by identifying what they mean to those diplomats tasked with managing SNS profiles. Among both natives and immigrants, the term ‘engagement’ refers to a scale of interactions that ranges from ‘likes’ to actual conversations with followers. Natives did emphasize that ‘engagement’ rests on continuous, real-time conversations. However, among both groups, actual ‘engagement’ takes the minimal form of responding to questions and direct messages. Thus, there is a substantial gap between diplomats’ definition of ‘engagement’ and its actual practice.

This is not the case with ‘listening.’ According to digital natives, ‘listening’ includes a host of activities such as relying on audience feedback when publishing information on SNS; tailoring SNS content to followers’ interests and local context and sending follower feedback to relevant MFA departments. Both immigrants and natives tended to identify contentious issues by examining the tone and volume of online comments. Thus, the gap between diplomats’ conceptualization and practice of ‘listening’ is rather small.

The article also contributes to the debate surrounding the ‘new’ public diplomacy. While some scholars assert that the goal of the ‘new’ public diplomacy is to build long-term relationships with connected publics (Cull, 2008; Melissen, 2005), others maintain that the ‘new’ public diplomacy still prioritizes influence over relationships (Pamment, 2013). These diverging opinions were evident in gaps between natives and immigrants. For natives, the term ‘digital diplomacy’ is closely associated with building relationships through online interactions and using digital tools to substitute offline diplomacy. Immigrants, on the other hand, view ‘digital diplomacy’ as the use of SNS for one-way information dissemination and influencing their nation’s image abroad. It thus appears that more senior diplomats still prioritize influence over relationship building.

Notably, conceptual differences between generations were found in all MFAs and across all MFAs. Thus, the results of this study indicate that MFAs looking to leverage digital technologies must address generational gaps. One way of doing so is through digital training. For instance, SNS training could elucidate the importance of listening to online audiences and valuing their comments. For while tailoring increases one’s audience size, feedback offers a wealth of information on how a nation is viewed abroad. Moreover, training should highlight the variety of goals that can be obtained through digital technologies. In this study, digital immigrants focused on managing their nation’s image. Yet SNS could also be used to cultivate relationships with travel bloggers or interact with diasporas. Digital immigrants may lack the vision required to employ digital technologies in innovative ways.

An important question relates to agency or whether the surveyed diplomats had the agency necessary to determine what content to publish online and when to engage with followers? Notably, we deliberately surveyed diplomats from MFAs that offer their diplomats autonomy when communicating online. Moreover, respondents from all MFAs demonstrated high levels of agency in their answers. Respondents searched MFA SNS accounts to identify communication priorities and tailored SNS content with respect to language and context. MFA instructions were found to influence only immigrants’ online content. As such, we assert that diplomats’ in our sample enjoyed the agency necessary to leverage SNS towards public diplomacy goals.

However, digital natives were more likely to seize on their autonomy. Unlike immigrants, natives were more likely to decide what content to publish on SNS and when to engage followers. This could suggest that agency is comprised of two elements: having agency and seizing that agency to advance public diplomacy goals.

Finally, it is important to note this study’s limitations. First, while our sample size provided a rich research corpus, it may have been too small to fully capture conceptual differences between natives and immigrants. Moreover, personal interviews, as opposed to questionnaires, may have afforded a deeper understanding of these conceptual differences. Lastly, the sample was limited to nations that practice digital diplomacy in English. Future studies should be more inclusive.

5 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors would like to acknowledge the support of the Azrielli International Postdoctoral Fellowship.

Biographies

Ilan Manor is a digital diplomacy scholar at Tel Aviv University and a member of Oxford University’s Digital Diplomacy Research Group. His 2019 book, The digitalization of public diplomacy, was published by Palgrave Macmillan as was his 2020 co-edited volume Public diplomacy and the politics of uncertainty.
Ronit Kampf is a teaching fellow at Tel Aviv University and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. She studies computerized simulations as a learning tool for youth in conflict regions and social media as a tool for social change among youth in divided societies.

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1758-5899.13095