Blog Page 283

Iterating our support for service managers

Just before Christmas we released dates for the next four cohorts on GDS’s Service Manager Induction and Development Programme.

During 2013, we took the programme through discovery, alpha, beta, and into live. We reached 30 service managers from 11 departments, who between them cover 15 of the exemplar transformations.

As Paul Slade blogged back in October, each group spent up to 8 days with us at Aviation House, taking part in sessions on putting users first, being agile, and building the team; as well as more specialist topics such as assisted digital and identity assurance.

We’re really grateful for all the participants’ feedback which is helping us continue to improve the programme.

In the follow-up survey to the alpha and beta, service managers told us the programme made a big difference to their network, confidence and knowledge as service managers. They appreciated hearing from experts who have real-life experience of running digital services in government. And they enjoyed the practical exercises and case studies.

Among their comments:

  • “[The programme] gave me the evidence and the confidence to challenge ‘short cuts’… to encourage more focus on regular user testing and change throughout.”

  • “Improved my knowledge and confidence in the agile delivery process… I am now mentoring other delivery teams and facilitating workshops.”

  • “I feel confident articulating the service manager role to others.”

We’ll continue running inductions in small cohorts of up to 10 service managers who can get to know each other and tackle issues as a team. We’ve also invited programme alumni back in to network and share their experiences with each cohort.

For all new service managers on exemplars and 100,000+ transaction services to take part in the programme, we estimate up to 150 participants by Q2 2015.

To make the programme more flexible and open to a wider range of participants, we’ve divided modules between two formats:

  • Induction programme – 4 days to equip newly appointed service managers with the basic knowledge, network and confidence to take the lead in transforming digital services.

  • Open programme – 3 days of more specialist modules to help you succeed and improve in particular areas of the Digital by Default Service Standard.

All newly appointed service managers should book to attend both the induction programme and all 3 days of the open programme. More experienced service managers or others in specialist roles in government may choose to book onto any or all of the open programme modules.

See the Service Manual for more information about the programme in 2014, including a link to request your place.

Follow Matt on Twitter: @mattedgar, and sign up for email alerts here.


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A checklist for digital inclusion – if we do these things, we’re doing digital inclusion

How we do user research in agile teams

Iterating the trade tariff tool with HMRC

A checklist for digital inclusion – if we do these things, we’re doing digital inclusion

As with most of our work at the Government Digital Service, we release things early for review and comment. The digital inclusion team, set up last year, would like to share and get your feedback on an alpha version of a checklist for digital inclusion.

We first mentioned a set of principles (we’re now calling it a checklist) when we published action 15 of the Government Digital Strategy. Over the last three months, this checklist has been developed in collaboration with partners from across government, private, voluntary and public sectors.

The intention is for the checklist to act as a guide for any organisation involved in helping people go online. In other words, if you do these things, you’re doing digital inclusion. Alongside each of the six checklist items, we have included an illustrative example of what works and a potential action that could be included in the upcoming digital inclusion strategy.

Checklist Overview

1.  Start with user needs – not our own
2.  Improve access – stop making things difficult
3.  Motivate people – find something they care about
4.  Keep it safe – build trust
5.  Work with others – don’t do it alone
6.  Focus on wider outcomes – measure performance

We want to hear from you

We are looking for feedback on the checklist from organisations and individuals who are involved in helping people, small businesses and small charities go online. We are keen to hear other examples from you  that illustrate great digital inclusion in action. We also want to know what actions we should be taking. Like those we have identified from the examples here, please let us know what you would do.

Your comments

Feedback is great and we want to hear everyone’s thoughts and advice as we develop the digital inclusion strategy. As well as the feedback we’ve asked you for on the checklist above, we have 4 other specific questions that we would really appreciate your help with:

1.  There a number of different roles that government could play. From your experience of digital exclusion, how should the government help tackle this issue?

2.  Getting funding to the those who can help people take the first steps to go online is really difficult and complex. How can we make it easier for support and funding to reach organisations who can offer the best support to people offline?

3.  We need new ways of inspiring and helping people go online – not just laptops and slideshows. How can we foster and promote innovation within digital inclusion?

4.  Everyone we have spoken to says that we all need to work together better to tackle digital exclusion. What is stopping this? How to we support greater collaboration, partnerships and joint working?

We are really keen to hear any and all of your feedback via comments below or you can email them to the team at digital-inclusion@digital.cabinet-office.gov.uk. If we could ask for your comments, feedback and ideas by the end of January that would be great*.

Your feedback and advice will help to shape a digital inclusion strategy to be published in early Spring and set out how we can all collectively tackle digital exclusion.

We can’t wait to hear from you.

Join the conversation on Twitter: @GDSTeam

*Of course, if you want to get involved, work with us or simply pass on an idea we are always willing to talk. So get in touch!

Checklist

1.  Start with user needs – not our own

Tailor support around the unique barriers that stop people going online, and adapt to people’s needs which change over time

Throwing money at the problem and offering generic support does not help people go online for the long-term. People need tailored support to help them overcome their own particular barriers; whether that’s around access, cost, confidence or skills. Services need to be built for the user, not for government or business – putting their changing needs first.

Example of what works:

Lambeth Digital Buddies will support 50,000 Lambeth Council residents go online. Many residents are without access to the internet or lack the skills to confidently complete online transactions, and at the same time are heavily reliant on essential services that are migrating to online-only provision.

Digital Buddies are volunteers in the local community that will give their time to help people learn basic online skills, based around a mix of things that interest them, as well as using online government services. As many of those learning digital skills do not have regular access to the internet they can also receive text alerts advising them of important emails (for example from the Department for Work and Pensions) so they can log in knowing that there is something for them to attend to. The scheme also provides tangible benefits to buddies; for example, voluntary work experience helps improve job prospects by building experience and providing references for job applications.

Building on this example, a potential action could be to:

  • Empower local digital buddy networks within a national community of volunteers

2.  Improve access – stop making things difficult

Provide simple, low cost options for those who are socially and economically excluded to get online

Going online can be confusing, difficult and costly. It isn’t just about buying a laptop or smartphone; subscription fees, connection charges, setting up online accounts and installing firewalls can all make for a challenging experience.

Some people in the UK do not yet have access to broadband where they live even if they want to go online. The most digitally excluded are often the most socially and economically excluded, and could benefit the most from going online. Making the practical steps of going online easy and affordable makes a huge difference to people who are new to the internet.

Example of what works:

The Glasgow Housing Association (GHA), Scottish Government and BT have joined together to provide affordable broadband to a tower block in central Glasgow. With only 37% of those people living in social housing being online, support through housing providers is hugely important.

At £5 per month, not only does the service provide residents with simple and affordable connectivity and hardware, but the additional ongoing training and support they receive allows them to feel confident to use it.

By working together, all partners benefit from the scheme: reducing costs for GHA through online rent payments, fault reporting and communications with tenants; residents are now able to take advantage of the financial and social benefits that the internet can offer; for BT, increased market share and a new customer base; and, the scheme supports the government’s priorities by preparing for changes to universal credit.

Building on this example, potential actions could be to:

  • Establish a national model to provide housing association residents with connectivity, hardware and training

  • Define common standards across service providers, not just government, for basic online transactions e.g. paying rent online

3.  Motivate people – find something they care about

Bring digital into people’s lives in a way that benefits them; helping them do things they care about and can only do online

Pushing people to do something that doesn’t interest them doesn’t work. Let’s face it, doing government transactions online is not the most inspirational digital activity and is unlikely to be the motivator that gets someone to go online. In contrast, keeping in touch with your grandchildren who live abroad might be. Nobody wants to learn digital skills for the sake of it, and having an internet connection is useless unless you have a reason to want to use it.

Example of what works:

The E-mentoring initiative for the Rehabilitation of Prolific and Priority Offenders gives ex-offenders access to support, advice and guidance across a range of issues. When integrating back into society, priorities for ex-offenders include getting a job, finding secure accommodation and easily keeping in contact with their probation officers.

Through a ‘Virtual Home’, members can store vital personal information such as proof of ID, qualifications, CV and employment history which are not easy to maintain due to the transient and uncertain lifestyle that many are faced with.

By making ex-offenders’ lives better and focusing on the things that they care about, digital becomes part of their everyday lives. This innovative project was led in Leicestershire and Rutland with the support of the Brightside Trust.

Building on this example, a potential action could be to:

  • Make digital skills a central component of all rehabilitation

4.  Keep it safe – build trust

Make it easier to stay safe online by providing simple and straightforward advice and tools

Going online can be a daunting experience for many as they open themselves up to new risks. To keep people online in the long term it’s vital that they can rely on trusted sources to get the help, support and assurance they need to build their confidence in a digital world. The internet will never be 100% secure and staying safe online needs to be a basic digital literacy skill. Not enough people know how to look after themselves and others securely and not enough people trust the internet in the first place.

Example of what works:

Go ON UK  are developing a single place called digitalskills.com for those helping individuals, small businesses and small charities learn to be proficient, confident and safe online.

digitalskills.com is a repository of local resources and opportunities for accessing, learning and sharing digital skills. Still in its beta phase, the website has been created with a group of highly regarded and reputable national brands and will, over time, be developed to assure the quality of the resources and advice that is made available.

As well as links to useful information and services, there are maps to direct people to where local physical resources and advice are located. Go ON UK’s ambition and intent is to to create a single, trusted, and evolving source for online services that will help instill confidence and trust amongst new users and those supporting them.

Building on this example, a potential action could be to:

  • Build and promote digitalskills.com to be a UK wide trusted source of tools, advice and opportunities

5.  Work with others – don’t do it alone

Work together to maximise expertise, experience and resources to better meet user needs

Services to help people go online are not joined up enough. Efforts are duplicated across providers, funding is sporadic and does not always align with users’ needs. Better links and coordination are needed between the public, private and voluntary sector, so that their efforts add up to more than the sum of their parts.

Example of what works:

Liverpool’s Race Online 2012 (Go ON it’s Liverpool) brought together some 5,000 digital champions to help people go online by promoting a wide range of activities across the city – for example, encouraging people to ‘Give an hour’ to help those off-line to go online. This was a highly successful campaign brought about by a collaborative model involving everyone from; politicians, to community groups, the police, local businesses and volunteers to help the people of Liverpool go online.

This multi-faceted partnership and high profile initiative helped 104,000 people in Liverpool who had never been online (July 2011) and reduced those digitally excluded by 58,000 over the year. The success of the Liverpool Race has led to this model being replicated in the first of Go ON UK’s regional programmes in the North East.

Building on this example, a potential action could be to:

  • Partners in the public, private and voluntary sectors to work together to roll-out Go ON UK’s regional partnership programme nationally

6.  Focus on wider outcomes – measure performance

Identify wider outcomes that can be delivered by helping people become independently confident online and use data to understand what works

Reducing digital exclusion is not about the number of people who simply log-on once; how we measure digital inclusion needs to become far better. Equally, being able to go online is not an end in itself, but it does offer one way to help improve wider social and economic outcomes like improved health, employment or reduced re-offending and loneliness.

Identifying and prioritising against wider outcomes, agreeing common measures, evaluating and testing what works, as well as iterating and making things better, is critical to realising the benefits of going digital and achieving maximum impact for minimum resources.

Example of what works:

There are very few longitudinal surveys which track the long term efficacy of help and support provided to those digitally excluded; meaning that what works and what doesn’t is hard to understand.

Citizens Online and BT have been running a series of training sessions as part of their Get IT Together initiative. Learners receive 4 sessions of training and are then contacted after 3, 6, 12, and 24 months. Understanding ongoing user-confidence, types of devices owned and services being used, as well as the reasons for being online and offline allows Citizens Online and BT to iterate and make changes to their approaches when delivering training, support and developing new services.

Building on this example, a potential action could be to:

  • Establish a common measure of digital inclusion across national, local, public and private surveys

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You may also be interested in:

Introducing the new digital inclusion team

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Getting started on assisted digital

Going ‘live’ with the Service Standard

The Digital by Default Service Standard has been running as a beta for almost a year now, but formally comes into force in April. Now that we’ve run over 40 assessments, we thought it was time to summarise what we’ve learned so far.

The Service Standard is what we believe ‘good’ looks like for government digital services. The standard consists of 26 criteria that cover a range of areas essential for building new or redesigning existing digital services. The purpose is to improve the quality of government digital services and support the Cabinet Office spending controls.

Government committed in the Government Digital Strategy that by April 2014 all new or redesigned digital services will meet the Service Standard before they can go live. From April 2014, services going through an assessment will be assessed against all 26 points of the standard.

Getting ready …

In preparation for April, we’ve been assessing services against the standard at the end of their alpha and beta phases, before they launch in public or move to the next phase. In the year before the standard formally comes into effect, rather than expecting them to meet all 26 criteria, we’ve primarily focussed on whether services meet user needs, can be rapidly improved, and are safe and secure. The reason for this has been to give the teams building services time to get up to speed with working in a new way. But, by April this year, we’ll expect services seeking to move from beta to live to meet all 26 criteria.

We’ve been really impressed with the great work that is going on across government to improve digital services, and we hope that the process has been as helpful for departments as it has been for us. By running assessments against the standard before it comes into full force in April 2014, we’ve been able to learn and improve the process. I want to explain a little bit about what we’ve learnt so far and how we’ve changed the process in response.

Who is involved?

Last year, assessments were led by an experienced product owner with support from a technical architect and an analyst from GDS. This worked well because the people in these roles have a good understanding of government services and the Service Standard – after all they are already building or running digital services to meet the service standard in their day jobs. They were sometimes joined by an analyst and/or a designer on a service by service basis. Since then, we’ve realised just how valuable the support of a designer is to ensure we cover all elements of each service in sufficient detail.

What we’ve learned

We’ve found that it’s really difficult to know beforehand how long an assessment is going to take. This isn’t surprising since we know that services across government can be very different, some are more complex than others. So, we’ve extended the length of the assessments from 2 hours to 3 hours – this works much better because the services that don’t need all 3 hours finish early but the others don’t overrun.

We’ve learnt that the assessment meetings run much more smoothly when the assessors understand a bit more about the service before the assessment meeting. That’s why we now ask for a description of the service before each assessment including who its users are, what user needs the service is aiming to meet, and a working link to the service.

For services themselves, we’ve found that that there is a real benefit to sharing learning from one service to the next. For example, this might be by sharing code and design from a service that has passed an assessment or by avoiding common pitfalls from services that haven’t passed. To help this learning across different services, we are going to start publishing assessment reports soon.

There may be a few more improvements that we’ll make ahead of April. If you have suggestions, please do comment below.

Follow Mark on Twitter: @Mark_Mc4 and sign up for email alerts here.


You may also be interested in:

Beta testing the Service Standard

Setting open standards for government documents

First open standards selected

A new home for the GDS blog

This morning we moved the GDS blog over to the GOV.UK blogging platform. You might notice a few changes to the way the site looks and works, including a new URL.

The move is an important one for us, as it give us more control over the design and functionality of the blog, and makes things like searching by topic and author much easier for you.

The move does also mean some changes that we wanted to make you aware of.

Unfortunately most of the comments made during the last couple of weeks on the old platform will not be moved over, so they won’t show up on the new blog.

Also, if you subscribe to email updates to this blog, you’ll notice that the emails will change.

As with everything here at GDS, we really value your feedback. Please let us know what you think of the new platform, and how we could improve on it. You can comment below, send us a tweet or find our contact ethos and email information here.

However you want to get in touch, we are keen to hear from you.

Has Human Security Disappeared from the International Agenda?

“The world cannot be at peace unless people have security in their daily lives”[1]

UN Human Development Report, 1994

Understanding human security as “safety from chronic threats and protection from the sudden hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life,” this paper proposes that while it could be argued that human security as a concept and framework for practices has largely disappeared from the international agenda, such a viewpoint ignores the work done by various agencies in the name of human security and the relatively recent resurgence of interest internationally in human security. The reasons for the apparent decline of human security are examined—namely conceptual ambiguities, framework difficulties, and the apparent misuse and failure of human security interventions by international institutions. However, the advances of the human security approach and the recent resurgence of interest in human security in the UN are examined to argue that the ideals of human security remain and are active.

When discussing human security’s conceptual problems, the most contentious issue surrounds its definition. While this paper uses a simple definition, scholars and policymakers rarely agree on what constitutes human security.[2] Human security’s 1994 inception by the UN Human Development Report divided human security into several categories ranging from economic to environmental security.[3] Such a sweeping definition caused problems for scholars. Khong argued that by prioritizing everything, human security has prioritised nothing due to the difficultly it creates in dealing specific issues.[4] Once an issue is ‘securitized,’ it gains priority among policymakers.[5] If everything is prioritised, what gets preference?

In response to criticism, human security advocates have grouped the original definition into two categories: namely, a ‘narrow’ view, constituting ‘freedom from fear’ (violence), and a ‘broad’ view, constituting ‘freedom from want’ (economic and personal).[6] Whilst significant convergence between these two groupings exist, scholars are still faced with difficultly prioritising ‘freedom from fear’ or ‘freedom from want.’[7] Human security’s conceptual difficulty has perhaps contributed to its apparent decline, as agents are unsure of its meaning. Brahimi, a former UN official, allegedly told Martin and Owen, “I don’t use the term human security because I don’t know exactly what I mean, and I worry that someone will come up and contradict me.”[8]

Another conceptual issue related to human security’s apparent decline is its radical nature. Throughout the Cold War, the international community’s security conception was embedded within the Nation-State model, wherein the primary security objective was related to defending State sovereignty. States exercised a dual role as internal provider of citizens’ security and as an external source of security threats to others. In line with this approach, the international community adhered resolutely to the principles of sovereignty when approaching intra-State conflicts where ‘even in cases of severe human rights abuses, most states formally rejected the idea that states could intervene in other states.’[9] Alternatively, human security aimed to empower individuals by providing a two-part support system, comprised of both the State and, should individual security be compromised, the international community.[10] In effect, State security became one option among many others, and State sovereignty became flexible.[11]

This concept has provoked the ire of commentators, such as Chappuis, who argued that taking human security seriously would require a total change in the international community’s structure.[12] Others have argued that human security violates national sovereignty. It could be postulated that human security makes intervention following human security abuses seem apolitical, when intervening in another State’s affairs is fundamentally a political act. In his dismissive review of human security as ‘The Dog that Didn’t Bark’, Chandler argued that human security provides stronger States an excuse to intervene in the sovereignty of others.[13] Thus, critics of human security have presented the concept as a neo-imperial tool and attempted to tarnish it, thereby contributing to the apparent decline of human security. Whether this is the case will be examined, but firstly this paper deals with framework disagreements stemming from the conceptual difficulties.

Understanding framework as “a set of ideas or facts that provide support for something,” this paper examines human security frameworks in international relations and how they have contributed to its apparent disappearance.[14] There are two frameworks of note: frameworks built on ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want.’ Frameworks built on ‘freedom from fear’ have perhaps been the most effective and popular approach among States. Historically, Canada has been at the forefront of such an approach, but in 2005, a UN initiative labelled ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) was established, which broadened its advocacy base. The essence of R2P is that sovereignty is not a right, but entails responsibilities for States to provide protection and security for their citizens.[15] In many senses, therefore, R2P replaced human security as a framework based on ‘freedom from fear.’ The gross misuse of R2P, which will discussed later, perhaps led to a growing uneasiness about using such a framework.

The second policy framework adopted by States has been based on ‘freedom from want.’ Traditionally, Norway and Japan have been great proponents of such an approach, but the EU and the UN have also been involved.[16] This framework attempts to extend the ‘threat’ agenda to include hunger, disease, and natural disasters, as they are seen as inseparable concepts in addressing human insecurity.[17] However, such a framework suffers from many of human security’s conceptual weaknesses. Where do States intervene first? What takes precedence, a famine or tsunami? Compared to R2P, a framework based on ‘freedom from want’ appears, at first glance, to be much more abstract and fluid a concept, something which is of little use to policymakers. Another issue for many commentators is that a great deal of funding is required for ‘freedom from want’ frameworks. Indeed, a UN initiative to develop regions has been primarily funded only by Japan for over a decade.[18] This perhaps makes such a framework at times unattractive for States.

Implementation of both frameworks by international institutions has, unfortunately, left much to be desired. The current UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti, which began in 2004, elucidates many of the problems of human security frameworks in international relations.[19] The mission was mandated with a comparatively narrow interpretation of human security, primarily based on ensuring ‘freedom from fear.’[20] Emphasis was on creating a secure domestic environment, explicitly for the purpose of enabling human rights, preventing “the loss of human life,” and restoring national “peace and security.” Yet the mission was also tasked with improving Haitian economic conditions. [21]  Thus, the mission exemplifies a neat combination of a narrow ‘freedom from fear’ framework influenced by ‘freedom from want’ concerns.

The results to the framework were mixed. Muggah argued that the mission’s beginning was seen by some to represent a ‘new reality’ based on human security peacekeeping.[22] Unfortunately, the UN’s human security concept appeared to be well ahead of the realities on the ground. Haiti’s security situation deteriorated after UN intervention and, eventually, it was decided that a human security framework was not sufficient to deal with on the ground violence.[23] Put simply, a more traditional peacekeeping method was needed. While the Haitian mission was not a complete failure for human security, it did expose its weakness i.e. that it could not stand alone without a traditional security force.

While the UN human security intervention in Haiti is seen as benign in intent, NATO’s 2011 Libyan incursion was viewed as anything but. NATO undertook military intervention in terms of human security (‘R2P’), citing Libyan dictator Gaddafi’s planned air attacks upon civilians.[24] Thus, it was a ‘freedom from fear’ concern. However, “having crippled Libyan air capabilities,” NATO continued targeting Gaddafi’s compound, prompting critics to note, “the boundaries between protecting civilians and pursuing regime change became increasingly blurred.”[25]  Depicting human security as a neo-imperialist tool, critics alleged that, contrary to the principles of human security, diplomatic means had not been exhausted prior to NATO’s deployment.[26] Whilst Gaddafi’s genocide language prior to intervention indicated that mass violence against civilians was imminent, sustained NATO attacks against Gaddafi cast human security interventions in a negative light, as it appeared that the West used human security as a smokescreen for intervention.[27] Perhaps, most damaging were reports that NATO was responsible for twice as many civilian deaths as Gaddafi.[28] This was not the first time human security language had been used to overstep boundaries. Gilmore noted that the US employed human security language in its ‘War on Terror’ even though the ‘War’ was anathema to human security.[29] Human security as a concept has, perhaps ‘disappeared’ from political discourse because it has been manipulated to serve specific personal agendas. Interestingly, in 2010 the Canadian Government effectively blacklisted ‘human security’ from its communications, perhaps indicating the tarnished image of the concept.[30]

Has human security – ‘The Dog that Didn’t Bark’ – disappeared? The answer appears to be no. Those who argue otherwise ignore the vast advances made in peacekeeping, thanks to human security such as: the Ottawa Treaty (banning anti-personnel mines), the Rome Treaty (creating the International Criminal Court), the UN Security Council resolutions on Children and Armed Conflict and Women, Peace and Security, and, of course, R2P.[31] While human security is not as popular a concept as in its heyday in the early 1990s, its essence has continued through a number of political institutions. Dealing with ‘freedom from want,’ the UN Trust Fund for Human Security has funded over 200 projects since 1999.[32] This has included a vast array of issues from Cambodian drug counselling to supporting Sudanese agricultural investment. Dealing with ‘freedom from fear,’ the EU has largely built its common foreign policy around issues of human security.[33] And, while discourses on human security in the UN were scarce for many years, a 2012 debate in the UN focused on coming to agreement over what human security constitutes.[34] Whether this will be successful is yet unknown, however, its presence indicates that human security has not disappeared from the international agenda.

The Syrian Crisis and debates over intervention during 2013 marked an interesting example of the longevity of human security. In late August and September 2013, Western military strikes were contemplated in response to allege chemical weapons use against civilians near Damascus i.e. a violation of human security. While negotiations over military intervention were eventually vetoed, the Syrian Regime cooperated with the international community to destroy its chemical weapons. This may seem like a small victory, until one recalls McCormack’s assertion that previously ‘even in cases of severe human rights abuses, most states formally rejected the idea that states could intervene in other states.’[35] It appears human security has allowed at least some cooperation between States in trying to lessen the damage of internal strife. This is progress. While human security was not invoked as a concept during the Syrian Crisis, its ideals certainly were.

This paper proposed that while it could be argued that human security as a concept and framework for practices has largely disappeared from the international agenda, such a viewpoint ignores the work done by various agencies in the name of human security and the relatively recent resurgence of interest in human security. The reasons for the apparent decline of human security were examined before the paper went on to examine the advances of the human security approach, along with recent resurgence of interest in human security internationally. While critics such as Chandler may view the relative disappearance of the term human security as a victory, the victory appears to have been pyrrhic. The ideals of human security appear prevalent in the intentions of many international actors.

Bibliography

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Chappuis, F., “Human Security and Security Sector Reform: Conceptual Convergences in Theory and Practice”, in Benedek, W., Kettemann, M. C., Mostl, M. (Eds.) Mainstreaming Human Security in Peace Operations and Crisis Management,  (Abingdon: Routledge), 2011, pp. 99-122.

Dembinski, Matthias, and Reinold Theresa, “Libya and the Future of the Responsibility to Protect: African and European Perspectives”, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, (Frankfurt: PRIF, 2011).

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Gilmore, Jonathan, “A Kinder, Gentler Counter-Terrorism Counterinsurgency, Human Security and the War on Terror”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2011), pp.   21-37.

Kaldor, Mary, A decade of the ‘War on Terror’ and the ‘Responsibility To Protect’: The global debate about military intervention, 10 Years After September 11, 2011    (http://essays.ssrc.org/10yearsafter911/a-decade-of-the-%E2%80%9Cwar-onterror%E2%80%9D-and-the-%E2%80%9Cresponsibility-to-   protect%E2%80%9D-theglobal-debate-about-military-intervention-2)  [Accessed 4 December 2013]

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Muggah, Robert, and Krause, Keith, “True Measure of Success-The Discourse and Practice of Human Security in Haiti”, Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy International Relations, Vol. 7 (2006), pp. 129-141.

Modeme, Lawrence, “The Libya Humanitarian Intervention: Is It Lawful In International Law?”, Academia, 2011             (http://www.academia.edu/576116/The_Libya_Humanitarian_Intervention_Is_it   _Lawful_in_International_Law)  [Accessed 2 December 2013].

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Owen, Taylor, “Human Security-Conflict, Critique and Consensus: Colloquium Remarks and a Proposal for a Threshold-Based Definition”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 35, No. 3 (2004), pp. 373-387.

Paris, Roland, “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?”, International Security, Vol. 26, No. 2 (2001), pp. 87-102.

Rock, Allan, “The Human Security Network, Fifteen Years On”, Centre for International Policy Studies, 21 May 2013 (http://cips.uottawa.ca/the-human-security-network-fifteen-years-on/) [accessed 4 December 2013].

Stahn, Carsten, “On’ Red Lines’ and ‘Blurred Lines’: Syria and the Semantics of Intervention, Aggression and Punishment”, Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 11, (2013), pp. 955-977.

U.N. General Assembly,  ” General Assembly Calls for Accelerated Efforts to Eliminate   Malaria in Developing Countries, Particularly Africa, by 2015, in Consensus Resolution. Also Adopts Consensus Text on Human Security, Holds Dialogue on Macroeconomic Policy, Sustainable Development”, United Nations, 10 September, 2012 (http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/ga11274.doc.htm) [accessed 2 December 2013].

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[1] United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report: Annual Report  (New York: UNDP, 1994), p. 17.

[2] Roland Paris, “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?”, International Security, Vol. 26, No. 2 (2001), p. 88.

[3] UNDP, Human Development, p. 24.

[4] Yuen Khong, “Human security: A Shotgun Approach to Alleviating Human Misery?”, Global Governance, Vol. 7, No. 3 (2001), p. 232.

[5] Edward Newman, “Critical Human Security Studies”, Review of International Studies, Vol. 36, No. 1 (2010), p. 85.

[6] Taylor Owen, “Human Security-Conflict, Critique and Consensus: Colloquium Remarks and a Proposal for a Threshold-Based Definition”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 35, No. 3 (2004), p. 375.

[7] Ibid., p. 376.

[8] Mary Martin and Taylor Owen, “The Second Generation of Human Security: Lessons from the UN and EU Experience”, International Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 1 (2010), p. 216.

[9] Tara McCormack, “Power and Agency in the Human Security Framework”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 21, No. 1 (2008), p. 115.

[10] Ibid., p. 116.

[11] Gerd Oberleitner, “Human Security: A Challenge to International Law?”, Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2005), p. 186.

[12] F. Chappuis, “Human Security and Security Sector Reform: Conceptual Convergences in Theory and Practice”, in W.Benedek , M. C. Kettemann, M. Mostl, (Eds.) Mainstreaming Human Security in Peace Operations and Crisis Management, (Abingdon: Routledge), 2011, p. 109.

[13] David Chandler, “Human Security: The Dog that Didn’t Bark”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 39, No. 4 (2008), p. 429.

[14] “Framework”, Merriam-Webster (http://bit.ly/1bpktVk) [accessed 6 December 2013].

[15] McCormack, “Power and Agency”, p. 116.

[16] Mary Martin, “Back to the Future for ‘Human Security’”, OpenDemocracy, 13 July 2013 (http://bit.ly/1geryLV) [accessed 6 December 2013].

[17] UNDP, Human Development, p. 20.

[18] Sadako Ogata, “Human Security – A New Response to Complex Threats”, The Huffington Post, 01 May 2013 (http://huff.to/1bOp98M) [accessed 5 December 2013].

[19] United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, Haiti Moving Forward Step by Step, (New York: UN, 2012), p. 2.

[20] Robert Muggah and Keith Krause, “True Measure of Success-The Discourse and Practice of Human Security in Haiti”, Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy International Relations, Vol. 7 (2006), p. 134.

[21] Ibid., p. 134.

[22] Ibid., p 136.

[23] Chandler, “Human Security”, p. 432.

[24] Mary Kaldor, “A decade of the ‘War on Terror’ and the ‘Responsibility To Protect’: The global debate about military intervention”, 10 Years After September 11, 2011 (http://bit.ly/18KbdN2)  [Accessed 4 December 2013].

[25] Lawrence Modeme, “The Libya Humanitarian Intervention: Is It Lawful In International Law?”, Academia, 2011 (http://bit.ly/196UuS5)  [Accessed 2 December 2013], p. 20.

[26] Ibid., p. 13.

[27] Matthias Dembinski and Theresa Reinold, “Libya and the Future of the Responsibility to Protect: African and European Perspectives”, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, (Frankfurt: PRIF, 2011), p. 6.

[28] Elena Ostroumova, “Price of ‘Freedom’: Libya’s Annus Horribilis”, RT News.  Last updated 12 February 2012 (http://bit.ly/1bOpdWa) [Accessed 24 November 2013].

[29] Jonathan Gilmore, “A Kinder, Gentler Counter-Terrorism Counterinsurgency, Human Security and the War on Terror”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2011), p. 29.

[30] Martin and Owen, “The Second Generation”, p. 211.

[31] Allan Rock, “The Human Security Network, Fifteen Years On”, Centre for International Policy Studies, 21 May 2013 (http://bit.ly/18rtBV2) [accessed 4 December 2013].

[32] Ogata, “Human Security”.

[33] Martin and Owen, “The Second Generation”, p. 218.

[34] U.N. General Assembly,  “General Assembly Calls for Accelerated Efforts to Eliminate Malaria in Developing Countries, Particularly Africa, by 2015, in Consensus Resolution. Also Adopts Consensus Text on Human Security, Holds Dialogue on Macroeconomic Policy, Sustainable Development”, United Nations, 10 September, 2012 (http://bit.ly/1f5FLI2) [accessed 2 December 2013].

[35] Carsten Stahn, “On’ Red Lines’ and ‘Blurred Lines’: Syria and the Semantics of Intervention, Aggression and Punishment”, Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 11, (2013), p. 955.


Written by: Conor Heffernan 
Written at: Trinity College Dublin
Written for: Professor Haine
Date written: December 2013

How Seriously Should the Threat of Cyber Warfare be Taken?

Cyber warfare is very much a contentious issue. To briefly illustrate this, in 1993, John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt wrote an article entitled “Cyber War is Coming!” (1997) whilst, more recently, Thomas Rid wrote an article entitled “Cyber War Will Not Take Place” (2012). During this time, a cyber attack actually managed to take control of physical infrastructure and disrupt Iranian nuclear ambitions whilst the cyber domain allowed for the unstoppable publication of hundreds of thousands of secret diplomatic cables and war logs, referring here to the WikiLeaks fiasco. The fact of the matter is that cyber-attacks happen, cyber espionage is rife, and has been since the early 21st century, along with all sorts of other politically and financially motivated illegal or malevolent cyber activity.

The main focus of this essay is whether the world is in the midst of a cyber war. The essay argues  that both those who think cyber warfare is a threat to international security and those, like Thomas Rid, who feel that cyber war has not and will not take place are to a large extent both right and wrong. To think that the world is in a full-blown cyber war serves to confuse the definition of warfare and ignores more pressing security dilemmas, whilst to completely dismiss the phenomenon risks ignoring the issue of cyber security itself.

This essay will first attempt the difficult task of defining the term “cyber warfare” and will show that cyber security is currently a bigger issue for international security than the limited spectrum of cyber warfare. As the essay will demonstrate, using the term “warfare” narrows down issues within the cyber domain, which risks overlooking the threat posed to international security from non-state entities in cyberspace. Also, the term “warfare” may not even be accurate to describe conflict between states within cyberspace. Following this, the essay puts the issue into context by outlining how pervasive politically motivated cyber activity has been over the last 20 years, which will also demonstrate that the issue is, perhaps, not as new as one would initially think. Following this, the essay outlines some of the most prominent examples of cyber-attacks, in order to illustrate the seriousness of the threat and determine whether it is accurate to describe such incidents as cyber warfare. Finally, the essay illustrates the seriousness of the threat posed by some of the most sophisticated cyber-attacks, specifically referring to the Stuxnet attack on Iranian nuclear facilities, and demonstrates, more explicitly, that policy makers and researchers should take the treat from the cyber domain seriously, because the tools used to carry out cyber-attacks are available to all internet users.

As a term on its own, cyber is fairly straight-forward to define. Joseph S. Nye (2011) offers a useful definition: “cyber is a prefix standing for computer and electromagnetic spectrum related activities” (Nye, 2011, p. 19). It includes the physical and digital networks of networks that make up the internet and the world wide web, but also other communication technologies and infrastructure such as “mobile communications, fiber optic cables, and space based communications” such as GPS (Global Positioning System) (Nye, 2011, p. 19). Complexities arise, however, when the term warfare is used in conjunction with cyber. Immediately what comes to mind when attempting to define cyber warfare is that it must involve acts of war against a state using ICTs. But within the literature surrounding this area, policy makers and researchers clearly use the term to describe acts that are not war-like.

For instance, Jeffrey Carr (2011) describes Magomed Yevloev, who died in 2008, as a casualty of cyber warfare (Carr, 2010, p. 1).  Yevloev set up an anti-Kremlin website and was arrested and “accidently” killed whilst he was being transported by police (Carr, 2010, p. 1). Carr does acknowledge the ambiguities in defining cyber warfare, and the above example illustrates the main issue with the term—can we really consider the act of creating a website or taking websites temporarily offline as acts of war? This is not to say that they are not politically motivated cyber acts. Perhaps Carl von Clausewitz’s traditional concept of war will help illuminate the issue.

According to Thomas Rid (2012), cyber war will not take place; instead, any political cyber-attacks that have, or will take place in the future, will be nothing more than “sophisticated versions of activities that are as old as warfare itself: subversion, sabotage and espionage” (Rid, 2012, p. 6). Based on Clausewitz’s classic interpretation of what war is, Rid concludes that no act of cyber warfare meets all three of Clausewitz’s criterion—these being violent, instrumental, and political (Rid, 2012, pp. 7-10). Certainly, thus far, there is no recorded cyber-attack that has been violent, instrumental, and political at the same time, which according to Rid, is the point of Clausewitz’s definition of warfare (Rid, 2012, pp. 7-10). With relative certainty, there has been no instance of a cyber-attack ever ending in violence, although, as the essay shows, cyber attacks have been utilised alongside military excursions.

Before moving further, for the context of this essay, “cyber warfare” relegates to inter-state military affairs. Although the essay acknowledges that authors such as Jeffrey Carr, John Arquilla, and David Ronfeldt use terms like “cyber warfare,” “netwar,” and “information war” almost interchangeably but, throughout much of the literature, there seems to be little attention in defining terms in this area, and when there is attention to definition, sufficient conclusions are rarely drawn (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1997, 27). However, as mentioned in the introduction, this does not mean that the broader issue of cyber-attacks and cyber security cannot be discussed because it may confuse the debate. On the contrary, the essay focuses simply on cyber-security in all its forms. With regard to what is to be secured in cyber-security, it is cyberspace and all that exists within the cyber domain, from control systems to sensitive information. Although Arquilla and Ronfeldt do attempt to distinguish between cyber war and netwar, stating that cyber war is a predominantly military concern whilst netwar involves social, economic and political cyber conflicts, they go on to state that “netwar represents a new entry on the spectrum of conflict that spans economic, political, and social as well as military forms of war” (Arquilla Ronfeldt, 1997, p. 28). Again, there is a lack of distinguishing features between terms here.

As much one may consider cyber security and its related areas like cyber warfare and cyber espionage as new developments within security discourse, in fact, Information and Communication Technology (ICT) has been exploited for political purposes for at least the last two decades. There is a sufficient amount of evidence, for example, that China has been involved in the cyber espionage business for much of the last decade, particularly aimed at the United States (US), in order to circumvent the US’s land, sea, and air superiority (Inkster, 2010, pp. 55-66). Even in the late 1990s, China was accused of infiltrating American nuclear facilities.

What is more, the Chinese government is not shy about revealing how important it feels the cyber domain is within its military establishment and has on many occasions publicised its development of a strong cyber army (Crosston, 2011, pp. 105-106). In fact, China is “unabashed in their virtual patriotism; honkers (hackers) espouse a philosophy that the best defence is a capable offense” (Crosston, 2011, pp. 105-106). China’s cyber doctrine seems to be that not only should China protect its cyber territory, but also that it must respond to cyber-attacks in a dominant fashion, not necessarily in a proportionate fashion (Crosston, 2011, p. 106). Matthew D. Crosston (2011) concludes that this may mean that states like China and Russia consider themselves to be in a cyber-war with potential adversaries and rivals, but that this may be a one-way mind-set because weaker states, compared to say the US and the UK, clearly may be taking advantage of the more level playing field in cyberspace, where as a level playing field certainly does not exist within conventional military environments (Crosston, 2011, p. 106).

It is worth mentioning that the internet, itself, was initially created as a military application during the early stages of the Cold War (Castells, 2000, pp. 68-69). The first unofficial cyber-attack to have physical consequences happened in 1982 where it is alleged that the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) indirectly supplied the Soviet Union with control systems for a pipeline which contained malicious code (Rid, 2012, p. 10). Since the explosion of the internet in the 1990s, there has been an exponential growth in online criminal and politically motivated activity; wherever the internet has impacted areas of social, economic, and political life, the opportunity for criminal and political actors has increased. When Russia invaded Chechnya in 1997 to retain a “Moscow-friendly regime,” both sides engaged in what Jeffrey Carr (2010) describes as information operations, this mainly involved temporarily taking websites offline (Carr, 2010, p. 3). Herein lies one of the most prominent methods of political cyber-attacks—disabling websites usually by way of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks.

The Russian Georgian War 2008 is the first example of large-scale cyber attacks being initiated along with a land, sea, and air invasion, which one would be forgiven for suggesting that a cyber-war was happening alongside conventional warfare. Again, the main focus of attack in this situation was to take official websites offline via DDoS attacks (Carr, 2010, p. 3). Perhaps, the most pervasive form of political activity in cyberspace is espionage. Carr agrees that cyber espionage is much more evident than cyber warfare, and he distinguishes between the two activities (Carr, 2010, p. 4). The media and the US do not apparently recognise the difference; for example, the Financial Times recently reported that China is stepping up its cyber spying doctrine and ran the article’s title as, “US says China is stepping up Cyber War” (McGregor, 2013 Online). Here is an example of the issue over definitions; can one really consider taking websites offline as acts of war?

Although few would suggest that cyber warfare is an unrealistic scenario, the examples in this essay amount, at best, to politically motivated or criminal acts, not full scale acts of war. The Stuxnet event, however, has provided researchers in this area with a glimpse of what a full-scale cyber war may look like, with consequences that amount to traditional warfare. Many commentators have labelled the Stuxnet attack on Iranian nuclear centrifuges as the stuff of science fiction turning into reality—and for a good reason too. Stuxnet exemplified the first instance of a cyber-attack actually having a physical impact on critical infrastructure; it was significant because it is likely that Stuxnet put back Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons ambitions by several years (Demchak Dombrowski, 2011, pp. 32-61). On a more positive, or useful note, Stuxnet achieved what the international community had been trying to do for years. The question must come to mind: what if such an attack was aimed at critical national infrastructure in the West, infrastructure which millions of civilians rely upon for their wellbeing? The same question can be posed for military equipment, especially electronically controlled military equipment such as communications and drones.

The most interesting and, perhaps, worrying aspect of the Stuxnet event is the fact that the virus was not sophisticated, considering the amount of damage it caused. Many authors such as Sean Collins, Stephen McCombe, and Charles J. Dunlap, along with other commentators, not to mention the news media, have been quick to highlight the sophistication of the Stuxnet worm, claiming that only a state or official authority could have pulled off such an attack (Dunlap, 2011, p. 81; Collins Stephen, 2012, p. 80; Cimbala, 2011, p. 120). The point the media and some commentators have not highlighted, however, is the fact that much of the component parts of Stuxnet are readily available at the criminal level of the cyber domain.

For example, the DNS (Domain Name System) based command and control network characteristic of Stuxnet, as well as other core technical features, “made it less stealthy than much of the more advanced malware that criminals use” (Farwell Rohozinski, 2011, p. 25). According to James P. Farwell Rafal Rohozinski (2011), the code contained in Stuxnet was nothing new, and again, much more sophisticated programs exist within criminal and hacking communities’ online (Farwell Rohozinski, 2011, p. 25). As much as Stuxnet is likely to have been state-sponsored, either by the Israelis, the Americans, or even the Russians or the Chinese, there are two key developments that need to be highlighted in isolation from any political discussion. First, science fiction is now a reality, and the physical environment is vulnerable to attack from within cyberspace. Second, Stuxnet exemplified how power in cyberspace is not weighted in the states favour and is, in fact, sporadically dispersed right down to the individual level. The essay will now briefly look at these two issues, infrastructure and power diffusion, as they highlight broader concerns for cyber security.

Clearly, if a state or non-state actor delivered a cyber attack towards critical infrastructure, which resulted in physical harm, death, or destruction on a large scale, then it would be reasonable to declare such an attack as an act of war. The Stuxnet attack on Iranian nuclear centrifuges has set a precedent for the future of cyber security. The doomsday scenario may be possible; Stuxnet, to a large extent, confirms this. With regards to national nuclear energy facilities, cyber security attacks have been taking place since 2002. Carr, for instance, provides five examples from 2002-2008 (Carr, 2010, pp. 10-11). The key issue with critical infrastructure today is the physical control systems that are increasingly being connected to the public Internet for remote control purposes among other useful means (Carr, 2010, pp. 8-11). And, even if control systems run on separate networks external to the public Internet, they are still just as vulnerable to cyber attacks.

As it turns out, the Iranian nuclear facility at Natanz, which was the main target of the Stuxnet worm, was “air-gapped; in other words, the centrifuges were not connected to the public internet” (Farwell Rohozinski, 2011, p. 24). The developed world has come to rely upon ICTs, critical infrastructure such as water, gas, electric, and energy facilities, telecommunications, public transportation, public health facilities, national economies, and the global economy “have become reliant on software, computers and networks” (Edward, 2011, p. 1). When discussing cyber warfare or cyber security, the systems that control national infrastructure are absolutely key to understanding how serious the threat is. Building up traffic on a website and temporarily shutting it down through a DDoS attack is one thing, but manipulating train signalling or nuclear energy reactors is paramount to an act of terrorism, which could, in a worst case scenario, result in injury or loss of life.

Warfare is a policy area which has traditionally been monopolised by states; the cost of military resources imposes a high barrier to entry and thus makes it possible for states to dominate this realm (Nye, 2011, pp. 19-20). However, power in the 21st century is being diffused much more sporadically, and nowhere is this truer than within the cyber domain, specifically the Internet. If the power of the Nation-State has been challenged by non-state entities since the 1960s with the rise of the Multi-National Corporations and financial markets, cyberspace is likely to take this to a whole new level. The costs for non-state entities to participate in cyberspace, compared to land, sea, and air, are virtually zero (Nye, 2011, pp. 19-20). The nuance of this situation lies in the power that ordinary individuals have. For examples, see the events surrounding the WikiLeaks controversy, the use of social media in the Arab Spring, and the activities of hacktivists (Howard Hussain, 2011; Bellia, 2012, pp. 1472-1476; Lunghi Wheeler, 2012, pp. 32-39).

The Internet has grown and invaded all aspects of social, economic, and political life at an exponential rate, and it has simply been too quick to keep up with as far as security is concerned. This is due to not only the speed by which the internet has been rolled out into the public, but also because governments have had little influence over its development, as it has been primarily market driven (Castells, 2000, p. 69). The developed world may now have created an undesirable situation whereby everyone is so dependent on ICT whilst simultaneously cyberspace is very exposed and vulnerable to malevolent behaviour.

Although warfare is still largely dominated by land, sea, and air, and strategists, academics, and policymakers clearly understand these environments—i.e. what tools are used in these military environments and who the players are, usually states and non-state actors such as terrorists, paramilitary groups, and guerrilla fighters—cyberspace is completely different. The cyber domain is, in fact, primarily made up of civilians, or netizens. Because of how diverse cyberspace is, discussing cyber-war is limited with national interest dominating the agenda, and as military affairs are still dominated by physical military power, cyber warfare only serves to ignore the greater security concern, which is protecting the physical and digital infrastructure itself.

At the moment, cyber warfare is also narrow with regard to what actors are under discussion at any one time, usually between two states like that of the US and China. But the cyber domain is a truly global and transnational phenomenon; it is a borderless world where jurisdictions do not play an important role as much as they do in the physical world. The point is that security concerns for cyberspace go beyond military affairs. For instance, in the last three to four years, the world has seen much more activity from individuals disrupting the cyber domain than from states, or at least the activity of individuals over states has been more broadly publicised. The well-known example is WikiLeaks taking the global media spotlight for virtually most of 2010.

Furthermore, cyber crime is also much more pervasive and damaging than cyber reconnaissance missions by China, for example. It may well be too early to determine if the world is amidst a full cyber warfare situation, but from reading the literature in this area, it would seem that the world has not reached that point yet. As a result, some points for deliberation in policy circles and research environments ought to focus on possible outcomes of cyber-attacks more broadly, not just concerning cyber warfare between states and how society deals with, not necessarily doomsday scenarios, but certainly undesirable outcomes—which this essay leaves unchecked—that could have serious consequences for the daily running of globalised institutions such as the global economy and national and international communications.

Whether the threat of cyber warfare should be taken seriously is difficult to answer. Still, cyber security ought to be taken seriously, as cyber attacks have been demonstrated to be a widespread problem. However, one must also bear in mind that no state has officially declared a cyber war—yet. Also, when war is declared, officials do not use the terms land war or sea war, but rather declare war in all its variants. During times of conflict along land, sea, and air warfare, cyberspace may simply become another environment to conduct military activity, without formal cyber warfare being declared.

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Written by: Philip Smith
Written at: Staffordshire University
Written for: Dr. S. Bali
Date written: May 2013

The Impact of the ICISS Report on State Sovereignty

Does the ICISS report achieve to change the notion of state sovereignty and thereby alter state practice with regards to intervention?

In August 2011, the civil war in Syria had already reached the level of a full-fledged humanitarian crisis. Twenty-six months later, the conflict has cost thousands of lives and is still ongoing, while the UN Security Council (UNSC) remains estranged and inactive. (Washington Post, 2013) And yet in 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) had released a report titled “Responsibility to Protect”, which aimed to propose strategies for the international community to deal with humanitarian crises. The acronym, R2P, soon found its way into debates at UN level. But the evolution of the ICISS report into what was adopted at the 2005 UN Summit illustrates the crux: While a panel of experts can find consensus on state practice and attempt to alter existing notions of sovereignty, states themselves will not restrain their own scope of action. The following case study will therefore argue that the report has initiated a trend towards a changed normative discourse on state sovereignty and increased moral pressure on states to act to protect citizens outside their territory, but failed to change the existing notions of state sovereignty or to alter state practice following its evolution into the principle adopted in 2005. It will do so starting with an outline of the key catalysts, namely the genocide in Rwanda and the intervention in Kosovo in 1999, and elements of the report, to then examine the international reactions as well as the impact it had on the reality as well as on the discourse on sovereignty.

The Commission was initially born out of necessity in a time that had seen intra-state wars supersede inter-state wars as the main threat to international peace and security after the end of the Cold War. (Belloni, 2006; ICISS, 2001) Amidst the mass atrocities committed within the territory of sovereign states, and in particular the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, the UN Charter and international law itself were perceived as anachronistic and unfit to rise to the challenges faced with. (ICISS, 2001; Lyon, 2009) The NATO-mission in Kosovo in 1999 then further fuelled that notion through the debates on its “legitimacy but illegality.” (Hehir, 2011; ICISS, 2001) Thus, it had become apparent that for the years to come, in order to deal with mass atrocities committed within state borders, there needed to be new rules established. (GSDRC, 2013)  It was Kofi Annan who urged the UN member states to find a way of reconciling popular sovereignty with state sovereignty, and who played an important role in forming the ICISS together with the Canadian government. (Badescu, 2011) When it released its report one year later in December 2001, the timing could not have been worse, as the events of 9/11 and their consequences still held sway over much of the international community; yet it did evoke a strong response from state- as well as non-state actors. (Macfarlane, Thielkind and Weiss, 2004)

The report essentially builds on work by Francis Deng and “argues that individual human rights ‘trump’ the rights of sovereignty.” (Chandler, 2004, p.64; Deng, 1996; Deng, 2010; Hehir, 2010; ICISS, 2001, VIII) The main responsibility lays within the sovereign state, but if it failed to protect its citizens, that responsibility is transferred to the international community, which the report envisioned to act through the following: Prevention, Reaction and Rebuilding. (ICISS, 2001) Moreover, the Commission attempted to challenge the existing notions of sovereign decision-making, territorial sovereignty and self-determination by proposing criteria and guidelines on intervention, and a code of conduct for the UNSC.

Reactions following the release were almost diametrically opposed: Academics either heralded the report as a first step in the right direction, or denounced it as doing too little, or too much to facilitate interventions and thereby redefine sovereignty. (Weiss, 2004) Yet to those who were in favour of the innovative aspects of the report, it soon became clear that they could not survive the decision-making processes at the UN. (Bellamy, 2009; Hehir, 2010; Weiss, 2004) There were two major obstacles which could not be overcome but that were brought down to the lowest common denominator in rounds of negotiations: some states objected to parts of the report because they feared a legal obligation for intervention, and thereby a limitation on their own policy – and decision-making sovereignty. (Luck, 2008, p. 62-85) A second group feared R2P could revive imperialist behaviour by former colonial powers, and yet another had objections to the role of the Security Council in authorising interventions. (Ayoob, 2002; Evans, 2005) Hence, what was agreed to has been termed “R2P lite”, since the code of conduct as well as the threshold criteria for intervening found no mentioning anymore. (Luck, 2011, p.23)

Considering its evolution, the report did not break completely new ground when attaching responsibilities to sovereign states, as will be shown below. With the signing of the treaty of Westphalia, sovereignty was mostly understood as being based on territoriality and “the exclusion from external actors from domestic authority structure.” (Krasner, 1999, p.9) The focus therefore was very much on the ruling authority, not on the people. However, this concept has subsequently been “redefined in terms of a social contract between citizens and rulers.” (Thakur, 2003, p.165) Moreover, the Nuremberg Trials of 1945 erased any doubts left that sovereignty had ever been “a licence to kill”. (Evans, 2008; Hehir, 2010, p.230) And in 1948, Article 21(3) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights finally “dethroned” the sovereign in international law. (Reisman, 1990, p.868)

With regards to state practice, numerous interventions and wars during the Cold War period prove the fact that sovereignty had never been an insurmountable obstacle to intervention or peacekeeping. (Hehir, 2010) Hence, while the UN Charter enshrines the principle of the equality of sovereign states (Article 2.1) and their non-intervention in each other’s domestic affairs (Article 2.7), sovereignty never equalled a licence to do whatever states pleased. (Hehir, 2010) It is important to note, that neither the report nor the adoption of the principle changed international law, but that it is at best described as an emerging norm. (Bellamy, Davies and Glanville, 2011) The principle of R2P is “consistent with the core claims of sovereignty”, as Luck (2011, p.17) shows. R2P therefore only made “explicit what international law already requires.” (Brunnée and Toope, 2011, p.75)

Still, the report does signify the point in time where the normative pressure on the international community to halt or prevent mass atrocities when a sovereign state failed to protect its population increases. (Piiparinen, 2012) While this is in line with the increased attention paid to Human Security in general after the Cold War, it was the report that evoked a sense of transferred responsibility from sovereign states to the international community for the first time. Yet, this responsibility remains optional due to the lack of enforcement mechanisms, which is reflected in the selectivity with which R2P has been, if at all, invoked so far. (Hehir, 2010)

These enforcement mechanisms and fixated criteria on when to defy a state’s sovereignty for humanitarian purposes lacked in 1994, and they continue to now. (Kuperman, 2011) Especially the past misapplications of the concept, as in Iraq and Georgia, have made it more difficult for it to evolve from a declaration of good will to a legal obligation. (Caplan, 2011; Moses, Bahador and Wright, 2011) While the proponents would point to the putative successes of the doctrine (the resolutions on Kenya in 2008 and the authorisation of the mission in Libya in 2011[1]), it has become obvious that shared norms and understandings of the international civil society do not make law or alter existing practices. (Amneus, 2012; De Waal, 2007; Hehir, 2010, Kuperman, 2011) In fact, the similarities between the inaction of the international community at the time of the Rwandan genocide and the inaction of the international community nearly twenty years later, are harrowing.

However, while the legal framework has not changed due to the ICISS report, public awareness and discourse have, and that by itself may be reason for optimism with regards to altering state practice down the road. (Bellamy and Reike, 2011; Stahn, 2007) R2P is ubiquitous in the media as much as in debates at UN level. Its rise from an idea in the report released in 2001 to a principle – if altered from its original shape – adopted by the General Assembly in 2005, and subsequently by the UNSC in 2006, is unique in its speed. (Bellamy, 2006; Evans, 2005; UNRIC, 2013) As Welsh and Banda (2011, p.137) framed it, R2P has become “a social fact.” Maybe its biggest achievement is bringing back the essence of both the Genocide Convention and the Human Rights Declaration into the consciousness of the wider public and statesmen. (Schneider, 2010) Sadly, 21st century’s history up until today reveals the dubiousness of the moral consciousness of the international community, which allows for an incoherent engagement of its actors in conflicts within the territory of sovereign states such as Sri Lanka, Sudan, Libya and Syria.

Thus, the evidence that has been presented paints a clear picture: The ICISS report does not signify a change in state practice or in international law, but it did achieve to re-frame the discourse on intervention and sovereignty. It reaffirmed the conditionality of sovereignty and attempted to define the point where sovereignty’s responsibilities were breached more clearly. However, all those aspects that would have restricted states’ sovereignty in either its territorial or self-determining sense have been met with resistance from all sides. Hence, the principle that was adopted in 2005 has limited the usefulness of the doctrine even more, and epitomizes the unwillingness of states to compromise their sovereign rights. Yet in making the case for a transfer of responsibility to the international community, the ICISS report started a trend to increase the normative pressure on states to act in the face of mass atrocities. Unfortunately, Darfur, Sri Lanka and Syria are sad evidence of the little influence normative pressure has on “realpolitik”. (Piiparinen, 2012, p. 493)

References

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Ayoob, M. 2002. Humanitarian intervention and state sovereignty. The International Journal of Human Rights, 6 (1), pp. 81–102.

Badescu, C.G., 2011. Humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect: security and human rights. Oxford: Routledge.

Bellamy, A. 2006. Whither the responsibility to protect? Humanitarian intervention and the 2005 World Summit. Ethics International Affairs, 20 (2), pp. 143–169.

Bellamy, A. 2009. Realizing the responsibility to protect. International Studies Perspectives, 10 (2), pp. 111–128.

Bellamy, A., Davies, S. and Glanville, L. eds. 2011. The Responsibility to Protect and International Law. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, pp. 1-12

Bellamy, A. and Reike, R. 2011. The Responsibility to Protect and International Law. In: Bellamy, A., Davies, S. and Glanville, L. eds. 2011. The Responsibility to Protect and International Law. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, pp. 81-100.

Belloni, R. 2006. The Tragedy of Darfur and the Limits of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’. Ethnopolitics: Formerly Global Review of Ethnopolitics, 5 (4), pp. 327-346. [Accessed: 22 Oct 2013].

Brunnée, J. and Toope, S. J. 2011 The Responsibility to Protect and the Use of Force: Building Legality? In: Bellamy, A., Davies, S. and Glanville, L. eds. 2011. The Responsibility to Protect and International Law. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

Caplan, R. 2011. Seeing the Responsibility to Protect in Perspective. Ethnopolitics: Formerly Global Review of Ethnopolitics, 10 (1), pp. 129-132. [Accessed: 22 Oct 2013].

Chandler, D. 2004. The responsibility to protect? Imposing the ‘liberal peace’. International peacekeeping, 11 (1), pp. 59–81.

De Waal, A. 2007. Darfur and the Failure of the Responsibility to Protect. International Affairs, 83 (6), pp. 1039-1054. [Accessed: 22 Oct 2013].

Deng, F. 1996. Sovereignty as responsibility. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

Deng, F. 2010. JISB Interview: The Responsibility to Protect. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 4 (1), pp. 83–89.

Evans, G. 2005. The Responsibility to Protect: Evolution and Implementation – International Crisis Group. [online] Available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/speeches/2005/the-responsibility-to-protect-evolution-and-implementation.aspx [Accessed: 22 Oct 2013].

Evans, G. 2008. State Sovereignty Was a Licence to Kill – International Crisis Group. [online] Available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/commentary/evans-state-sovereignty-was-a-licence-to-kill.aspx [Accessed: 13 Oct 2013].

GSDRC. 2013. GSDRC: The Responsibility to Protect. [online] Available at: http://www.gsdrc.org/go/topic-guides/international-legal-frameworks-for-humanitarian-action/challenges/-traps-and-debates/the-responsibility-to-protect [Accessed: 22 Oct 2013].

Hehir, A. 2010. The Responsibility to Protect: ‘Sound and Fury Signifying Nothing’?. International relations, 24 (2), pp. 218–239.

Hehir, A. 2011. The responsibility to protect in international political discourse: encouraging statement of intent or illusory platitudes?. The International Journal of Human Rights, 15 (8), pp. 1331-1348,. [Accessed: 22 Oct 2013].

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Krasner, S. D. 1999. Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

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Luck, E. C. 2008. A Council for All Seasons: The Creation of the Security Council and Its relevance Today. In: Lowe, V., Robers, A., Welsh, J. and Zaum, D. eds. 2008. The UN Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice Since 1945. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 62-85.

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Schneider, M. 2010. Implementing the Responsibility to Protect in Kenya and Beyond – International Crisis Group. [online] Available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/speeches/2010/implementing-the-responsibility-to-protect-in-kenya-and-beyond.aspx [Accessed: 22 Oct 2013].

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[1] While the scope of this case study does not allow for in-depth examination of these examples, it needs to be pointed out that both resolutions concerned could have been agreed on prior to the adoption of R2P.

 —

Written by: Valerie Luensmann
Written at: University of Westminster
Written for: Aidan Hehir
Date written: November 2013

Should Rationality Be Defined Instrumentally?

The myth of instrumental rationality formulated by Rational Choice Theory (henceforth ‘RCT’) has, since modern times, vitiated the debate about human action, power, ideology and desire, as instrumentality itself is an imperialist ideology which rejects the existence of the aforementioned particularities. Arguing to be neutral and objective, advocates of this essentialist theory claim that (instrumental) rationality is the only basis of action (Williams 2000:57), as human ‘nature’ is allegedly inherently selfish and competitive. This brief challenges these assumptions by firstly positioning RCT within the ontological-epistemological and methodological axioms, in order to illustrate its false premises and the effect of instrumental policies. As a practical example, the workfare scheme of the British coalition government will be discussed. The essay will finally provide an anti-foundationalist alternative for the analysis of rationality, which, this essay will suggest, does not include epistemic and/or ontological fallacies, with Foucault’s interpretation of power and human action providing a better understanding of: political behaviour; the so-called ‘rationality’; ideology; morality, and social norms (Udehn 1996:189). Rationality is itself constituent of biopolitics, and thus, ought not to be separated from it. Indeed, a correlation between the philosophy and political science can be made: ‘since Kant, the role of philosophy is to prevent reason from going beyond the limits of what is given in experience’ (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982:210).

In order to assess RCT’s relevance in analysing human rationality, one needs to start by addressing its ontological and epistemological position, and its support for methodological individualism; namely, the assumption that facts about societies are merely the sum of facts about individuals (Bhaskar 1998:208). In terms of methodology, although not entirely positivist nor interpretivist, RCT represents a bridge between hermeneutics and causality (Archer 2000:5). In short, the instrumental approach of rationality has been a product of the rationalised relations of modernity, representing a mere ‘contract of rational despotism with free reason’ (Foucault 1984:37). In other words, it reproduces the alienated state of social actors, to predict and control short-term decisions. As status quo and human power relations are nothing more than reified within the RCT’s theory, its purpose and mere ‘success’ is to verify its hypotheses: ‘the standard here is the satisfaction of preferences, not the satisfaction of people’ (Gibbard 1986:167-8). This brief does not attempt to reject RCT per se, but instead show that although individuals can act instrumentally in certain situations, it is not because of their inherent nature.

RCT’s principles are used by political ideologies. Liberal theory, for instance, appeals to universal truth-claims and principles which, in their view, ought to be followed by presumably non-biased, apolitical, Western individuals (Buckler 2010:169). Employing an a priori knowledge of being and human nature, it assumes a ‘such-as-it-is’ ontology, without leaving room for potentiality (Diefenbach 2011). RCT values parsimony when considering epistemology, as their ideas rely on actuality – ‘how things are’; actuality, thus, is given priority over human potentiality. However, only by acknowledging the existence and importance of potentiality can we further understand human action. It is clear then that the ontological dimension of reason presented by instrumental reason does not leave room for the possibility of spontaneity (Cowen 1991:367), and for this reason, ‘until a new and coherent ontology of potentiality’ is found, ‘a political theory freed from the aporias of sovereignty remains unthinkable’ (Agamben 1995:44).

At this stage, it is important to pose the question: is the instrumentally-driven reasoning the product or the premise of instrumental rationality? RCT claims that instrumentality is a cause of social reality (Archer 2000:1). Rational Choice theorists offer a theory of human nature, which, according to them, is inherently bad and competitive. But RCT is not a unified theory, in all respects. Some argue for a normative form of egoism (Korsgaard 2008; Schultz 2012); others prefer not to admit their support for instrumentality (Smith 2004), or dismiss the concept altogether: Raz, for example, argues for a ‘distinctive form of rationality or of normativity that merits the name instrumental rationality or normativity’ (2005:24). Either way, a conceptualisation of atomistic determination of individuals comes into play. It is said, consequently, that people assume the same behaviour both on the market and in politics (Udehn 1996:190): ‘the representative or the average individual acts on the basis of the same over-all value scale when he participates in market activity and in political activity’ (Buchanan and Tullock 1962:20). This statement is fallacious, as it is not the nature of human beings that makes them selfish and individualistic; rather, the constraints of capitalism as structure, shape their own being and the relation with others. Hence, RCT makes a distinction between emotions and reason (ratio and passio), denouncing and outlawing desires and emotions (Williams 2000:57).

As such, RCT does not recognise the existence of capitalist contingencies, hiding away the power which political actors and institutions hold. By claiming that RCT is neutral and at the same time, that human nature is bad, it contradicts itself; the very notions of impartiality and negativity are value-judgements – which, as we shall see, should be actively critiqued. This stance is to be regarded as elitist, giving a misleading account of that which is called ‘human rationality’. Going further, ideas are not given substantive importance either. As Marx argues, the ideas and interests ‘of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force’ (Marx 1970:92). We should therefore be aware of RCT’s theoretical foundations, beliefs and political agenda, in order to critically analyse its substantive value within political science.

The capitalist characteristic of modern episteme, that is, the epistemological unconscious of modern society, has undoubtedly had an impact on framing human rationality. At a philosophical level, the idea of pure rationality proceeds from the Cartesian dualism which distinguishes between (i) the ‘real object of rationality’ – in other words, the norms and values imposed by structures onto agents, and (ii) the ‘irrational’ feature of agents’ desire (Deleuze and Guattari 1983:38), truths being pursued ‘without any sensory experience’ (Simmons 2003). This belief, in Foucault’s terms, is a blackmail of the Enlightenment (Foucault 1984:42), as it assumes that individuals are inclined to make the best choices in order to maximise their utility; choosing the best means to achieve self-interested ends. This entails that the ‘common-sense’ of a self-interested person is natural, which leads to the emergence of one-dimensional individuals who act in a multi-dimensional power system (Marcuse 1964:11). As a result, RCT cannot account for dialectics in the analysis of change and progress, but rather it preserves the discourse formulated by the elite, naturalising and legitimising unimaginative stability (Buckler 2010:165).

It is now time to analyse a policy in order to illustrate RCT’s misrepresentation of social reality (Udehn 1996:189), and the way in which discourse of instrumentality blames the agents without agency, whilst failing to acknowledge the effect of structures. Workfare, the slave labour of modern times, has been a subject of heated debates among politicians across political spectrum. Conservative newspapers, such as The Telegraph, use clichés to emphasise that ‘idleness is the rational choice for people offered money for nothing’ (Johnston 2012; my emphasis). At the same time, Debenhams company, to excuse their practices, declared that their workfare programs are ‘purely voluntary and in no way linked to the receipt of benefits’ (BoycottWorkfare 2013). According to them, it is in the interest of the people to work for free in order to receive benefits and work experience. Not surprisingly, the narrative does not focus in any way on the profit and power of the company, as a result of exploiting the workforce.

A dichotomy between ‘taxpayers’ and ‘lazy benefit claimants’/‘benefit scroungers’ (Aspinall 2010) is maintained in order for the Government to justify their unjust political decisions and encourage the masses to support their selfish reasoning. Contributing to the effect which conservative policies have already created on the social redundancy of the less privileged, the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, Iain Duncan Smith constructs an image of the unemployed as free-riders: ‘job seekers allowance. The taxpayer is paying her wages’ (Morse 2013). This attitude is in line with Ayn Rand’s argument that;

‘The issue is whether man is to be regarded as a sacrificial animal. Any man of self-esteem will answer: No. Altruism says: Yes” (Rand, quoted by Langner 2009:10).

Let us presume for a moment that Rand is right. Even so, the economic interest of the taxpayer masses is not affected by benefit claimants, but by the private companies whose interests are protected by the state. According to RCT, it is then irrational for the taxpayers to support any policies that would act against their well-being. This is when ideology and power need to be considered: the so-defined antinomical groups (the unemployed and the employed), would, had they been actually rational, instead resist together the power of the state. However, taxpayers fail to recognise that by allowing workfare to exist, their taxes are directed not only towards the unemployed, but also to the companies which are part of that scheme. Even more, workfare schemes bring the level of salaries down, this being, again, to the detriment of society as a whole. It can be seen here how RCT is used by the state only to legitimise its policies.

In a neo-liberal system, structures exercise a different form of power (biopower), as a result of its intersection with capitalism, augmenting individuals’ capacities. Thus, we have moved away from the public punishment of (pre)-modern times, to a prison system where the offenders are hidden away (Buckler 2010:171). Be it in the supermarket or in a higher education institution (i.e. the University of Birmingham) (Jump 2012), workfare, or ‘volunteering work experience’ is underlined by the same assumption: that unpaid labour is a privilege. Hence, causes of poverty are being individualised (Deakin 1996:74) and the risk and failure of the job market is attributed not to the real creators of poverty, but to the economically-dependent individuals who are seen as a burden to society’s economic interests (Peck and Theodore 2000:119).

As shown above, employing instrumental rationality for political purposes proves to not only to ignore real social problems, but also to widen persistent power inequalities. The reason for which the masses unopposingly accept repression, as if it were a state of liberation, is because their drives, their sense of rationality, are not authentic, but rather constructed by the capitalist system (Smith 2007:74). Therefore, it is imperative that a shift towards normative, substantive rationality is adopted, which concentrates on the ultimate ends – taking this way a critical realist stance. Consequently, it is important to recognise the reality of emergent properties to argue that social structures condition, but not determine, the rationality of individuals (Cruickshank 2000:81). On the other hand, the very conception of ‘means’ and ‘ends’ is arguably flawed and irrelevant, when talking about ‘human reasoning’ (or, indeed, politics – assuming that being is political):

politics is the sphere neither of an end in itself nor of means subordinated to an end; rather, it is the sphere of a pure mediality without end intended as the field of human action and of human thought (Agamben 2000:116).

Coming back to the idea of power and potentiality, it can be said that instead of considering any theory of human rationality, one should first understand the aporia of power and power relations; as Kant puts it, ‘[t]he possession of power unavoidably spoils the free use of reason’ (quoted by Flyvbjerg 1998). To do so, theorists need to recognise the historical and ideological legitimation of structures which constructs power relations. Contrary to RCT’s assumptions, it is power that precedes rationality, not the other way round (i.e. they see power as a zero-sum game). Hence, a new critical ontology is necessary to reinvigorate normative beliefs, and, consequently, that which is called ‘human rationality’. Until power equality is established, rationalities ought to be regarded as ‘regimes of practice’ which constrain individuals’ choices and behaviour (Simons 1995:55), giving individuals the tempting illusion of absolute reason and individual autonomy in the short run.

This brief has presented the limitations of the ‘instrumental’ rationality discourse, exposing its limited and exclusionist premises. Seeing itself as objective, RCT gives misleading accounts of individuals’ rationality, refusing to acknowledge the historical aspect of human condition within social structures, and that capitalism itself is a power system, instrumentality being part of governmentality. Instead of considering power as a zero-sum game, one should accept that rationality is inversely proportional to power (Flyvbjerg 1998). It would be perhaps beneficial to entirely reject the idea of rationality, and focus instead on potentiality. In a world where change has been colonized by a market-driven logic, instrumental rationality imprisons our true humanity and destroys the possibility of resistance. A plausible theory of human action would therefore consider the autonomy and importance of potentiality over reason and actuality, regarding action/reason as itself an end.

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Written by: Ioana Cerasella Chis
Written at: University of Birmingham
Written for: Dr Stephen Bates
Date written: March 2013

UPDATED: Digital Diplomacy +SocialGood Forum 25 October…

UPDATED: Digital Diplomacy +SocialGood Forum

25 October 2013
Half-day conference beginning at 9:00am (1:00pm GMT)
Breakfast at 8:30am 

UN Foundation
1800 Massachusetts Avenue, NW 
Washington, D.C. 20036

RSVP HERE (Space is limited)

Join the Digital Diplomacy Coalition (DDC) and the UN Foundation for a half-day conference focused on the transformative power of technology. This event brings together the dynamic international community with innovative technologists and influential minds. Diplomats, non-profit leaders and industry professionals will explore the potential of digital media and technology to make the world a better place, and how to translate that potential into action.

Full conference agenda ›

Video from our Digital Diplomacy +SocialGood Forum held on 25…

Video from our Digital Diplomacy +SocialGood Forum held on 25 October in Washington, DC.

The event was a Digital Diplomacy Coalition (DDC) and UN Foundation hosted half-day conference focused on the transformative power of technology. This event brings together the dynamic international community with innovative technologists and influential minds. Diplomats, non-profit leaders and industry professionals explore the potential of digital media and technology to make the world a better place, and how to translate that potential into action. 

More info ›

Канцеларија за јавну и културну дипломатију