What a great way to say goodbye to 2013 – we exceeded 500,000,000 views on GOV.UK recently – which tells us that you’re finding loads of ways to access our services. We’ll keep working tirelessly to make things better, and here’s to the next half a billion.
Join the conversation on Twitter: @GDSteam and sign up for email alerts.
You may also be interested in:
Yesterday the BBC published data showing more people accessing iPlayer via tablet than via computer. This prompted me to update some of the data I gathered for the government’s agreed approach to mobile last this time last year.
The objective of the UK government’s digital strategy is to make sure our digital services that are so straightforward and convenient that all those who can use them will choose to do so. But what our users consider to be ‘straightforward’ and ‘convenient’ is not static. We need government services to be able to adapt quickly to big changes in people’s behaviours and expectations.
For example, here’s a graph showing how the devices people use to visit GOV.UK have changed since its launch. (To be precise, the data is for visits, rather than users.)
Percentages of visits to GOV.UK from computer, mobile and tablet
Since 1 January 2014, 63% of visits to GOV.UK have come from a computer, 23% from a mobile and 14% from a tablet. In January 2012 it was 77% computer, 15% mobile and 9% tablet. If you visit the GOV.UK performance dashboard you’ll see that the sample sizes are non-trivial.
Compared with the general UK population, the graph above may be skewed by a minority (around 2%) of GOV.UK users who visit the site more than 100 times a month, often to research government activity as part of their job, typically from a work computer.
I’ve tried to get more representative UK data by looking at the visit data for the two weeks following Christmas Day, when such power users are probably not quite so busy.
The device breakdown for this period last year was 74% computer, 16% mobile and 10% tablet.
This year saw 61% using a computer, 24% mobile and 15% tablet.
On Christmas Day 2013, only 51% visited GOV.UK from a computer, compared with 66% on Christmas Day 2012. (Over 300k visits to GOV.UK this past Christmas Day; 34k were looking for a job; over 5k bought a tax disc.)
Shifts in the devices people use to access the internet should come as no surprise, but the pace of change might. And I do not expect this switch away from PCs towards more personal, portable, touchscreen devices to slow down anytime soon.
The UK government e-petitions service has seen incredible changes in how, when and where it is used. Pete Herlihy has product managed this service since it went live in summer 2011. As he revealed recently, only two years ago over 75% of visits came via computers. Now a mere 27% do so, with 56% from mobile, and 17% from tablet.
Not every service will end up with such proportions, but e-petitions demonstrates just how rapidly and radically user behaviour can change. Here’s current data for some of the transactional services on GOV.UK:
Book your practical driving test:
Computer – 67.4% (was 71.3% in March 2013)
Mobile – 21.4% (was 17.7% in March 2013)
Tablet – 11.2% (was 11% in March 2013)
Change date of practical driving test booking:
Computer – 56.9% (was 61.3% in March 2013)
Mobile – 32.4% (was 30.3% in March 2013)
Tablet – 8.7% (was 8.4% in March 2013)
Computer – 64.6%
Mobile – 26.6%
Tablet – 8.8%
Make a Lasting Power of Attorney:
Computer – 84.3%
Mobile – 12.4%
Tablet – 3.3%
Computer – 67.1%
Mobile – 17.7%
Tablet – 15.2%
I hope this helps explain why the digital by default service standard requires that, from April 2014 onwards, all new or redesigned central government digital services must be designed with an appropriate range of devices in mind. As we say in the GDS Design Principles, our services must understand the context in which people will use them. And for many people, for many services, that context is swiftly becoming more mobile, more personal and more touch-controlled.
Designing for small screens can be a real challenge. Which is why for many of the 25 exemplar services we’re now designing the mobile version first, despite visits from computers still being in the majority. Why? Simply, it’s often easier to make a service also work for a computer monitor and keyboard if you’ve already made it work really well on a small touchscreen than it is to go the other way.
Moreover, as Andy Washington, MD of Expedia UK Ireland, explained at a recent panel, designing within the constraints of a small touchscreen helps keep your underlying service as clear and as simple as it needs to be to serve all your users, including those who may be new to the internet, or find it a struggle.
Finally, to answer the question posed in the title to this post: When will more people visit GOV.UK using a mobile or tablet than a PC? On Christmas Day 2014, if not before.
NB I’ve seen no data over the past year to suggest the government’s approach to downloadable apps should change. We’re still not ‘appy about them, and central government departments and agencies must seek an exemption before they start developing any.
Sign up for email alerts and join the conversation on Twitter.
You may also be interested in:
The mobile question: Responsive Design
Foreign and security policy was once considered as the little and forgotten brother of European integration. However, in recent years the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as well as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) have become a central pillar of the European Union. Marking this development, a series of articles published on e-IR – summarized here – focus on the important research field of the EU’s foreign and security policy.
In Europe, we face a process of a “latent de-Europeanisation”. The influence of power or regulation of the EU decreases due to controversies in foreign policy; not just in EU foreign policy itself – but also due to the different national foreign policies of the member states. Besides that, we face a transformation process of the international system towards a multipolar system and a new shift in US foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific. Against this background a lot of effort has been put into new research – theoretical as well as empirical – in the field of CFSP CSDP that focuses on the effectiveness and efficiency of the EU’s foreign policy. This is especially happening because of the structure of European foreign policy, where three different types of foreign policy intertwine: the national foreign policies of the EU member states, the EU CFSP and CSDP, and the EU’s external relations.
In contrast to modern European states, where democracy, freedom and prosperity have been gradually implemented during the years following the end of the Cold War – people living in developing countries are facing discrimination, oppression as well as the negative outcomes of globalization. As a result, the international community faces the break out of new violent crises, the aggravation of existing conflicts or migration due to global frustration and increasing inequities.
Against this background, the European Security Strategy defines international terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failed states and organized crime as the new security challenges. Other potential risks for traditional state-oriented security policies arise from social and cultural changes, or from global population growth and migration flows. None of these dynamic security challenges can be considered as being unique nor can be dealt with exclusively military or civilian measures. Therefore, the EU introduces a comprehensive approach. This is especially reflected in the European Security Strategy which demands a combination of civilian and military instruments within the overall framework of conflict resolution and focuses on the root causes of each specific conflict.
This is relevant with a view to the Arab Spring, as Chiara Steindler points out. Unlike many other articles dealing with this topic in the current debate, Steindler argues that the “divided reaction of the Union is a consequence of its powers rather than a deliberate choice to act or abstain from acting.” The European Member States were “paralyzed in the sectors (CSDP) where the Treaties had preserved [their] national sovereignty […] and where [their] interests diverged.” As a result, those Member States that “unanimously agreed, on the European Council, that Gadhafi should step down, had different views on to how this should happen.” To this end, “the EU was able to operate with those tools that were familiar and closer to institutional configuration: mediation buttressed by a policy of economic support in exchange for political adjustment.”
Nearly the same applies to the Malian Crisis as analysed by Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni. Mali was “precisely the kind of crisis that EU´s Common Foreign and Security Policy is geared to address.” Eilstrup-Sangiovanni calls for measures of the EU, where the Union’s competences are the strongest. Namely, “EU post-conflict stabilization focusses on political and legal capacity-building and economic re-development [drawing] on Community funds for long-term foreign aid rather than ad hoc voluntary contributions.” As a result, the “EU´s civilian reconstruction efforts are less prone to collective action problems and generally more efficient than its military exertions.”
The strategic objective within EU external relations today combines two elements: securing the geostrategic periphery as well as contributing to a viable international normative structure. The European Security Strategy therefore calls upon the strengthening of the international order based on the effective multilateralism. For the EU itself this requirement means the development towards an active, coherent and powerful foreign policy actor. Or, in other words, the improvement of the EU’s capacity to act effectively on the basis of a systematic use of pooled and shared assets.
Because the CFSP and CSDP are faced with major economic and financial problems requiring cuts in defence budgets, “European defence policy cannot ignore its economic dimensions”, says Keith Hartley. He argues that the precondition for pooling and sharing is trust between sovereign nations, but “whilst international agreements might form the basis for trust, they are not guaranteeing that a nation will abide by the agreement. In defence, nations cannot rely on international agreements when their national interests are threatened.” The solution would be risk taking and a selection of a “combination of national defence policy and membership of international military alliances.”
The EU has seen itself as a civilian power for a long time. It is not surprising therefore that the public debate did not really focus on the ethical consequences, for example, of the progressive use of remotely controlled vehicles. However, André Barrinha does so in his article. He notes that the “EU´s institutional design allows security and defence policies to develop outside the public attention, between agencies and commitees more or less obscure.” To address this he calls for an open debate on questions “regarding the relation between citizens, states and the European project.”
Little attention has been given to another arm of the EU´s crisis management and crisis resolution system: the growing participation of NGO´s in this field. Daniela Irrera focuses on the potential to enhance the civilian dimension of the missions in her article, arguing, that NGOs “have often served as a bridge between the EU personnel and the local communities. Cooperation with civil society can legitimate the EU external intervention and, as a consequence, enhance their effectiveness.”
Security integration “is the real test for how far the idea of an ‘ever closer Union’ might go”, argues Mai’a K. Davis Cross in her article. She sees the necessity “to open up the black box of formal decision-making [and to] examine the dynamics that occur behind the scenes in Brussels.” That is, that “knowledge-based experts […] are playing an important role in shaping the future of European security policy [because] diplomatic processes among these actors are gradually contributing to more innovations in European integration, reaching into traditionally contentious policy areas for member states.”
What do we learn from these findings? Jolyon Howorth in his article stresses out that “if CSDP is to develop into a policy area with a future, it is time to ask some probing, fundamental questions”. The most important question then would be: “What is the EU aiming to accomplish in a world undergoing power transition?” His answer is threefold: Firstly, he asks the reader to “recall why the word ‘autonomous’ in the December 1998 St. Malo Declaration was so important”. Secondly, he calls for a “deep, heart-searching re-appraisal of intervention as an activity and as a principle.” Thirdly, he raises the question of “who[m] should be part of a putative ‘core CSDP’?”
Finally, the debate on the EU’s Security and Defence Policy should not forget the theoretical dimension. That important discussion is added by Daniel Fiott in his article. He tests the liberal institutional approach as well as the arguments of constructivists and the structural realist perspective on CSDP. He concludes, that “realism still provides the most compelling IR theory when analyzing the CSDP.” In the end, the debate on EU foreign policy must contain both the theoretical analysis as well as the in-depth “heart-searching” discussions between actors, scholars and practitioners involved in the CSDP.
—
Anja Opitz is Senior Researcher (International Relations) at the Academy for Civic Education and Research Tutzing and founding member of the Middle East and International Affairs Research Group (MEIA research). In her research she focuses on Security Sector Reform, the development and operability of CFSP and CSDP with a special focus on civil-military cooperation and strategy in the area of conflict resolution. Her regional expertise includes North Africa and the Balkan countries.
Global events vividly displaying the social significance of religion and secularism as powerful mottos of governance and rebellion have marked the last decade. In spite of the fact that religion and secularism carry multiple ‘households of meaning’, on the international scene they often appear as if they were uniform and singular ideas.[1] The War on Terror launched in defense of freedom,[2] the revival of new Taliban movements in Pakistan claiming to be defending religion, or the Arab Spring, where Islamist versus secular political identities have dominated the conflict arenas, are a few illustrative examples of the mobilizing role hardened doctrines can play. Doctrinal conflicts are an increasingly important part of international conflict, as yet little attended to by the scholars of IR. During the past decade, sufficient empirical evidence points to the fact that doctrines of order, sovereignty and governance (packaged into labels of ‘secularism’ and ‘religion’), matter for the major conflict line between entities such as Islamism and the West – not in terms of irreconcilable civilizational categories per se, but when they enter the field of security politics.
A doctrine constitutes a set of ideas, principles, or beliefs, which is accepted as authoritative or true by a group of people.[3] Doctrines are, however, not static, nor do they necessarily lead to conflicts, but when they enter they realm of security politics they often appear uncompromising and hardened. Hence, doctrines are relevant for war when they are securitized; that is, when they are lifted from the realm of ordinary politics, where differences can be negotiated and tolerated, to the extraordinary realm of security politics where the ordinary rules of democratic conversation and negotiation do not always apply.
Writing in the early 20th century, social scientist William Graham Sumner pointed to a perilous relationship between wars and doctrines that has regained salience today. “If you want a war”, he wrote, then
nourish a doctrine. Doctrines are the most frightful tyrants to which men are ever subject, because doctrines get inside a man’s reason and betray him against himself. Civilized men have done their fiercest fighting for doctrines…. Now when any doctrine arrives at that degree of authority, the name of it is a club which any demagogue may swing over you at any time and apropos of anything.[4]
Particularly since September 11, 2001, doctrinal conflicts have come to the forefront of global affairs, and we have seen doctrines being raised to a level of authority that compels individual activists, organized groups and governments enter war or engage in armed conflict. Doctrines of freedom, religion, and secularism, presented as unambiguous principles of governance and order, are today frequently referenced in confrontations throughout the world. Some examples of the invocation of these doctrines include not only the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon in 2001, but also: the US-led invasion of Afghanistan later the same year and of Iraq in 2003; the release of the Dutch movie Submission in 2004; the Danish Cartoon Crisis in 2005; the 2004 suicide attacks in Madrid; and the attacks in London the following year. The ongoing violence linked to the insurgencies in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Mali and Syria are also apparent examples that can be inscribed into global doctrinal tensions, resulting in bloody and tragic confrontations.
What has Changed?
There is in fact nothing historically new in observing a clash between conflicting principles, beliefs or ideologies. The wars of religion in Europe before the Westphalian peace settlement, the French Revolution, and the Cold War are all major incidents in world history that have been described as events with ideational dimensions. However, empirically, there are new developments for IR scholars to consider, particularly after a long period that has been characterized by silence when it comes to the role of religion and secularism in IR.[5]
The doctrinal wars of today are more globalized and less bound to specific territory or geography. That a movement like al-Qaeda can attract foreign fighters to a variety of battlefields on the basis of its claim to defend Islamic doctrines is the ultimate example of the globalization of doctrinal battles. It is notable for the major doctrinal confrontations today that their battlefields easily expand from the national realm to become international and global in scope. Those participating in the conflict rapidly embrace a larger frame of understanding, translating such events into a fundamental conflict between ‘Islam’ and the ‘West,’ or between opposing principles of governance and public order. Some might use this to argue that Samuel Huntington was after all right in ascribing significance to civilizational categories; yet it is important to note that doctrinal confrontations seem to run across religions, civilizations, ideologies and worldviews.
The enemy in doctrinal wars is first and foremost an abstract image, but in order for action to be taken it is brought down to earth and materialized, as was the case when US troops invaded Taliban-led Afghanistan in defense of freedom. Unlike the competing ideologies of the Cold War, the doctrines defended today seem to be more ambiguous, paradoxically drawing on less content-fixed concepts despite their strong appeal to broad publics. It is not easy to point out what exactly is being claimed when freedom is represented as a fundamental pillar of western civilization or sharia as a fundamental code for the Islamic civilization. The rivalry between capitalism and communism was somehow simpler in terms of its boundaries, as it was simultaneously an East-West conflict and a clash between the mightiest power centers of the world. Globalization has clearly complicated the conflict structures around the world.
Years before 2001, the sociologist of religion Mark Juergensmeyer described the emergence of a new Cold War between the secular state and religious nationalism in a way that captures one dimension of doctrinal wars: religious nationalists reacting against the secular state.[6] Today this conflict-axis does not appear tightly linked to the state since battles have become organized around principles rather than the nation-state. Transnational religious activists are seemingly reacting against traits ascribed to larger entities like the ‘West’ or ‘secularism’. At the same time, after 9/11, the security narratives of many western governments, including those formulated by NATO and the EU came to adopt the US translation of counter-terrorism in doctrinal war terms: that is, as a defense of the free world against aggressive and destructive religiosity.[7]
Even though 9/11 can rarely be isolated as the event that changed everything for the entire world, the extensive public discussions of the incident and the counter-terrorism policies pursued in its aftermath were significant factors that bestowed remarkable power upon the doctrines of freedom, religion and secularism. It may very well be that the former American president was not right in the moment he identified this as a “new war” that requires “new thinking” immediately after the attacks in 2001; but he was eventually proven right. There was a self-fulfilling dynamic in claiming a doctrinal war in defense of freedom.
A New Typology of War
Whereas the subject of war has been widely discussed among International Relations theorists, doctrinal war in the sense discussed here has not been given any special attention. One main reason for this is the dominance of a realist position in security studies, in which the relationship between threats and the use of military force has been treated as if the latter was an objective response to the former. When doctrines are mentioned, the reference is to military or strategic doctrines, suggesting a foreign policy declaration that holds true across a series of actions and a spectrum of time. Doctrines of this sort are often ascribed to particular political leaders and their political legacy, and denote super-structural strategic patterns in decision making such as the long-term policies of non-interference or containment.
The kind of doctrines with which I am engaging here are inspired by the mid-twentieth century English School scholar Martin Wight, who described wars of doctrines together with wars of gain and wars of fear as the three distinct types of war evident in history. According to Wight, doctrinal war is a “missionary or crusading war, war to assert principles and advance a cause.”[8] He argued that since the end of the 18th century doctrinal assertion has become one of the most popular motives for warfare, the French revolutionary wars being the prime example. Despite this observation, and the fact that doctrines appear as increasingly noisy claims in 21st-century conflicts, there is a striking void in academic war literature when it comes to taking the doctrinal dimensions of war seriously. As in the case of religion in the study of modern warfare, diplomatic history and international relations, doctrines functioning as justifications are mostly treated as a reflection of something more real, some other rationality lying behind the articulation of defending doctrines or fighting for the implementation of doctrines.[9] Hence the power and significance of doctrines in their own right is often underestimated in analysis.
Bringing the powerful formation of doctrinal war into focus is important for two main reasons. First, it is indeed a real war, despite the fact that this kind of war is often wrongfully treated as mere rhetoric or pure strategies of justification and persuasion. It is true that doctrinal war often appears in tandem with more traditional warfare purposes such as the defense of territory and soil, national interests, improvement of specific human rights conditions, and so on; such wars can also reflect a more decentralized conflict structure, in which all parties involved are in it for different reasons. To argue that doctrinal war is a form of war that should be studied in its own right does not imply a rejection of the idea that policymakers and other political activists can and do evoke sacralized doctrines for strategic purposes, or that there are not potentially other more earthly or geographically-bound issues of concern related to the defense of doctrines. Rather, it is to acknowledge the self-fulfilling dynamics of claiming a doctrinal war: people do in fact enter war under the banner of doctrines like freedom, religion and secularism. In this sense, doctrinal war should be treated as a real concern, a real conflict and a real form of war with distinct security dynamics. What this also suggests is that it is necessary to develop a new framework for studying doctrinal dimensions of conflicts: a lens that engages with what we might call a ‘sociology of doctrinal conflicts’ that seeks to understand the dynamic processes through which such conflicts build up.
The second reason it is important to shed light on the doctrinal dimensions of conflicts is that they have a great potential to complicate conflict resolution. Even though violence and the images of defending a ‘holy’ doctrine do not necessarily come together, their fusion points can be magnetic. The strong persuasive, mobilizing and legitimizing power triggered by elevating doctrines or principles above doubt and negotiation harden them against resolution. When doctrines or principles enter the scene of security politics, the prospects for compromise and conciliation markedly decline.
Unlike the typology suggested by Wight, fear and doctrines do not necessarily appear as distinct reasons for war. It is important to recognize the interplay of fear and doctrine (-promotion): both discourses are often simultaneously drawn upon in conflict. For instance, the way the War on Terrorism was framed by the then-American President immediately after September 11, 2001 and the way the Danish Prime minister reacted to the global riots following the publication of the twelve cartoons in the Danish daily Jyllandsposten were strikingly similar in their ambiguity. Both stressed the importance of standing firm on principles of freedom. Both explained their strategy of action with reference to promoting freedom. But both also managed to frame their standpoint within a global dispute, and thus drew upon defensive discourses of fear for the survival of freedom, alongside the more activist discourses promoting the principle of freedom. The same ambiguity is present on ‘the other side’, and through my years of research on Islamist movements I have seen how defensive discourses based on fear of religion being eliminated by hostile forces often exist side by side with the more offensive discourses about the implementation of sharia or the establishment of some sort of Islamic polity.[10]
Securitizing Doctrines
In order to understand the dynamics of doctrinal wars, it seems vital to take interest in what doctrinal images means for the creation of war. It is possible to look at how doctrines are represented, avoiding the methodologically problematic question of whether those who have the power and authority to represent the war actually believe in and are motivated by the images they promulgate. In an IR context, doctrines are powerful not only in terms of what they actually are (their essence or truth), but of what they are capable of doing. The question of motivation, what doctrines have to do with them—the terrorists, the policymakers, or the security strategists—is different from the question of what doctrines have to do with it–with the nature of the conflict and the creation of war. Trying to understand the dynamics of war is different from trying to explain the causality related to the actor.
In his work, anthropologist Talal Asad has challenged the way ‘ordinary’, state-driven violence is commonly viewed as more legitimate than the type of violence Europeans and Americans largely ascribe to terrorists and insurgent groups.[11] The moral distinction made between these two forms of violence, he argues, is due to a broad consensus that violence perpetrated by democratically sanctioned liberal states is based on a morally superior motivation, even though it is hard to scientifically prove whether the ‘true’ motivations behind the unauthorized form of violence are much worse than those driving the authorized form. In order to avoid the often-politicized questions of motivation, focusing on the link between evoking doctrines and conflict escalation seem to be a relevant pathway for future IR research.
The theory of securitization developed by the Copenhagen School of security studies is a good point of entry in this regard. The theory points at the link between security narratives about existential threats to important referent objects, on the one hand, and extraordinary security political action within different sectors of security, on the other.[12] Characteristic of each sector is the distinct referent object (the issue being defended), the securitizing actors (those with authority to make authoritative claims), and the kind of action warranted.[13] The theory does not argue for a rigid causality between radical narratives about the neccesity of urgent action and violence or other forms of emergency behavior (secrecy, torture, espionage, armament etc.), but points to how the latter are conditioned by the former and by a favorably disposed audience. Studying images of threats and war through securitizing speech acts is thus to study part of the conditions of possibility for actual warfare.
Unlike the situation during the Cold War, the formations of doctrinal war take away the importance of asymmetry found in traditional state-versus-state war situations, since the authority of doctrines does not initially depend upon military capability but upon public resonance. Weak actors can play a role just as forceful as powerful actors so long as they have a strong doctrine. Despite the fact that asymmetry in physical power relations can be the reason for the empowerment of some doctrines, the outcome of doctrinal wars are far from predictable. Securitization of doctrines requires strong conviction among a community, and policymakers are not necessarily the main driving force in the process of securitization. Other opinion makers and intellectuals, those who write and retell history, schools and those who decide the canon, filmmakers, news media and reporters can all potentially play a more fundamental role in the proces of securitization. The point is that doctrines can only become deadly if they are accepted as worth dying for. Before they can be securitized, the significance of doctrines is to be believed by the audience; the authority of a doctrine depends on its believers. The particular content of the different doctrines and the legendary myths they are founded upon can therefore be interesting to study precisely because they condition the processes of securitization.
The Security Dilemma between Religion and Secularism
One of the most vivid doctrinal confrontations today is between religion and secularism. My analysis elsewhere reveals a security dilemma between two meta-narratives, where one side is securitizing freedom and secularism against what is represented as aggressive religiosity, and the other side is securitizing freedom and religion against what is represented as aggressive secularism.[14] In both meta-narratives, extraordinary security/political action is also justified with reference to ideas about sovereignty, governance and order, and both sides frame their war as defensive, as just, and as principal. Doctrines like freedom, secularism and religion appear to be especially inclined to securitization, because their content is heavily disputable and thus amount to what discourse theorists would categorize as empty signifiers.
Within the discipline of International Relations, a security dilemma traditionally refers to a situation wherein states are drawn into conflict over security concerns, even though none of the states actually desire conflict.[15] The security dilemma occurs when states fear for their security vis-à-vis other states, and as each state acts to make it more secure, the other state interprets its actions as threatening. A cycle of unintended provocations emerges, resulting in an escalation of the conflict. In his analyses of history telling, the British historian Herbert Butterfield described such self-reinforcing conflict constellations with reference to the classical Greek tragedies, where it is not one of the contending parties in the story, but the situation itself, which drives conflict. Neither party recognizes the dynamics of the conflict or their own role in keeping the conflict alive, but frames their own actions as an objective reaction towards the threat from the other. Thus Butterfield argues that, in escalated conflicts, “…we see only the sins of the enemy and fail to reflect on those predicaments and dilemmas which so often develop and which underlie the great conflicts between masses of human beings.”[16] Bringing these predicaments and dilemmas into focus is vital in the analysis of conflicts because they challenge a one-way casual analysis of action patterns. Thus, if people say they act on behalf of threatened doctrines, it is more important to note whether or not they have mobilizing, hardening, and absolutizing effects on a conflict than if they are right in their claims or not.[17]
A focus on the security political narratives of all involved sides of a conflict is crucial for understanding the security dilemma in doctrinal wars. There seems to be a clear similarity between how the Islamist securitization of religion works and how freedom and secularism are securitized in dominant political narratives advanced by influential opinion makers in Europe and America. Conventional security politics speaks the language of absolutism and resoluteness, defending hardened doctrines, the raison d’être of which are presented as being beyond doubt. The same is true for Islamist narratives, making a simple equivalence between freedom, order, and religion. Islamists position Islam as guarantors for these doctrines by drawing on narratives about the birth of Islam, just like the West often present itself as the guarantor of freedom by drawing upon the memory of the birth of modernity, the French and American Revolution. All are narratives about valuable progress or the birth of a just order, demanding extraordinary effort and the willingness to die and sacrifice for a higher cause.
Secularism seems to be an important focal point in understanding the securitization of religion, and vice versa. As political scientist Elizabeth Hurd has pointed out, despite the fact that both history and the present testify manifold practices and notions about the right relationship between religion and politics within and across different countries, the secular dogma and the notion of authentic Islam are upheld by the mirror image of each other. Each hegemonic system is simultaneously sustained and threatened by the alien ideas of its counterpart. Both systems insist upon a singular and universal set of relations between sacred and profane dimensions of existence.[18] Many observers have noticed these inflammable tensions between central doctrines of secularism and religion that seem captive to this kind of conflict dynamics. On one side, we have the adherents of the secularist doctrine, promoting the divide between religion and politics as the recipe for peace. In arguing against religion in the public, they refer to lessons from European history, where the success of the constitutional state, productive markets and modernization came with secularism. On the other side, we have adherents of religion, many of whom share another historical experience with secularism and define religion differently. For them religion is inscribed into the phenomenon of global peace while secularism is seen as the threat.
Concluding Reflections
Doctrinal wars are the outcome of increasing globalization, where fluidity transgresses not only notions of place and territory, but more importantly notions of time and history. When conflicts are cast in transhistorical terms and presented detached from material issues, diplomatic efforts of reconciliation appear more complicated. New approaches to diplomacy and conflict resolution seem to be warranted in order to break security dilemmas not bounded by states – dilemmas that are simultaneously upheld by fear and the assertion of hardened doctrines.
There are serious implications in claiming that there is a security logic related to secularism and freedom vis-à-vis religion that drives the escalation of doctrinal wars. If secularism (framed as equivalent to an aggressive West, colonial powers, US foreign policy, etc.) is seen as the other part of the conflict, it cannot be treated as a neutral concept applicable to efforts toward peace and reconciliation. Existing surveys of, for instance, the Islamist threat constructions question conventional thinking about secularism as a neutral arbiter, having an apolitical nature and being the obvious solution to conflict.[19] Opening up for different meanings related to the concepts of secularism, freedom, and religion can contribute to the softening of the concepts, and render visible alternative ways of infusing labels with content. Academia can therefore play an important role when it comes to de-escalating doctrinal conflicts.
In popular political debates in Europe and America, the threat from terrorism and militant Islamism is often seen as something external to our doctrines and to our way of life. An often-advanced opinion is that militant Islamists represent an unprovoked fight against freedom. Such a perspective leads to the categorization of militant Islamism as only an aggressive, expansive, and faith-driven phenomenon. The objective threat emerging from its religio-politics is seen as the cause of confrontation, and security political measures are framed as unavoidable for the survival of the core values of the West. By contrast, a securitization perspective on threat constructions opens up the possibility of alternative patterns of action. For policymakers, the results of such analysis can be utilized for a self-critical examination of what the other party feels threatened by and how we contribute to sustaining their fears. This perspective is not a justification of their fears or violent actions, but an encouragement to enhance the understanding of the conflict between secularism and Islamism as an escalating pattern of mutually representing each other’s doctrines as existential threats, and thereby motivating radical countermeasures, nurturing a spiral of increasing fear and threat perception.
Placing a focus on the doctrinal dimensions of war in a non-instrumentalist but non-essentialist way suggests the possibility of taking doctrines into consideration in a causative manner. But to avoid the fallacies of rigid causality models or of conducting one-way and single-factor analyses of the motivations of elites, methodological considerations about how to approach doctrinal dimensions of war appear to be not only operational but crucial for the possibility of taking doctrines into account. Scholars of International Relations, modern warfare and diplomatic history have long suppressed questions of religion and doctrines, choosing to abide by the instrumentalist interpretation among a dearth of non-essentializing alternatives. Nevertheless, the option of bringing competing doctrines of sovereignty, governance and order into the picture exists. It, however, demands that the disciplines of security studies and IR look beyond the doctrine of keeping facts and values apart.
—
Dr. Mona Kanwal Sheikh is a postdoctoral researcher at the Danish Institute of International Studies, and specializes in issues of religion and secularism in International Relations. She is currently a visiting research scholar at the Orfalea Center for Global and International Studies at UC Santa Barbara. Relevant publications include ‘Sacred pillars of violence: Findings from a study of the Pakistani Taliban’ (Politics, Religion, Ideology, 2012), ‘How does religion matter? Pathways to Religion in International Relations’ (Review of International Studies, 2012), ‘Western secularisms – variations in a doctrine and its practice’ (In Thinking International Relations Differently, eds. Arlene B. Tickner and David L. Blaney, Routledge. 2012) and ‘A Sociotheological Approach to Understanding Religious Violence’ (In The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Violence, eds. Michael Jerryson, Mark Juergensmeyer, and Margo Kitts, Oxford University Press, 2012).
[1] See e.g. Mona Kanwal Sheikh Ole Wæver: ‘Western secularisms – variations in a doctrine and its practice’. In Arlene B. Tickner and David L. Blaney (eds.) Thinking International Relations Differently (Routledge, 2012).
[2] “Today our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack…” These were the words of the former American president on the evening of September 11, 2001. In 2008, George Bush was still repeating what was then his immediate reaction. That year however, freedom became elevated to a principle, a viewpoint and a doctrine that could successfully stand alone. It was no longer the freedom of Americans that was threatened, but freedom itself, as a doctrine and principle. As he bluntly put forward, “They attack our countries and target our people because we stand for freedom.” (Accessed from http://www.whitehouse. gov/new/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html in 2001, and http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/04/20080402-2.html in 2008).
[3] See e.g. the Merriam-Webster encyclopedia http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/doctrine
[4] The quote is from 1903. See War and Other Essays, ed. Albert Galloway Keller (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1919).
[5] The trend of recognizing religion as an important factor in IR accelerated after 9/11 both in the literature and in programme initiatives undertaken at various academic and policy institutions. For a treatment of why religion was absent for many years, see e.g. Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile, Edited by Fabio Petito and Pavlos Hatzopoulos (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).
[6] Mark Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
[7] According to the General Secretary of NATO in 2002, NATO operated on the notion of a fundamental distinction between past ideological wars and the post 9/11 situation since the new enemy, unlike other threats, are “extremist fanatics, driven by hatred, and operating beyond rationality and predictability.” (see http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020620a.htm). After 9/11 the The European Commission symbolically placed the “fight against terrorism” under the rubrics of freedom, security, and justice, and described the terrorist threat as a threat against “our values,” “our way of life,” and “our ideals.” See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Stepping up the fight against terrorism (Brussels, 6 November, 2007), accessed through http://eur-lex.europa.eu.
[8] Martin Wight, Power Politics, H. Bull and C. Holbraad, eds., (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1978), p. 139.
[9] This is true for instance in the critical position taken among just war scholars occupied with the link between counter-terrorism and democratic regime change since 9/11. The critical position taken in these debates has revolved around the idea of ‘goal substitution,’ that is, waging interest-driven wars under cover of the principle of democracy or freedom. See for instance Allen Buchanan, “Institutionalizing the Just War,” Philosophy Public Affairs 34 (winter 2006): 2-38.
[10] See e.g. Mona Kanwal Sheikh: Sacred pillars of violence: Findings from a study of the Pakistani Taliban (2012). In Politics, Religion, Ideology. Special issue on Non-State Armed Groups and the Dynamics of Community Support: Religion and Ideology as Legitimization Strategies in Civil Conflict. Edited by Thomas O’Brien and Sukanya Podder. Routledge.
[11] Talal Asad, On Suicide Bombing (New York: Columbia UP, 2007).
[12] Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. Security. A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 1997), pp. 23-26.
[13] Securitization theory offers a framework of analysis that divides issues of security into both different sectors of security (such as the military, societal, and environmental sectors), and different referent objects within these sectors. For instance, in the environmental sector, pollution is identified as a threat while the environment or civilization as such is the referent objects of security. In the same manner, immigration or EU integration are identified as threats to identity or the national ”We” in the societal sector. In 2000, religion was introduced as an independent security sector with faith as its ultimate referent object. Carsten Bagge Laustsen and Ole Wæver ”In Defence of Religion: Sacred Referent Objects for Securitization” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 29, No. 3 (2000), pp. 705-739. However since secularism and freedom can function the same way as religion, the doctrinal sector is arguably a more inclusive label for this sector of security.
[14] Mona Kanwal Sheikh Ole Wæver, “Lines in Water and Sand: Comparative Secularism as Analytical Tool for Conflict Containment.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of International Studies Association, March 2005, Hawaii, USA.
[15] John H. Herz, ”Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,” World Politics, vol. 2 (1950), p. 157.
[16] Herbert Butterfield, “The Tragic Element in Modern International Conflict,” The Review of Politics, Vol. 12, No. 2 (April, 1950), p. 147.
[17] Mona Kanwal Sheikh, How does religion matter? Pathways to religion in International Relations (2012). In Review of International Studies. Vol.38, no.02, pp. 365-392. Cambridge University Press.
[18] Elizabeth S. Hurd, “Towards a Postsecular Alternative: Secularism and Political Islam in Historical and Relational Context,” Paper presented at the Middle East History and Theory Conference, The University of Chicago (May 2001), pp. 4-5.
[19] Sheikh Wæver, Ibid.
Assessing whether states divided by religion are more prone to conflict than those divided by language is impossible to quantify. Although quantitative indexes of analysis have been developed[1], none have produced conclusive evidence (Kalyvas 2008: 1044). More important than evaluating the relative effect that religious or linguistic divisions have on degrees of conflict, is to look at the state, and elite-led group interaction with the state, as the primary source of these divisions. An assessment of religious or linguistic division is only relevant to understanding conflict in the context of how the state, and those acting in relation to it, internalise their control.
The statement makes three assumptions: religious or linguistic division will lead to conflict; religious or linguistic identities are fixed; and religious or linguistic conflict exists primarily between, rather than within, groups. These assumptions made in the statement can be broken down with reference to the conditions in which the fault lines of ethnic identity are made salient, rather than by examining the origins of identity itself. Implicit in the statement is a primordialist definition of identity, where assumed ascriptions of kinship[2] form the basis of a common understanding between groups (Bayar 2009: 1641). However, a constructivist views identity as a result of societal structures ‘independent of objective reality’ (Banton 1996: 9). This does not assume that ethnic difference is arbitrary, rather that ethnic difference is not fixed, or a cause of ethnic conflict; the boundaries of exclusion exist independently of the ‘cultural stuff’ of language and religion (Barth 1998: 15). It is within this framework of analysis that the conditions of the construction of religious and linguistic fault lines will be examined.
The statement assumes that ethnic groups act independently of the structures of the state; however, the interaction between individuals and the perceived legitimacy of the state are more likely to determine the definition of group cleavages. ‘Ethnicising’ analyses of conflict imposes on the subject matter a pre-existing paradigm in which religion and language are determined to play a significant role (Brubaka and Laitin 1998: 424). An example reflecting the more complex nature of language as a signifier for identity is India in the 1920s. In this case the Dravidian movement, although originally suggested as a force for socio-economic change, politicised language as a salient maker for ethnic identity in response to, and in defence of, the homogenising Northern Indian nationalism promoted by the state (Chatterjee 2005: 83).
Reactionary ethnic cleavages have also been observed in the Nigerian divide between north and south where the spread of southern power forced a re-definition of northern Nigerian identity along religious lines (Coleman 1958: 363), culminating in violent clashes in 1967 and continued incidences of sporadic violence ever since. This supports the notion that religion and language connect ‘political claims to ownership with the psychological demands for the affirmation of group worth… thereby binding elite material interests to mass concerns’ (Horowitz 2000: 222).
However, this elite manipulation of mass psychology is not an intrinsically religious or linguistic characteristic (Hobsbawm 2012: 6). In observing the occurrence of conflict between ethnic groups, there is a danger of over predicting, and over ascribing, the ethnicisation of violence (Brubaker and Laitin 1998: 443, McGarry and O’Leary 1995: 173). In his introduction to a series of essays on the role of discourse in constructing national identities, Homi Bhabha notes: ‘The ‘other’ is never outside or beyond us; it emerges forcefully, within cultural discourse, when we think we speak most intimately and indigenously ‘between ourselves’’ (Bhabha 1999: 4). Understanding conflict along religious or linguistic lines is closely linked to the role of discourse within conflict itself, which, as Bhabha observes, self-perpetuates an isolationist narrative that serves to exacerbate the boundaries that then become the subject of analysis. Therefore, the assumption in the statement of divisions defined as either primordially religious or linguistic is inconsistent with idea that identities are formed following the exacerbation of the fault lines of ethnicity by elites in response to threats of homogenising state movements, and through self-perpetuating cultural discourse. Neither of these are intrinsic characteristics of religion or language.
Case studies of ethnic dissidence demonstrate the fluidity of identity and are ignored when religious or linguistic groups are assumed to contain ‘diametric opposites’ (Gaborieau 1985: 8). If ethnic defectors are taken into account, religion or language as a factor of analysis is undermined (Kalyvas 2008: 1055). ‘Defection’ is defined as individuals becoming part of organisations in direct opposition to the perceived aspirations of their own ethnic group (Kalyvas 2008: 3). Analysts have begun to explore this phenomenon as a continuation of the struggle for dominance within groups, rather than as ideological or policy-motivated dissidence (Staniland 2012: 17).
A report for Human Rights Watch in 1996, ‘India’s secret army in Kashmir’, focuses on former militants who were ‘responsible for grave human rights abuses, including summary executions, torture and illegal detention’ (Human Rights Watch 1996: 1). Although the report also highlights coercive techniques used by the state in order to win over the former militants, it also states that ‘groups appear to operate on their own’ (Human Rights Watch 1996: 1). Staniland notes that in the early 2000s, ‘ethnic defection in Kashmir was primarily motivated by lethal battles within the militant movement’ (Staniland 2012: 30). This example provides an exception to the assumption in the statement of fixed religious or linguistic identities. Following constructivist logic, ethnic allegiance has the potential not only to be solidified but also to be dissolved (Kalyvas 2008: 1046). This undermines the notion that states divided along a particular ethnic line will experience more conflict than those divided along another; the conditions for the definition of these divisions is dependent on the structural make up of the state and on the continuing intra-group struggles for power in the war that follows.
Given the examination of the conditions for the construction of identity, it is necessary to look more closely at another assumption implicit in the statement: religious or linguistic division will lead to conflict. The theory of the security dilemma suggests that the insecurity of fault lines determine conflict where ethnic groups operate in a system without authority (Posen 1993: 29, Fenton 2004: 185). However, the assumption in the statement pre-supposes the stability of the state, with the religious or linguistic division as the source of conflict.
In Kenya in 2007, in line with the changing structure of the state during a period of democratisation, elites became representatives for ethnic divisions (Branch and Cheeseman 2008: 3). Interpreting this struggle for power within Kenya, as rooted in tribal division, ignores the effect that elite generated pro and anti-Kikuyu bloc voting had on increasing the salience of ethnic divisions (Branch and Cheeseman 2008: 3). The selectivity of ethnicity by elites, and those seeking to counter elite domination, is incremental in determining the conditions of conflict (Brass 1994: 87). It was the elites’ ability to manipulate a system in which authority was absent that allowed for a restructuring of identity along ethnic lines (Lake and Rothchild 1996: 54).
This is linked to the notion of ‘ethnification cascades’, where – in line with a game theoretical understanding of human behaviour – individuals will look to ethnic definition as a means of distinguishing preferences (Brubaker and Laitin 1998: 440). These preferences are not only fluid, but also they are affected by interactions with the state. This is demonstrated in Lisa Wedeen’s examination of consent in Syria since the 1980s (Wedeen 1998). Wedeen makes a distinction between the ‘performative’ behaviour of individuals and their true feelings of consent; language and symbols are used as a means of intruding into the private lives of individuals and encouraging them to believe the fictitious symbols of the controlling elite (Wedeen REF: 506). These symbols then form ‘shared conditions of unbelief’ whereby the myths become normalised and, as a result, reinforced (Wedeen 1998: 512). This signifies the connection between individual preferences and linguistic or religious definition, and the way in which these are shaped by interactions with the state.
Therefore, not only is it important not to confuse ‘ethnic self-interest’ with religious or linguistic difference (Allport 1958: 448), it is also essential to look at the context in which elites are acting in, in order to examine the conditions for conflict. Contrary to the assumptions in the statement, assessing the relative importance of religious or linguistic division is impossible without taking into account the structural make up of the state.
In conclusion, the underlying assumptions in the statement reinforce claims of religious or linguistic division, which do not necessarily reflect the conditions of identity or conflict. In assuming that religious or linguistic identities are fixed, the statement ignores the effect that elites and the threat of a homogenising state, or indeed the power vacuum within a restructuring state, can have on emphasising ethnic boundaries. The interaction of the individual with state structures has a significant impact, not only on the exacerbation of linguistic or religious fault lines, but also on the definition of those boundaries. Although the origins of identity remain contested, it is important not to confuse debates about the nature of identity with analysis of ethnic conflict. This confusion can lead to the assumptions made in the statement, which suggests pre-disposition to conflict by religious or linguistic groups. As shown by an examination into ethnic defection, the formation of reactionary cleavages, and the conditions in which division may lead to conflict, it is clear that whether there will be conflict in a state is dependent on the structural forces within the state, and the extent to which boundaries of ethnic difference are made salient by powerful elites.
References
Allport, Gordon W. (1958) The Nature of Prejudice New York: Doubleday.
Banton, Michael (1996) ‘The Cultural Determinants of Xenophobia’, Anthropology Today, 12/2: 8-12.
Barth, Fredrik (1998) ‘Introduction’ in Fredrik Barth (ed) Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organisation of Culture Difference, Prospect Heights III: Waveland: 9-38.
Bayar, Murat (2009) ‘Reconsidering Primordialism: An Alternative Approach to the Study of Ethnicity’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 32/9: 1639-1657.
Bhabha, Homi (1999) ‘Introduction’ in Homi Bhabha (Ed) Nation and Narration London: Routledge: 1-7.
Branch, Daniel and Cheeseman, Nic (2008) ‘Democratisation, Sequencing, and State Failure in Africa: Lessons From Kenya’, African Affairs, 108/430: 1-26.
Brass, Paul R. (1994) ‘Elite Competition and Nation Formation’ in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds.) Nationalism: A Reader Oxford: Oxford University Press: 83-89.
Brubaker, Rogers and Laitin, David D. (1998) ‘Ethnic and Nationalist Violence’, Annual Review of Sociology, 24: 423-452.
Chatterjee, Shibashis (2005) ‘Ethnic Conflicts in South Asia: A Constructivist Reading’, South Asian Survey, 12/1: 75-89.
Coleman, James Smoot (1958) Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, London: University of California Press.
ELF (2013) Ethnolinguistic Fractionalisation Index, http://www.nsd.uib.no/macrodataguide/set.html?id=16sub=1, date accessed 10/11/2013.
Fenton, Steve (2004) ‘Beyond Ethnicity: The Global Comparative Analysis of Ethnic Conflict’, International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 45/3-4: 179-194.
Gaborieau, Marc (1985) ‘From Al-Beruni to Jinnah: Idiom, Ritual and Ideology of the Hindu-Muslim Confrontation in South Asia’, Athropology Today, 1/3: 7-14.
Hobsbawm, Eric (2012) ‘Introduction: Inventing Traditions’ in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.) The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1-14.
Horowitz, Donald (2000) Ethnic Groups in Conflict, London: University of California Press.
Human Rights Watch (1996) ‘India’s Secret Army in Kashmir: New Patterns of Abuse Emerge in the Conflict, May 1996’ www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1996/India2.htm, date accessed 10/11/13.
Kalyvas, Stathis N. (2008) ‘Ethnic Defection in Civil War’, Comparative Political Studies, 41/8: 1043-1068.
Lake, David A. and Rothchild, Donald (1996) ‘Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict’, International Security, 21/2: 41-75.
McGarry, John and O’Leary, Brendan (1995) Explaining Northern Ireland, Oxford: Blackwell.
Posen, Barry R. (1993) ‘The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict’, Survival, 35/1: 27-47.
Staniland, Paul (2012) ‘Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Insurgent Fratricide, Ethnic Defection and the Rise of Pro-State Paramilitaries’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 56/1: 16-40.
Vanhanen, Tatu (1999) ‘Domestic Ethnic Conflict and Nepotism: A Comparative Analysis’, Journal of Peace Research, 36/1: 55-73.
Wedeen, Lisa (1998) ‘Acting “As If”: Symbolic Politics and Social Control in Syria’, Society for the Comparative Study of Society and History, 40/3: 503-523.
[1] For example the Ethnoliguistic Fractionalistaion Index (ELF 2013).
[2] ‘Kinship’ is taken to mean racial, religious, linguistic, geographical or cultural ties (Bayar 2009: 1641, Vanhanen 1999).
—
Written by: Emily Tripp
Written at: University of Nottingham
Written for: Katherine Adeney
Date written: November 2013
What Light can Constructivist Analysis Shed on the Governance of the EU?
I. Introduction
The late 1990s witnessed a transformation in the way the European Union (EU) is analysed (Kohler Koch, Rittberger 2006). As a result, this ‘governance turn’ shifted academic interest from the integration process to the ‘great debate’ concerning governance (Pollack 2006, p. 44). Certain European scholars indicate that the integration-focused theoretical clash between neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism has been replaced by an ideological battle between constructivism and rationalism (Christiansen et al 1999, Moravscik 1999). Despite rationalism once being considered the dominant stream of new-institutionalist thought, constructivist critiques have begun to erode rationalism’s effectiveness as both a normative (social) theory and as a research tool.
This essay seeks to illustrate how constructivist thought offers a broader and more comprehensive analytical understanding of EU governance than its rationalist counterpart. To highlight this, the first section will examine constructivism’s position amongst the other contemporary theories. The second section will identify specific components which aid constructivist approaches in governance analysis. The third section will discuss the dangers of ‘bridging the gap’ between constructivism and rationalism. Through this, it will be argued that although rational approaches are not becoming redundant, they are in danger of simply becoming an internal dimension of a wider constructivist perspective.
II. Situating Constructivism
Both constructivism – an interest-based approach to international relations that ‘sees interests as socially constructed’ (Rosamond 2007, p.130) – and rationalism are central in the debate about how to best analyse governance. Governance is described as ‘both a process and a state whereby public and private actors engage in the intentional regulation of societal relationships and conflicts’ (Kohler-Koch, Rittberger 2006, p. 28). As EU governance is driven by actor behaviour, social approaches are particularly pertinent. To clarify, this essay will demonstrate how constructivist thought offers a more complete understanding of this behaviour.
Before the constructivist ‘turn’, ‘a rationalist ontology dominated the study of the EU’ (Bache et al 2011, p. 41). Armed with a material-gains rationale – reminiscent of realist accounts of international relations (IR) – its main ‘challenger’ in the theoretical debate was reflectivism. However, following the end of the Cold War and the surge in European development, constructivism seized the moment. This is the first aspect of constructivism that is more succinct than rationalism, describing the historical development and expansion of the EU (see Risse 2009, p. 147). Stuttering rationalist accounts of EU history have undoubtedly led to growing confidence amongst constructivist scholars, and as a result, EU governance was thrust under their analytical microscope.
Christiansen (et al 1999) present constructivism as the ‘middle-ground’ approach to understanding European governance, separating rationalism and reflectivism. The constructivist position at the top of the triangle is doubly significant. It could be argued that this reflects its position as the more encompassing theory, in which rationalism and reflectivism are increasingly playing supporting roles. This is reflected in other fields of political science, notably in international relations where constructivism became a very popular ‘theory’ following the end of the Cold War. Drawing further on Christiansen’s (ibid, p. 536) research, his situation of constructivism is important (as everything between rationalism and reflectivism). However, there is an alternative interpretation to the understanding offered by both Christiansen and Bache (2011, p.41). Instead of perceiving these constructivist ‘points’ as ‘building bridges’, this essay argues that constructivism is drifting away from rationalism towards reflectivism, stretching the links to the former whilst absorbing the latter. Despite that it would be erroneous to claim the two are poles apart, a more accurate image would be an expanding constructivist pole converging on a static rationalist pole. This potential overlap will be assessed in the next section.
III. Constructivist Strengths
Institutional Development
Where does rationalism fall short in its analytical capabilities? First of all, the stress on ‘fixed preferences’ invites constructivist criticism (Schmidt 2010, Checkel 2001). Understanding the decision making processes of the actors invested in the EU is crucial to uncovering the motivators that influence governance and, here, the rigid structure of rationalist analysis will never shed new light on EU governance. The problem is twofold. Firstly, these ‘fixed preferences’ vary depending on which rational choice advocate is writing. Whether it be Hoffman’s (S. 1966) predilection for safeguarding sovereignty or Moravscik’s (1998) interest in economic security, a significant aspect of rational choice’s ideological cornerstone is ambiguous. Secondly, this reliance on ‘fixed’ preferences suggests fixed outcomes (dependent on the variable structure). This is to be expected from an explanatory tool that relies exclusively on material ontology for its foundations. In conjunction, these characteristics present a skewed version of reality and a confused theoretical framework. Schmidt (2010, p. 5) acknowledges the adoption of some flexibility in preferences. However, this is unable to address the larger issue of rationalism, failing to not just explain, but to understand institutional change. Constructivists like Checkel (2001) suggest a change in formula to enhance understanding of institutional development.
Checkel’s (2001, pp. 560-561) model stresses the relationship between an actor and its ability to ‘learn’ from prior relations with different institutions. This ‘alternate causal pathway’, therefore, implies that instead of fixed preferences creating fixed outcomes, outcomes stem from how an actor has ‘learnt’ from preceding interactions, which in turn ‘leads to preference change’. This ‘preference change’, therefore, has the capacity to reshape actor’s identities and interests. ‘Learning’ further accentuates constructivist understanding of European governance by suggesting a constructive role for regional hegemons. Whereas rationalists might suggest that the norms of hegemons are imposed regionally through ‘authority’, a constructivist analysis proposes that the ‘learning and socialisation process’ allow hegemons to ‘persuade because they have managed to create a common understanding of a problem’ (Saurugger 2013, p. 894). The Eurozone crisis offers a good example: although many member states were pushed to adopt austerity measures by the EU (read the ECB and Germany), Britain was not, yet it was this ‘common understanding’ of the problem that drove the government to adopt pre-emptive measures.
Rationalism’s inability to conceive preferences through sociological means confines its analytical scope. Social learning is a solid analytical starting point as the limitations of rationalist preference formation echo its structural weaknesses. Christiansen (et al 1999, p. 8) shares the widespread belief that rationalist thought is ‘underpinned by familiar positivist epistemology’. It can causally explain, but its narrowness restricts the chance of any real analysis. Chebakova (2008) expands on this by citing the benefit of an interpretive approach in the case of the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP). The author similarly urges ideational and sociological examination, but, nonetheless, declares ‘recognition of material ontology’ to be vital in allowing researchers to ‘employ conventional qualitative and quantitative methods’, before interpreting the data in a ‘constructivist manner’ (ibid, p. 4). This approach is tied with analysis of the CFSP, and Hill’s (1993) rationalist conclusion that as it poorly serves the interests of the member states, thus it is an inefficient failure. Although a constructivist might empirically come to the same conclusion, it will doubtlessly consider broader aspects of the CFSP – how it was historically formed; how, despite resistance, it has become a ‘second pillar’ issue; and how it projects a global identity (Chebakova 2008). Identity is a central characteristic of constructivism, and rationalist ignorance of its value is crucial to this essay’s argument – so it would be constructive to analyse it in closer detail.
Identity
The constructivist idea represented by Christiansen (et al 1999) reflects a reality that does not rely exclusively on material interests, but one that is constructed through ideational, social, and material ontologies (Chebakova 2008, p. 5). An integral tenet of constructivism is identity. While not all rational choice scholars are averse to assigning identity a central role, most approach it reductively, simplifying the concept as individual desires and preferences (Aguair 2008). Moreover, Aguair (2008, p. 7) notes the rational choice rejection of identity as an ‘obscure’ abstract. So how does this impact upon EU governance analysis? An example would be the idea of a ‘common European identity’ – as it is almost incomprehensible for a rational choice thinker (Risse 2004). This shared identity is valuable in explaining European integration and decision-making, and Risse (2004) cites the example of enlargement as ‘identity construction’ in action. This essay does not claim that a rationalist opinion (of principals allowing enlargement after a cost-benefit analysis) is illogical, but simply demonstrates certain characteristics of governance that rationalism is fundamentally designed to overlook. Constructivism inevitably sheds new light on EU governance simply as it can incorporate more ontologies into its understanding, and a larger arsenal allows it to analyse both endogenously and exogenously.
This ‘common identity’ is extended to Adler and Barnett’s (1996) ‘security community’, and more concretely, the CFSP. Rational choice analysis of security governance prioritises the protection of national interests. Constructivists, in contrast, would argue that the CFSP has ‘contributed to a convergence of national foreign policies and to a growing sense of a common international identity’ (Wagner 2003, p. 576). Chebakova (2008) argues that this not only represents the importance of common identity, but it also reveals how institutionalising norms collectively can result in a new institution. This links well with Checkel’s (2001) theory that, through repetition and continual ‘social learning’, identities can be reshaped and preferences redefined. This essay draws on the CFSP as an example not only because its development can be well analysed from a constructivist perspective, but because in doing so, this essay confronts Cowles’ (2003, p. 110-111) assertion that constructivists rarely address ‘bad’ things that have been socially constructed. This only strengthens claims that constructivism is vital to governance analysis, as it opens countless more avenues to uncover why the CFSP is ineffective and unpopular. In short, EU governance analysis benefits as constructivism can self-reflect endogenously, whereas rationalists are constrained by an exogenous outlook.
Decision-making and reform is central to EU governance. Consider the sweeping reforms of the European governance process in the Lisbon treaty, particularly the transition to qualified majority voting in the European Council. This provision threatens the power of individual member states in the policy-making process, as under the previous unanimity method of voting, unwanted reforms could easily be avoided by a single vote; this is especially impactful for powerful states that continue to exert influence over certain smaller states. Yet, the ‘logic of appropriateness’ model was followed, and members voted not out of national preference, but on what is best for the group European Community.
Approaching from a game-theory perspective, decision-making – which takes other player’s best interests into account (reminiscent of the Nash equilibrium) – incorporates a collective (and constructivist) element, whilst rationalist players would follow their strategy regardless of the other players. Whereas a rationalist explanation of this reform is narrow, constructivists could tackle it in numerous ways. They could argue that this reform demonstrated a moment of European self-awareness, recognising itself as a common community with a shared identity – and protecting this identity by acting to reduce the democratic deficit. The deficit, following a constructivist analysis, can be considered a discursive creation – built by social pressure and discontentedness (Christiansen et al 1999, p. 541). This challenges rationalism’s national preference theory, as although the public desired a more transparent decision-making process, certain member state governments may have benefited most from unanimous voting. The role of identity not only undermines rationalist decision-making rationale, but also its hierarchical decision-making structure. Here constructivism sheds a significant amount of light on EU governance. Not only does it allude to identity as an important factor in decision-making, it is also valuable for ‘tracking’ the member state’s rationale throughout the process. A rationalist rationale would be fixed throughout, so there would never be significant insight into how this important facet develops.
The relationship between agents and structures is central to this debate. (Risse 2004, Saurugger 2013). Rational thinkers consider the two to be distinct; however constructivists contest this by arguing that ideas and identity can permeate this detached connection (Saurugger 2013 p891). The ‘logic of appropriateness’ reveals agents and structures to be ‘co-constituted’, showing agents to be influenced by the social context established by institutionalised structures (Hoffman, M. 2000). Identity plays a crucial role in shaping both the institutions and the social context (or – what should be considered correct behaviour). Risse (2004, p. 151) claims this insight ‘allows for a deeper understanding of the impact of the EU on its member states’, and consequently, hinting that rationalist analysis of EU governance suffers from the ‘logic of consequentialism’.
Discourse
Another constructivist component – absent in rationalist analysis – is discourse and the power of language. Rationalists perceive discourse as ‘symbolic’ and not substantive and, therefore, it has no place in its analytical toolkit (Christiansen et al 1999). Constructivists, on the other hand, assign huge significance to discourse in understanding institutional change and policy reform. Chebakova (2008, p. 7) claims that ‘speech acts [can] be institutionalized into norms… change realities and provide the meaning for action’. This process can be applied analytically to concepts that rational choice often misunderstands – such as the constitutionalization of Europe (Rittberger, Schimmelfennig 2006, pp. 1158-1159). Here they track this communitarian process from the debate that launched the legal framework, to the support of subnational actors which resulted in member states being ‘forced to be concerned about their image’, and finally to the national level and the Rome Treaty establishing the European Constitution. Language and communication are constructivist norms (Aalberts 2004, pp. 35-37) and offer insightful observations about the history and creation of many EU institutions (EMU etc). Rational choice’s understanding of these institutional developments is again restricted by its limited scope, and the inception of these lasting institutions suggests the role of discourse is more than ‘symbolic’.
IV. ‘Bridging the Gap’
Panke (2006) promotes the use of the theories in conjunction, claiming constructivist approaches are better suited to low politics, while rationalist approaches more appropriate for high politics. She reasons that as two non-substantive theories, there is no need for conflict, as they are merely research tools that are used to form hypotheses for primary IR theories.
So why are attempts to bridge the gap relevant to EU governance? The concept suggests that the approaches are not opposed, and instead, can be used in a complimentary fashion to probe deeper than before. However, most attempts to ‘bridge the gap’ rely on the assumption that interests are not a social construct, thus preferences do not play a central role in a constructivist analysis. Empirical evidence illuminated in this essay would suggest that states’ interests can be shaped by social interaction, and that sometimes, material gains are intrinsic to a constructivist decision-making process. The ideational foundations of EU constitutionalization and the CFSP suggest Panke’s (2006) conclusions are ascertained through outdated perceptions of an overly-idealistic perception of constructivism. Attempts to bridge the gap are harmful for governance analysis, as any theoretical compromise made by constructivism can only result in a narrower understanding of European political process.
V. Conclusion
This essay supports the argumentation that constructivism plays a vital role in EU governance, whilst presenting rational choice as an ineffective research tool that can be absorbed by the broader diagnostic approach offered by constructivism. This essay has demonstrated that despite efforts to ‘bridge the gap’ between constructivism and rationalism, the latter approach is fatally hindered by its ‘ontological blindness’ (Pollack 2006, p.32), its theoretical disconnect with structures and agents, and its short-sightedness in recognising the impact of ideas, identity, and discourse in the governance process. Finally, it has illustrated that constructivism does, indeed, shed markedly more light on EU governance compared to its counterparts, whereas conversely, the limitations of rationalist analysis dramatically reduce its capacity to improve upon a constructivist perspective – especially as the core tenets of rationalism such as materialism and preference convergence are equally pertinent to a constructivist assessment.
References
Aalberts, T. (2004) ‘The Future of Sovereignty in Multilevel Governance Europe – A Constructivist Reading’ Journal of Common Market Studies, 42(1), pp.23-46.
Adler, E. Barnett, M. (1996) ‘Governing Anarchy: A Research Agenda for the Study of Security Communities’, Ethics and International Affairs, 10(1), pp63-98.
Aguair, F. (2008) ‘Can Rational Choice Cope With Identity?’ Paper presented to ISA Forum of Sociology, Barcelona, pp.1-25.
Bache, I., George, S. Bulmer, S. (2011) Politics in the European Union, 3rd Edition, Oxford University Press: Oxford.
Chebakova, A. (2008) ‘Theorizing the EU as a Global Actor: a Constructivist Approach’, The Maturing European Union – ECSA-Canada Biennial Conference Paper, pp.1-16.
Checkel, J. (2000) ‘Bridging the Rational Choice/Constructivist Gap? Theorizing Social Interaction in European Institutions’, ARENA working papers – workshop: ‘Institutionalism and the Study of the European Union, University of Washington, Accessed online http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arena-publications/workingpapers/working-papers2000/wp00_11.htm on 12/11/13.
Checkel, J. (2001) ‘Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change’, International Organization, 55(3), pp.553-588.
Christiansen, T., Jorgenson, K., Wiener, A. (1999) ‘The Social Construction of Europe’, Journal of European Public Policy, 6(4), pp.528-544.
Cowles, MG. (2003) ‘Non-State Actors and False Dichotomies: Reviewing IR/IPE Approaches to European Integration’, Journal for European Public Policy, 10, pp102-120, in Bache, I., George, S., Bulmer, S. (2011) Politics in the European Union, 3rd Edition, Oxford University Press: Oxford, p45.
Hill, C. (1993) ‘The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe’s International Role‘ Journal of Common Market Studies, 31(3), pp305-328, in Chebakova, A. (2008) ‘Theorizing the EU as a Global Actor: a Constructivist Approach’, The Maturing European Union – ECSA-Canada Biennial Conference Paper, pp.1-16.
Hoffman M (2000) ‘Entrepreneurs and Norm Dynamics: An Agent-Based Model of the Norm Life Cycle’, Workshop on Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, pp.1-38. Accessed online –http://scholar.google.co.uk/scholar_url?hl=enq=http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/~sok/papers/h/Hoffmann_norms.docsa=Xscisig=AAGBfm2sQZbZyD9spduG4g8aaMF9BC1Y9goi=scholarrei=0nKMUsmLJ8aN7QaLzYDoCgved=0CC8QgAMoADAA 14/11/13.
Hoffman, S. (1966) ‘Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe’, Daedalus, 95(3), pp.862-915.
Kohler-Koch, B. Rittberger, B. (2006) ‘Review Article: The ‘Governance Turn’ in EU Studies’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 44(1), pp.27-49.
Moravscik, A. (1998) The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht, Cornell University Press: Ithaca.
Panke, D. (2006) ‘The Differential Impact of Communicated Ideas: Bridging the Gap between Rationalism and Constructivism’, Hamburg Review of Social Sciences, 1(3), pp.312-342.
Pollack, M. (2007) ‘Rational Choice and EU Politics’ in Jorgenson, K., Pollack, M. Rosamond, B. (eds) (2007) Handbook of European Union Politics, Sage Publications: London, pp.31-55.
Risse, T. (2004) ‘Social Constructivism and European Integration’, in Wiener, A. Diez, T. (eds) (2004) European Integration Theory, Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp.159-176.
Risse, T. (2009) ‘Social Constructivism and European Integration’, in Wiener, A. Diez, T. (eds) (2004) European Integration Theory, 2nd Edition, Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp.144-160.
Rittberger, B. Schimmelfennig, F. (2006) ‘Explaining the Constitutionalization of the European Union’, Journal of European Public Policy, 13(8), pp.1148-1167.
Rosamond, B. (2007) ‘New Theories of European Integration’ in Cini, M. Borragan, N. (2007) European Union Politics, (2nd Edition), Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp. 117-136.
Saurugger, S. (2013) ‘Constructivism and public policy approaches in the EU: from ideas to power games’, Journal of European Public Policy, 20(6), pp.888-906.
Schmidt, VA. (2010) ‘Taking Ideas and Discourse Seriously: Explaining Change through Discursive Institutionalism as the fourth ‘New Institutionalism’, European Political Science Review, 2(1), pp.1-25.
Wagner,W. (2003) ‘Why the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy will remain Intergovernmental: A Rationalist Institutional Choice Analysis of European Crisis Management Policy’, Journal of European Public Policy, 10(4), pp.576-595.
—
Written by: Matthew Richmond
Written at: University of Sheffield
Written for: Simon Bulmer/Owen Parker
Date written: November 2013
How many diplomats does it take to solve a crisis? It turns out the answer to that question might be one diplomat, one NGO, and a whole lot of developers. At least that was the premise being debated and played out at Diplohack this week at the Hub in Westminster.
“We wanted to do something innovative, using open data and technology,” Jon Pelling, head of communications for the Swedish Embassy in London, told Wired.co.uk. “We’re interested in using technology in diplomacy in general and have strong networks ourselves, with NGOs etc.” The idea of Diplohack however, was to open up those networks and that knowledge to each other, and to the public, using technology to pave the way and help solve community problems. Pelling and his Dutch counterpart Weijer Vermeer, press and public diplomacy attaché at the Dutch Embassy in London, discussed the idea of a diplomat/NGO/developer hack day a year ago. And just four weeks ago they sat down to make it happen.
“We interviewed NGOs to come up with the questions, making sure we kept it broad and not too controversial,” explains Stephanie Denamps, the MakeSense volunteer leading the day’s hackathon. Denamps and her MakeSense colleagues gave up their time (her day job is at O2) to facilitate the debates and discussions, and steer the ten groups — each made up of a diplomat, a member of an NGO and a developer, or someone with relevant experience — toward a tangible plan. The morning consisted of a brainstorming session where what they saw as the biggest problems in the two chosen areas — sustainability in the food supply chain and freedom of speech in the arts — were hashed out. By the afternoon, the teams’ chosen concepts were refined for the final presentation.
The two questions — “How can creative collaboration in the arts enhance freedom of speech and tolerance?” and “How can open data and technology improve sustainability in the food supply chain?” — were not designed to give life to concrete ideas that would result in app development. The point was the process. What happens when you stick individuals from totally different backgrounds, skillsets and agendas in the same room to hash out an idea.
That all three career fields are founded in creative problem-solving meant there was in fact a surprising amount of success, however, with more than a few great ideas filtering out of a process that drove one diplomat to comment, “All of the ideas have some kind of future”. Of course, he may have just been being diplomatic. But his experience of the day was not a façade. It quickly became clear how much each diplomat gained from the experience of taking their ideas out of the office setting, from behind the gated communities of embassy life, and into a shared workspace. There they worked in tandem with strangers as enthusiastic about the issues at hand as they were.
“I like the creative part, it was very energetic,” commented one. “We’re all from such different backgrounds but we had a lot to talk about. We talk to a lot of people all the time, but sitting down to get an idea going was very productive. The setup is something I want to take with me back to Holland and the Hague.”
Another Dutch diplomat said: “It shows we have so much to learn from each other, there is huge potential in this for us.”
From the sustainability side, a few ideas stood out. Cropcheck is an app that allows farmers to alert the authorities to a pest problem. Tim Holmes of not-for-profit scientific research organisation CABI and Lisa Ommanney of design practice Something and Son worked on the design. The idea was to convince farmers to share data. Instead of immediately burning their crops if a problem arises, policy makers would incentivise them to share important data. In return, staff would be sent to investigate and give free advice. The app would also send alerts to farmers in the local area, asking them to check their crops.
An idea from Ed Dowding, founder of Food Trade, and an intern from the Dutch embassy focused on what to do if a crop disease or pests come to your country. The app would allow you to input categories such as what you want to buy and from where, and if there are any cases of diseases or pests being present, they are flagged up. It would also be integrated with a legal database telling you what tariffs would potentially be levied, and what to do to control the problem (quarantine etc).
The ideas for the freedom of speech apps drews the most debate.
Art in a Box, created by an employee from Global Partners Digital and a web consultant, would allow censored artists to sell work anonymously. They could be paid via Paypal or Bitcoin, and a bio explains their story — if they are in danger and why, why they have been censored, whether they are seeking legal help. They could even include a Twitter hashtag to get their story heard. “It empowers artists who don’t want to disclose their identity,” said one of the creators.
Bannedit, as the name suggests, showcases banned content. An interactive map would show where in the world an artist is. Policy makers could use it to see where there is tolerance and which areas perform badly, as communities emerge on the map. People can choose to like, distribute or support the artwork, with celebrity or even government endorsements a vital element. Content could also be curated and moved from the virtual world to the real, showcased at festivals.
Get Creating would allow artists to upload like audio files, to be modified by other artists. Users can then view all iterations; a history of the creative process. Other artists, supporters or governments could choose to support and endorse particular works. “Then it’s more difficult to ban it,” one designer said. It encourages artists to work together, creates a sense of solidarity and as clips get voted up or down, they gain notoriety.
Finally, journalist Rohan Jayasekera chipped in with an idea for banned films. Directors are asked to do a print of their film with the cut frames filled with black spaces. An app would allow viewers to lift their phone up when the banned content appears, and view it on the device. They can also listen to the director explain why the scene was important, and why it was censored.
The ideas are all obviously at their very, very early stages. Without the proper technological advice it was hard for the teams to outline how they might protect an artist’s identity, or even how they would identify whether an artist is who they say they are. If an artist is banned, it’s also likely authorities will know what their art looks like and could identify them that way.
It was suggested next time they get more makers involved — a few artists attended, but not enough –and more developers. “We need more techies to tell us if its actually possible,” commented Rebecca Zausmer of Global Digital Partners. Dowding suggested incentivising developers with a prize, but also giving them a specific challenge. “We’ve done a lot of hacks and the more refined the question is the better the output,” advised Quentin Johns from the Hub.
Nevertheless, the enthusiasm was infectious. One Dutch diplomat, Tanja Roling, was waxing lyrical about her app idea to Wired.co.uk. “I wanted to take it further, but there was no time left,” she said, explaining the different mods to the original concept she would like to implement. She wants to bring together her idea, Bannedit, with Get Creative. “What do people want to see? They want something cool and visual.” Combining the two would see artists modifying each other’s work and creating a timeline of their creation.
Listening to Roling pontificate about the design and how to make it user-friendly made a clear case for using a creative process to disrupt what is a deeply traditional world of foreign affairs.
“Today we need to work across much broader fields,” Swedish ambassador to the UK Nicola Clase told Wired.co.uk. “It’s useful in diplomacy; we need to be a less closed field.”
Sweden’s foreign office is particularly savvy when it comes to the issue, partly because of their tech-loving foreign minister Carl Bildt. “A few years ago he needed to get in touch with the foreign minister in Bahrain and couldn’t get hold of him, so he sent him a tweet,” says Clase, with a hint of pride. “It’s really important, we have strong support and are actually being pushed by the Foreign Minister. It’s a top-down approach!”
This year, Bildt was named the best connected world leader — basically, more world leaders follow him back than any other minister. According to Clase, he ordered all diplomats to get a Facebook and Twitter account that they are trusted to use as they see fit for professional purposes. “It wasn’t an option,” she says. And most importantly, they know it’s okay if they make mistakes — considering how new the concept of opening up is for the typically closed community of diplomacy, this is vital to encourage employees.
Today, Clase recounts a world where information flow has given diplomats access to what they need to know far quicker than ever before. “Today it’s about teaching diplomats digital literacy and in the future getting information and pushing it back to the public where necessary.”
“We’re asking ourselves, can we be a platform for discussion?”
The Dutch and Swedish embassies plan on following up Diplohack with the two issues of sustainability and freedom of speech dealt with separately next time.
http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2013-09/27/diplohack
PDiN Extras: Diasporas and Public Diplomacy
By Kia Hays, Associate Editor
The role of the diaspora in PD is something acknowledged by actors across the field. Secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton articulated just this sentiment in her opening remarks at the second annual Global Diaspora Forum last summer:
we all believe that diaspora communities have enormous potential to help solve problems and create opportunities in their countries of origin, because we believe that, as the title of this conference says, we can move forward by giving back. By tapping into the experiences, the energy, the expertise of diaspora communities, we can reverse the so-called “brain drain” that slows progress in so many countries around the world, and instead offer the benefits of the “brain gain.”
The articles on diasporas in our PDiN database further prove the importance of the diaspora in PD. The collection of articles documented over the years focus on diasporas from Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Americas participating in cultural, economic, and political activities within their communities. Below are just a few of these articles from the past few months.
To view the full list, please follow #diasporas.
AMERICA DOES NOT ATTRACT INDIAN STUDENTS ANYMORE
Indolink
AFTER WHARTON SNUB, MODI TO ADDRESS INDIAN DIASPORA IN USA
Hindustan Times
DIASPORA CONFERENCE TO FOCUS ON INVESTMENT AND TRADE
Jamaica Information Service
MODERN MIGRANT’S LOYALTY IS AN ASSET TO THE WORLD
The Age
PAKISTANI-AMERICAN ARTIST AWARDED US MEDAL OF ARTS
NY Daily News
http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/index.php/pdin_monitor/article/pdin_extras_diasporas_and_public_diplomacy/
The USC Center on Public Diplomacy and USC Annenberg School of Journalism were pleased to host a conversation with Kim Ghattas, the BBC’s State Department correspondent since 2008 and author of “The Secretary: A Journey with Hillary Clinton from Beirut to the Heart of American Power,” released in March 2013.
Joshua Marshall is Head of Accessibility at GDS. Just before Christmas, we sat him down for a short chat about his work.
In Joshua’s opinion, the single most important thing GDS has done to improve accessibility across government is “change how we write.”
Improving the quality of all the written content on GOV.UK has made more of a difference than anything else, he says. “It’s changed the perception of how government talks to its citizens.”
There are other important lessons Joshua has learned, including:
You can listen to the full interview (just under seven minutes) by clicking the play button in the embedded SoundCloud widget below. There’s also a full transcript just below that, if you’d prefer to read one.
An audio file for direct download is available from The Internet Archive.
(This audio interview is a new experiment for us – what do you think of it as a format for explaining what we do? As always, we’d love to hear your feedback.)
Follow Joshua on Twitter: @partiallyblind
Follow Giles on Twitter: @gilest
Joshua Marshall: I’m Joshua Marshall; I am the Head of Accessibility for the Government Digital Service.
Interviewer: What does accessibility actually mean?
Joshua: It means making sure that we’re not excluding anyone who might have to use our services.
Interviewer: Go into a bit more detail about that. What do you mean by excluding anyone? How could we exclude people?
Joshua: You can do things like not build your website in a particularly good fashion, so you might lock them out by not caring enough about colour contrast for someone who’s visually impaired. You might make it really difficult for someone who has to navigate just with a keyboard to be able to use the site. You might make the site not work particularly well with screen readers, for example, if you’re a blind user. We have to take all of those things into consideration while we’re designing the services that we’re building.
Interviewer: How do we do that, then? What’s the process that we go through?
Joshua: Mostly, we do that by making sure it’s part of the process, right from the very beginning. We work in an agile way, so we work with small development teams. We take the work that we do and break it up into quite logical sections of work, so if we’re building a new feature, for example, we’ll start from the beginning and ask what the user need is that we’re trying to solve. From the very start of that process, as we work out what we might need to build or what we might need to design, we’ll do it with the knowledge that this has to work for everyone, so we can’t cut corners, say that, “We’re just not going to bother supporting screen-reader users, we’re not going to bother supporting visually impaired users”, you know? They’re all tax payers too, so they don’t have a choice in interacting with these services, the same way that the rest of us don’t, so we have to make sure that what we’re building works for everyone.
Interviewer: In reality, does that mean that your job involves a fair bit of knocking heads together and making people think about things that they might not otherwise be thinking about?
Joshua: To a certain extent. It used to a lot more than it does now. We’re already two years into the process of making GOV.UK a viable product, so at this point we’ve already worked quite extensively with all the different development teams, and it’s an accepted thing that the products that we build will be accessible. It may be that if you’re working on something where you wouldn’t traditionally have considered it that much, you might have to have a little bit more of a pointer as to what we expect, but the implication for all of the things that we build from the Government Digital Service is they should all be accessible by default.
Interviewer: What’s the most difficult thing that you’ve had to face so far?
Joshua: Scaling up how much knowledge is required for different product teams, and different teams based in different departments around the country. We have a team based here with us in GDS who can test the products that we’re building; we can give guidance, but we’re in one location in London. We have teams in Liverpool, and in Warrington and in Glasgow, like all over the country, and scaling that, and making sure that all of the external, perhaps non-GDS teams; that they all try and build their things the way that we want them to, rather than the way that they have in the past.
Interviewer: What’s the most difficult thing about getting the message across? Accessibility is taken very seriously by some people on the internet, but by no means everybody. It seems that there’s still a lot of hammering home of the message to get across to a lot of people, so how do you deal with that?
Joshua: In the accessibility community in general, I think there’s always been a lot of feeling like you’re preaching to the choir, in some respects. I think for us, the best thing we can do is to put our money where our mouth is, really. We’re telling people that this is the way that it should be, based on us doing this work for two years with GOV.UK, and proving that you can work in an agile way and still make accessible products. It shouldn’t be a thing you try and bolt on at the end. It shouldn’t be optional. It should just be a part of the process of making something good in 2013.
Interviewer: What’s the thing that you’re most proud of achieving in those last two years?
Joshua: I would say… We won a DAD award, which is a design and advertising award. It’s a very prestigious thing, and we won a Yellow Pencil and a Black Pencil for the quality of the writing on GOV.UK. Without a doubt, I would say that the biggest thing we’ve done to improve accessibility across the government with GOV.UK is change how we write. Like, just that one thing has made more of a difference to people, like being able to actually understand what we’re trying to communicate. Everything else that we’ve done is great on top of that, but we couldn’t have done it without having a fantastic content team, like, changed the perception of how government talks to its citizens.
Interviewer: In contrast to that, then, what would you like to achieve in the next two years?
Joshua: I would like to ensure that our deaf users get as much out of the platform as any of the other user groups that we’ve chosen to focus on to this point. I’m currently trying to work out the scope of how we meet the needs of our deaf users better than we have been so far. We currently don’t have much in the way of British Sign Language content on the site. We don’t have video relay tools or anything that the deaf community typically uses to communicate. We’re in the process of investigating what those things are, and I’m really hoping it won’t take two years to get those things live and get them tested; see what the user need is.
Interviewer: Brilliant. Thank you very much.
Joshua: You’re welcome.
Sign up for email alerts and join the conversation on Twitter.
You may also be interested in:
Talking accessibility at ustwo
