What Light can Constructivist Analysis Shed on the Governance of the EU?

I. Introduction

The late 1990s witnessed a transformation in the way the European Union (EU) is analysed (Kohler Koch, Rittberger 2006). As a result, this ‘governance turn’ shifted academic interest from the integration process to the ‘great debate’ concerning governance (Pollack 2006, p. 44). Certain European scholars indicate that the integration-focused theoretical clash between neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism has been replaced by an ideological battle between constructivism and rationalism (Christiansen et al 1999, Moravscik 1999). Despite rationalism once being considered the dominant stream of new-institutionalist thought, constructivist critiques have begun to erode rationalism’s effectiveness as both a normative (social) theory and as a research tool.

This essay seeks to illustrate how constructivist thought offers a broader and more comprehensive analytical understanding of EU governance than its rationalist counterpart. To highlight this, the first section will examine constructivism’s position amongst the other contemporary theories. The second section will identify specific components which aid constructivist approaches in governance analysis. The third section will discuss the dangers of ‘bridging the gap’ between constructivism and rationalism. Through this, it will be argued that although rational approaches are not becoming redundant, they are in danger of simply becoming an internal dimension of a wider constructivist perspective.

II. Situating Constructivism

Both constructivism – an interest-based approach to international relations that ‘sees interests as socially constructed’ (Rosamond 2007, p.130) – and rationalism are central in the debate about how to best analyse governance. Governance is described as ‘both a process and a state whereby public and private actors engage in the intentional regulation of societal relationships and conflicts’ (Kohler-Koch, Rittberger 2006, p. 28). As EU governance is driven by actor behaviour, social approaches are particularly pertinent. To clarify, this essay will demonstrate how constructivist thought offers a more complete understanding of this behaviour.

Before the constructivist ‘turn’, ‘a rationalist ontology dominated the study of the EU’ (Bache et al 2011, p. 41). Armed with a material-gains rationale – reminiscent of realist accounts of international relations (IR) – its main ‘challenger’ in the theoretical debate was reflectivism. However, following the end of the Cold War and the surge in European development, constructivism seized the moment. This is the first aspect of constructivism that is more succinct than rationalism, describing the historical development and expansion of the EU (see Risse 2009, p. 147). Stuttering rationalist accounts of EU history have undoubtedly led to growing confidence amongst constructivist scholars, and as a result, EU governance was thrust under their analytical microscope.

Christiansen (et al 1999) present constructivism as the ‘middle-ground’ approach to understanding European governance, separating rationalism and reflectivism. The constructivist position at the top of the triangle is doubly significant. It could be argued that this reflects its position as the more encompassing theory, in which rationalism and reflectivism are increasingly playing supporting roles. This is reflected in other fields of political science, notably in international relations where constructivism became a very popular ‘theory’ following the end of the Cold War. Drawing further on Christiansen’s (ibid, p. 536) research, his situation of constructivism is important (as everything between rationalism and reflectivism). However, there is an alternative interpretation to the understanding offered by both Christiansen and Bache (2011, p.41). Instead of perceiving these constructivist ‘points’ as ‘building bridges’, this essay argues that constructivism is drifting away from rationalism towards reflectivism, stretching the links to the former whilst absorbing the latter. Despite that it would be erroneous to claim the two are poles apart, a more accurate image would be an expanding constructivist pole converging on a static rationalist pole. This potential overlap will be assessed in the next section.

III. Constructivist Strengths

Institutional Development

Where does rationalism fall short in its analytical capabilities? First of all, the stress on ‘fixed preferences’ invites constructivist criticism (Schmidt 2010, Checkel 2001). Understanding the decision making processes of the actors invested in the EU is crucial to uncovering the motivators that influence governance and, here, the rigid structure of rationalist analysis will never shed new light on EU governance. The problem is twofold. Firstly, these ‘fixed preferences’ vary depending on which rational choice advocate is writing. Whether it be Hoffman’s (S. 1966) predilection for safeguarding sovereignty or Moravscik’s (1998) interest in economic security, a significant aspect of rational choice’s ideological cornerstone is ambiguous. Secondly, this reliance on ‘fixed’ preferences suggests fixed outcomes (dependent on the variable structure). This is to be expected from an explanatory tool that relies exclusively on material ontology for its foundations. In conjunction, these characteristics present a skewed version of reality and a confused theoretical framework. Schmidt (2010, p. 5) acknowledges the adoption of some flexibility in preferences. However, this is unable to address the larger issue of rationalism, failing to not just explain, but to understand institutional change. Constructivists like Checkel (2001) suggest a change in formula to enhance understanding of institutional development.

Checkel’s (2001, pp. 560-561) model stresses the relationship between an actor and its ability to ‘learn’ from prior relations with different institutions. This ‘alternate causal pathway’, therefore, implies that instead of fixed preferences creating fixed outcomes, outcomes stem from how an actor has ‘learnt’ from preceding interactions, which in turn ‘leads to preference change’. This ‘preference change’, therefore, has the capacity to reshape actor’s identities and interests. ‘Learning’ further accentuates constructivist understanding of European governance by suggesting a constructive role for regional hegemons. Whereas rationalists might suggest that the norms of hegemons are imposed regionally through ‘authority’, a constructivist analysis proposes that the ‘learning and socialisation process’ allow hegemons to ‘persuade because they have managed to create a common understanding of a problem’ (Saurugger 2013, p. 894). The Eurozone crisis offers a good example: although many member states were pushed to adopt austerity measures by the EU (read the ECB and Germany), Britain was not, yet it was this ‘common understanding’ of the problem that drove the government to adopt pre-emptive measures.

Rationalism’s inability to conceive preferences through sociological means confines its analytical scope. Social learning is a solid analytical starting point as the limitations of rationalist preference formation echo its structural weaknesses. Christiansen (et al 1999, p. 8) shares the widespread belief that rationalist thought is ‘underpinned by familiar positivist epistemology’. It can causally explain, but its narrowness restricts the chance of any real analysis. Chebakova (2008) expands on this by citing the benefit of an interpretive approach in the case of the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP). The author similarly urges ideational and sociological examination, but, nonetheless, declares ‘recognition of material ontology’ to be vital in allowing researchers to ‘employ conventional qualitative and quantitative methods’, before interpreting the data in a ‘constructivist manner’ (ibid, p. 4).   This approach is tied with analysis of the CFSP, and Hill’s (1993) rationalist conclusion that as it poorly serves the interests of the member states, thus it is an inefficient failure. Although a constructivist might empirically come to the same conclusion, it will doubtlessly consider broader aspects of the CFSP – how it was historically formed; how, despite resistance, it has become a ‘second pillar’ issue; and how it projects a global identity (Chebakova 2008).  Identity is a central characteristic of constructivism, and rationalist ignorance of its value is crucial to this essay’s argument – so it would be constructive to analyse it in closer detail.

Identity

The constructivist idea represented by Christiansen (et al 1999) reflects a reality that does not rely exclusively on material interests, but one that is constructed through ideational, social, and material ontologies (Chebakova 2008, p. 5). An integral tenet of constructivism is identity. While not all rational choice scholars are averse to assigning identity a central role, most approach it reductively, simplifying the concept as individual desires and preferences (Aguair 2008). Moreover, Aguair (2008, p. 7) notes the rational choice rejection of identity as an ‘obscure’ abstract. So how does this impact upon EU governance analysis? An example would be the idea of a ‘common European identity’ – as it is almost incomprehensible for a rational choice thinker (Risse 2004). This shared identity is valuable in explaining European integration and decision-making, and Risse (2004) cites the example of enlargement as ‘identity construction’ in action. This essay does not claim that a rationalist opinion (of principals allowing enlargement after a cost-benefit analysis) is illogical, but simply demonstrates certain characteristics of governance that rationalism is fundamentally designed to overlook. Constructivism inevitably sheds new light on EU governance simply as it can incorporate more ontologies into its understanding, and a larger arsenal allows it to analyse both endogenously and exogenously.

This ‘common identity’ is extended to Adler and Barnett’s (1996) ‘security community’, and more concretely, the CFSP. Rational choice analysis of security governance prioritises the protection of national interests. Constructivists, in contrast, would argue that the CFSP has ‘contributed to a convergence of national foreign policies and to a growing sense of a common international identity’ (Wagner 2003, p. 576). Chebakova (2008) argues that this not only represents the importance of common identity, but it also reveals how institutionalising norms collectively can result in a new institution. This links well with Checkel’s (2001) theory that, through repetition and continual ‘social learning’, identities can be reshaped and preferences redefined. This essay draws on the CFSP as an example not only because its development can be well analysed from a constructivist perspective, but because in doing so, this essay confronts Cowles’ (2003, p. 110-111) assertion that constructivists rarely address ‘bad’ things that have been socially constructed. This only strengthens claims that constructivism is vital to governance analysis, as it opens countless more avenues to uncover why the CFSP is ineffective and unpopular. In short, EU governance analysis benefits as constructivism can self-reflect endogenously, whereas rationalists are constrained by an exogenous outlook.

Decision-making and reform is central to EU governance. Consider the sweeping reforms of the European governance process in the Lisbon treaty, particularly the transition to qualified majority voting in the European Council. This provision threatens the power of individual member states in the policy-making process, as under the previous unanimity method of voting, unwanted reforms could easily be avoided by a single vote; this is especially impactful for powerful states that continue to exert influence over certain smaller states. Yet, the ‘logic of appropriateness’ model was followed, and members voted not out of national preference, but on what is best for the group European Community.

Approaching from a game-theory perspective, decision-making – which takes other player’s best interests into account (reminiscent of the Nash equilibrium) – incorporates a collective (and constructivist) element, whilst rationalist players would follow their strategy regardless of the other players. Whereas a rationalist explanation of this reform is narrow, constructivists could tackle it in numerous ways. They could argue that this reform demonstrated a moment of European self-awareness, recognising itself as a common community with a shared identity – and protecting this identity by acting to reduce the democratic deficit. The deficit, following a constructivist analysis, can be considered a discursive creation – built by social pressure and discontentedness (Christiansen et al 1999, p. 541). This challenges rationalism’s national preference theory, as although the public desired a more transparent decision-making process, certain member state governments may have benefited most from unanimous voting. The role of identity not only undermines rationalist decision-making rationale, but also its hierarchical decision-making structure. Here constructivism sheds a significant amount of light on EU governance. Not only does it allude to identity as an important factor in decision-making, it is also valuable for ‘tracking’ the member state’s rationale throughout the process. A rationalist rationale would be fixed throughout, so there would never be significant insight into how this important facet develops.

The relationship between agents and structures is central to this debate. (Risse 2004, Saurugger 2013). Rational thinkers consider the two to be distinct; however constructivists contest this by arguing that ideas and identity can permeate this detached connection (Saurugger 2013 p891). The ‘logic of appropriateness’ reveals agents and structures to be ‘co-constituted’, showing agents to be influenced by the social context established by institutionalised structures (Hoffman, M. 2000). Identity plays a crucial role in shaping both the institutions and the social context (or – what should be considered correct behaviour). Risse (2004, p. 151) claims this insight ‘allows for a deeper understanding of the impact of the EU on its member states’, and consequently, hinting that rationalist analysis of EU governance suffers from the ‘logic of consequentialism’.

Discourse

Another constructivist component – absent in rationalist analysis – is discourse and the power of language. Rationalists perceive discourse as ‘symbolic’ and not substantive and, therefore, it has no place in its analytical toolkit (Christiansen et al 1999). Constructivists, on the other hand, assign huge significance to discourse in understanding institutional change and policy reform. Chebakova (2008, p. 7) claims that ‘speech acts [can] be institutionalized into norms… change realities and provide the meaning for action’. This process can be applied analytically to concepts that rational choice often misunderstands – such as the constitutionalization of Europe (Rittberger, Schimmelfennig 2006, pp. 1158-1159). Here they track this communitarian process from the debate that launched the legal framework, to the support of subnational actors which resulted in member states being ‘forced to be concerned about their image’, and finally to the national level and the Rome Treaty establishing the European Constitution. Language and communication are constructivist norms (Aalberts 2004, pp. 35-37) and offer insightful observations about the history and creation of many EU institutions (EMU etc). Rational choice’s understanding of these institutional developments is again restricted by its limited scope, and the inception of these lasting institutions suggests the role of discourse is more than ‘symbolic’.

IV. ‘Bridging the Gap’

Panke (2006) promotes the use of the theories in conjunction, claiming constructivist approaches are better suited to low politics, while rationalist approaches more appropriate for high politics. She reasons that as two non-substantive theories, there is no need for conflict, as they are merely research tools that are used to form hypotheses for primary IR theories.

So why are attempts to bridge the gap relevant to EU governance? The concept suggests that the approaches are not opposed, and instead, can be used in a complimentary fashion to probe deeper than before. However, most attempts to ‘bridge the gap’ rely on the assumption that interests are not a social construct, thus preferences do not play a central role in a constructivist analysis. Empirical evidence illuminated in this essay would suggest that states’ interests can be shaped by social interaction, and that sometimes, material gains are intrinsic to a constructivist decision-making process. The ideational foundations of EU constitutionalization and the CFSP suggest Panke’s (2006) conclusions are ascertained through outdated perceptions of an overly-idealistic perception of constructivism. Attempts to bridge the gap are harmful for governance analysis, as any theoretical compromise made by constructivism can only result in a narrower understanding of European political process.

V. Conclusion

This essay supports the argumentation that constructivism plays a vital role in EU governance, whilst presenting rational choice as an ineffective research tool that can be absorbed by the broader diagnostic approach offered by constructivism. This essay has demonstrated that despite efforts to ‘bridge the gap’ between constructivism and rationalism, the latter approach is fatally hindered by its ‘ontological blindness’ (Pollack 2006, p.32), its theoretical disconnect with structures and agents, and its short-sightedness in recognising the impact of ideas, identity, and discourse in the governance process. Finally, it has illustrated that constructivism does, indeed, shed markedly more light on EU governance compared to its counterparts, whereas conversely, the limitations of rationalist analysis dramatically reduce its capacity to improve upon a constructivist perspective – especially as the core tenets of rationalism such as materialism and preference convergence are equally pertinent to a constructivist assessment.

References

Aalberts, T. (2004) ‘The Future of Sovereignty in Multilevel Governance Europe – A Constructivist Reading’ Journal of Common Market Studies, 42(1), pp.23-46.

Adler, E. Barnett, M. (1996) ‘Governing Anarchy: A Research Agenda for the Study of Security Communities’, Ethics and International Affairs, 10(1), pp63-98.

Aguair, F. (2008) ‘Can Rational Choice Cope With Identity?’ Paper presented to ISA Forum of Sociology, Barcelona, pp.1-25.

Bache, I., George, S. Bulmer, S. (2011) Politics in the European Union, 3rd Edition, Oxford University Press: Oxford.

Chebakova, A. (2008) ‘Theorizing the EU as a Global Actor: a Constructivist Approach’, The Maturing European Union – ECSA-Canada Biennial Conference Paper, pp.1-16.

Checkel, J. (2000) ‘Bridging the Rational Choice/Constructivist Gap? Theorizing Social Interaction in European Institutions’, ARENA working papers – workshop: ‘Institutionalism and the Study of the European Union, University of Washington, Accessed online http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arena-publications/workingpapers/working-papers2000/wp00_11.htm on 12/11/13.

Checkel, J. (2001) ‘Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change’, International Organization, 55(3), pp.553-588.

Christiansen, T., Jorgenson, K., Wiener, A. (1999) ‘The Social Construction of Europe’, Journal of European Public Policy, 6(4), pp.528-544.

Cowles, MG. (2003) ‘Non-State Actors and False Dichotomies: Reviewing IR/IPE Approaches to European Integration’,  Journal for European Public Policy, 10, pp102-120, in Bache, I., George, S., Bulmer, S. (2011) Politics in the European Union, 3rd Edition, Oxford University Press: Oxford, p45.

Hill, C. (1993) ‘The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe’s International Role‘ Journal of Common Market Studies, 31(3), pp305-328, in Chebakova, A. (2008) ‘Theorizing the EU as a Global Actor: a Constructivist Approach’, The Maturing European Union – ECSA-Canada Biennial Conference Paper, pp.1-16.

Hoffman M (2000) ‘Entrepreneurs and Norm Dynamics: An Agent-Based Model of the Norm Life Cycle’, Workshop on Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, pp.1-38. Accessed online –http://scholar.google.co.uk/scholar_url?hl=enq=http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/~sok/papers/h/Hoffmann_norms.docsa=Xscisig=AAGBfm2sQZbZyD9spduG4g8aaMF9BC1Y9goi=scholarrei=0nKMUsmLJ8aN7QaLzYDoCgved=0CC8QgAMoADAA 14/11/13.

Hoffman, S. (1966) ‘Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe’, Daedalus, 95(3), pp.862-915.

Kohler-Koch, B. Rittberger, B. (2006) ‘Review Article: The ‘Governance Turn’ in EU Studies’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 44(1), pp.27-49.

Moravscik, A. (1998) The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht, Cornell University Press: Ithaca.

Panke, D. (2006) ‘The Differential Impact of Communicated Ideas: Bridging the Gap between Rationalism and Constructivism’, Hamburg Review of Social Sciences, 1(3), pp.312-342.

Pollack, M. (2007) ‘Rational Choice and EU Politics’ in Jorgenson, K., Pollack, M. Rosamond, B. (eds) (2007) Handbook of European Union Politics, Sage Publications: London, pp.31-55.

Risse, T. (2004) ‘Social Constructivism and European Integration’, in Wiener, A. Diez, T. (eds) (2004) European Integration Theory, Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp.159-176.

Risse, T. (2009) ‘Social Constructivism and European Integration’, in Wiener, A. Diez, T. (eds) (2004) European Integration Theory, 2nd Edition, Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp.144-160.

Rittberger, B. Schimmelfennig, F. (2006) ‘Explaining the Constitutionalization of the European Union’, Journal of European Public Policy, 13(8), pp.1148-1167.

Rosamond, B. (2007) ‘New Theories of European Integration’ in Cini, M. Borragan, N. (2007) European Union Politics, (2nd Edition), Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp. 117-136.

Saurugger, S. (2013) ‘Constructivism and public policy approaches in the EU: from ideas to power games’, Journal of European Public Policy, 20(6), pp.888-906.

Schmidt, VA. (2010) ‘Taking Ideas and Discourse Seriously: Explaining Change through Discursive Institutionalism as the fourth ‘New Institutionalism’, European Political Science Review, 2(1), pp.1-25.

Wagner,W. (2003) ‘Why the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy will remain Intergovernmental: A Rationalist Institutional Choice Analysis of European Crisis Management Policy’, Journal of European Public Policy, 10(4), pp.576-595.

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Written by: Matthew Richmond
Written at: University of Sheffield
Written for: Simon Bulmer/Owen Parker
Date written: November 2013

How many diplomats does it take to solve a crisis? It turns out the answer to that question might be one diplomat, one NGO, and a whole lot of developers. At least that was the premise being debated and played out at Diplohack this week at the Hub in Westminster.

“We wanted to do something innovative, using open data and technology,” Jon Pelling, head of communications for the Swedish Embassy in London, told Wired.co.uk. “We’re interested in using technology in diplomacy in general and have strong networks ourselves, with NGOs etc.” The idea of Diplohack however, was to open up those networks and that knowledge to each other, and to the public, using technology to pave the way and help solve community problems. Pelling and his Dutch counterpart Weijer Vermeer, press and public diplomacy attaché at the Dutch Embassy in London, discussed the idea of a diplomat/NGO/developer hack day a year ago. And just four weeks ago they sat down to make it happen.

“We interviewed NGOs to come up with the questions, making sure we kept it broad and not too controversial,” explains Stephanie Denamps, the MakeSense volunteer leading the day’s hackathon. Denamps and her MakeSense colleagues gave up their time (her day job is at O2) to facilitate the debates and discussions, and steer the ten groups — each made up of a diplomat, a member of an NGO and a developer, or someone with relevant experience — toward a tangible plan. The morning consisted of a brainstorming session where what they saw as the biggest problems in the two chosen areas — sustainability in the food supply chain and freedom of speech in the arts — were hashed out. By the afternoon, the teams’ chosen concepts were refined for the final presentation.

The two questions — “How can creative collaboration in the arts enhance freedom of speech and tolerance?” and “How can open data and technology improve sustainability in the food supply chain?” — were not designed to give life to concrete ideas that would result in app development. The point was the process. What happens when you stick individuals from totally different backgrounds, skillsets and agendas in the same room to hash out an idea.

That all three career fields are founded in creative problem-solving meant there was in fact a surprising amount of success, however, with more than a few great ideas filtering out of a process that drove one diplomat to comment, “All of the ideas have some kind of future”. Of course, he may have just been being diplomatic. But his experience of the day was not a façade. It quickly became clear how much each diplomat gained from the experience of taking their ideas out of the office setting, from behind the gated communities of embassy life, and into a shared workspace. There they worked in tandem with strangers as enthusiastic about the issues at hand as they were.

“I like the creative part, it was very energetic,” commented one. “We’re all from such different backgrounds but we had a lot to talk about. We talk to a lot of people all the time, but sitting down to get an idea going was very productive. The setup is something I want to take with me back to Holland and the Hague.”

Another Dutch diplomat said: “It shows we have so much to learn from each other, there is huge potential in this for us.”

From the sustainability side, a few ideas stood out. Cropcheck is an app that allows farmers to alert the authorities to a pest problem. Tim Holmes of not-for-profit scientific research organisation CABI and Lisa Ommanney of design practice Something and Son worked on the design. The idea was to convince farmers to share data. Instead of immediately burning their crops if a problem arises, policy makers would incentivise them to share important data. In return, staff would be sent to investigate and give free advice. The app would also send alerts to farmers in the local area, asking them to check their crops.

An idea from Ed Dowding, founder of Food Trade, and an intern from the Dutch embassy focused on what to do if a crop disease or pests come to your country. The app would allow you to input categories such as what you want to buy and from where, and if there are any cases of diseases or pests being present, they are flagged up. It would also be integrated with a legal database telling you what tariffs would potentially be levied, and what to do to control the problem (quarantine etc).

The ideas for the freedom of speech apps drews the most debate.

Art in a Box, created by an employee from Global Partners Digital and a web consultant, would allow censored artists to sell work anonymously. They could be paid via Paypal or Bitcoin, and a bio explains their story — if they are in danger and why, why they have been censored, whether they are seeking legal help. They could even include a Twitter hashtag to get their story heard. “It empowers artists who don’t want to disclose their identity,” said one of the creators.

Bannedit, as the name suggests, showcases banned content. An interactive map would show where in the world an artist is. Policy makers could use it to see where there is tolerance and which areas perform badly, as communities emerge on the map. People can choose to like, distribute or support the artwork, with celebrity or even government endorsements a vital element. Content could also be curated and moved from the virtual world to the real, showcased at festivals.

Get Creating would allow artists to upload like audio files, to be modified by other artists. Users can then view all iterations; a history of the creative process. Other artists, supporters or governments could choose to support and endorse particular works. “Then it’s more difficult to ban it,” one designer said. It encourages artists to work together, creates a sense of solidarity and as clips get voted up or down, they gain notoriety.

Finally, journalist Rohan Jayasekera chipped in with an idea for banned films. Directors are asked to do a print of their film with the cut frames filled with black spaces. An app would allow viewers to lift their phone up when the banned content appears, and view it on the device. They can also listen to the director explain why the scene was important, and why it was censored.

The ideas are all obviously at their very, very early stages. Without the proper technological advice it was hard for the teams to outline how they might protect an artist’s identity, or even how they would identify whether an artist is who they say they are. If an artist is banned, it’s also likely authorities will know what their art looks like and could identify them that way.

It was suggested next time they get more makers involved — a few artists attended, but not enough –and more developers. “We need more techies to tell us if its actually possible,” commented Rebecca Zausmer of Global Digital Partners. Dowding suggested incentivising developers with a prize, but also giving them a specific challenge. “We’ve done a lot of hacks and the more refined the question is the better the output,” advised Quentin Johns from the Hub.

Nevertheless, the enthusiasm was infectious. One Dutch diplomat, Tanja Roling, was waxing lyrical about her app idea to Wired.co.uk. “I wanted to take it further, but there was no time left,” she said, explaining the different mods to the original concept she would like to implement. She wants to bring together her idea, Bannedit, with Get Creative. “What do people want to see? They want something cool and visual.” Combining the two would see artists modifying each other’s work and creating a timeline of their creation.

Listening to Roling pontificate about the design and how to make it user-friendly made a clear case for using a creative process to disrupt what is a deeply traditional world of foreign affairs.

“Today we need to work across much broader fields,” Swedish ambassador to the UK Nicola Clase told Wired.co.uk. “It’s useful in diplomacy; we need to be a less closed field.”

Sweden’s foreign office is particularly savvy when it comes to the issue, partly because of their tech-loving foreign minister Carl Bildt. “A few years ago he needed to get in touch with the foreign minister in Bahrain and couldn’t get hold of him, so he sent him a tweet,” says Clase, with a hint of pride. “It’s really important, we have strong support and are actually being pushed by the Foreign Minister. It’s a top-down approach!”

This year, Bildt was named the best connected world leader — basically, more world leaders follow him back than any other minister. According to Clase, he ordered all diplomats to get a Facebook and Twitter account that they are trusted to use as they see fit for professional purposes. “It wasn’t an option,” she says. And most importantly, they know it’s okay if they make mistakes — considering how new the concept of opening up is for the typically closed community of diplomacy, this is vital to encourage employees.

Today, Clase recounts a world where information flow has given diplomats access to what they need to know far quicker than ever before. “Today it’s about teaching diplomats digital literacy and in the future getting information and pushing it back to the public where necessary.”

“We’re asking ourselves, can we be a platform for discussion?”

The Dutch and Swedish embassies plan on following up Diplohack with the two issues of sustainability and freedom of speech dealt with separately next time.

http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2013-09/27/diplohack

PDiN Extras: Diasporas and Public Diplomacy

By Kia Hays, Associate Editor

The role of the diaspora in PD is something acknowledged by actors across the field. Secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton articulated just this sentiment in her opening remarks at the second annual Global Diaspora Forum last summer:

we all believe that diaspora communities have enormous potential to help solve problems and create opportunities in their countries of origin, because we believe that, as the title of this conference says, we can move forward by giving back. By tapping into the experiences, the energy, the expertise of diaspora communities, we can reverse the so-called “brain drain” that slows progress in so many countries around the world, and instead offer the benefits of the “brain gain.”

The articles on diasporas in our PDiN database further prove the importance of the diaspora in PD. The collection of articles documented over the years focus on diasporas from Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Americas participating in cultural, economic, and political activities within their communities. Below are just a few of these articles from the past few months.

To view the full list, please follow #diasporas.

AMERICA DOES NOT ATTRACT INDIAN STUDENTS ANYMORE
Indolink

AFTER WHARTON SNUB, MODI TO ADDRESS INDIAN DIASPORA IN USA
Hindustan Times

DIASPORA CONFERENCE TO FOCUS ON INVESTMENT AND TRADE
Jamaica Information Service

MODERN MIGRANT’S LOYALTY IS AN ASSET TO THE WORLD
The Age

PAKISTANI-AMERICAN ARTIST AWARDED US MEDAL OF ARTS
NY Daily News

http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/index.php/pdin_monitor/article/pdin_extras_diasporas_and_public_diplomacy/

Joshua Marshall is Head of Accessibility at GDS. Just before Christmas, we sat him down for a short chat about his work.

In Joshua’s opinion, the single most important thing GDS has done to improve accessibility across government is “change how we write.”

Improving the quality of all the written content on GOV.UK has made more of a difference than anything else, he says. “It’s changed the perception of how government talks to its citizens.”

There are other important lessons Joshua has learned, including:

• everything we build should be accessible by default – accessibility is never an afterthought
• scaling knowledge between members of growing product teams all over the country was a hard problem to solve
• we’ve put a lot of work into accessibility but there’s still more we can do, particularly for the deaf community

You can listen to the full interview (just under seven minutes) by clicking the play button in the embedded SoundCloud widget below. There’s also a full transcript just below that, if you’d prefer to read one.

An audio file for direct download is available from The Internet Archive.

(This audio interview is a new experiment for us – what do you think of it as a format for explaining what we do? As always, we’d love to hear your feedback.)

Follow Joshua on Twitter: @partiallyblind

Follow Giles on Twitter: @gilest

Transcript

Joshua Marshall: I’m Joshua Marshall; I am the Head of Accessibility for the Government Digital Service.

Interviewer: What does accessibility actually mean?

Joshua: It means making sure that we’re not excluding anyone who might have to use our services.

Interviewer: Go into a bit more detail about that. What do you mean by excluding anyone? How could we exclude people?

Joshua: You can do things like not build your website in a particularly good fashion, so you might lock them out by not caring enough about colour contrast for someone who’s visually impaired. You might make it really difficult for someone who has to navigate just with a keyboard to be able to use the site. You might make the site not work particularly well with screen readers, for example, if you’re a blind user. We have to take all of those things into consideration while we’re designing the services that we’re building.

Interviewer: How do we do that, then? What’s the process that we go through?

Joshua: Mostly, we do that by making sure it’s part of the process, right from the very beginning. We work in an agile way, so we work with small development teams. We take the work that we do and break it up into quite logical sections of work, so if we’re building a new feature, for example, we’ll start from the beginning and ask what the user need is that we’re trying to solve. From the very start of that process, as we work out what we might need to build or what we might need to design, we’ll do it with the knowledge that this has to work for everyone, so we can’t cut corners, say that, “We’re just not going to bother supporting screen-reader users, we’re not going to bother supporting visually impaired users”, you know? They’re all tax payers too, so they don’t have a choice in interacting with these services, the same way that the rest of us don’t, so we have to make sure that what we’re building works for everyone.

Interviewer: In reality, does that mean that your job involves a fair bit of knocking heads together and making people think about things that they might not otherwise be thinking about?

Joshua: To a certain extent. It used to a lot more than it does now. We’re already two years into the process of making GOV.UK a viable product, so at this point we’ve already worked quite extensively with all the different development teams, and it’s an accepted thing that the products that we build will be accessible. It may be that if you’re working on something where you wouldn’t traditionally have considered it that much, you might have to have a little bit more of a pointer as to what we expect, but the implication for all of the things that we build from the Government Digital Service is they should all be accessible by default.

Interviewer: What’s the most difficult thing that you’ve had to face so far?

Joshua: Scaling up how much knowledge is required for different product teams, and different teams based in different departments around the country. We have a team based here with us in GDS who can test the products that we’re building; we can give guidance, but we’re in one location in London. We have teams in Liverpool, and in Warrington and in Glasgow, like all over the country, and scaling that, and making sure that all of the external, perhaps non-GDS teams; that they all try and build  their things the way that we want them to, rather than the way that they have in the past.

Interviewer: What’s the most difficult thing about getting the message across? Accessibility is taken very seriously by some people on the internet, but by no means everybody. It seems that there’s still a lot of hammering home of the message to get across to a lot of people, so how do you deal with that?

Joshua: In the accessibility community in general, I think there’s always been a lot of feeling like you’re preaching to the choir, in some respects. I think for us, the best thing we can do is to put our money where our mouth is, really. We’re telling people that this is the way that it should be, based on us doing this work for two years with GOV.UK, and proving that you can work in an agile way and still make accessible products. It shouldn’t be a thing you try and bolt on at the end. It shouldn’t be optional. It should just be a part of the process of making something good in 2013.

Interviewer: What’s the thing that you’re most proud of achieving in those last two years?

Joshua: I would say… We won a DAD award, which is a design and advertising award. It’s a very prestigious thing, and we won a Yellow Pencil and a Black Pencil for the quality of the writing on GOV.UK. Without a doubt, I would say that the biggest thing we’ve done to improve accessibility across the government with GOV.UK is change how we write. Like, just that one thing has made more of a difference to people, like being able to actually understand what we’re trying to communicate. Everything else that we’ve done is great on top of that, but we couldn’t have done it without having a fantastic content team, like, changed the perception of how government talks to its citizens.

Interviewer: In contrast to that, then, what would you like to achieve in the next two years?

Joshua: I would like to ensure that our deaf users get as much out of the platform as any of the other user groups that we’ve chosen to focus on to this point. I’m currently trying to work out the scope of how we meet the needs of our deaf users better than we have been so far. We currently don’t have much in the way of British Sign Language content on the site. We don’t have video relay tools or anything that the deaf community typically uses to communicate. We’re in the process of investigating what those things are, and I’m really hoping it won’t take two years to get those things live and get them tested; see what the user need is.

Interviewer: Brilliant. Thank you very much.

Joshua: You’re welcome.

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Talking accessibility at ustwo

GOV.UK accessibility: beyond box-ticking

User testing accessibility

Just before Christmas we released dates for the next four cohorts on GDS’s Service Manager Induction and Development Programme.

During 2013, we took the programme through discovery, alpha, beta, and into live. We reached 30 service managers from 11 departments, who between them cover 15 of the exemplar transformations.

As Paul Slade blogged back in October, each group spent up to 8 days with us at Aviation House, taking part in sessions on putting users first, being agile, and building the team; as well as more specialist topics such as assisted digital and identity assurance.

We’re really grateful for all the participants’ feedback which is helping us continue to improve the programme.

In the follow-up survey to the alpha and beta, service managers told us the programme made a big difference to their network, confidence and knowledge as service managers. They appreciated hearing from experts who have real-life experience of running digital services in government. And they enjoyed the practical exercises and case studies.

Among their comments:

• “[The programme] gave me the evidence and the confidence to challenge ‘short cuts’… to encourage more focus on regular user testing and change throughout.”

• “Improved my knowledge and confidence in the agile delivery process… I am now mentoring other delivery teams and facilitating workshops.”

• “I feel confident articulating the service manager role to others.”

We’ll continue running inductions in small cohorts of up to 10 service managers who can get to know each other and tackle issues as a team. We’ve also invited programme alumni back in to network and share their experiences with each cohort.

For all new service managers on exemplars and 100,000+ transaction services to take part in the programme, we estimate up to 150 participants by Q2 2015.

To make the programme more flexible and open to a wider range of participants, we’ve divided modules between two formats:

• Induction programme – 4 days to equip newly appointed service managers with the basic knowledge, network and confidence to take the lead in transforming digital services.

• Open programme – 3 days of more specialist modules to help you succeed and improve in particular areas of the Digital by Default Service Standard.

All newly appointed service managers should book to attend both the induction programme and all 3 days of the open programme. More experienced service managers or others in specialist roles in government may choose to book onto any or all of the open programme modules.

See the Service Manual for more information about the programme in 2014, including a link to request your place.

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A checklist for digital inclusion – if we do these things, we’re doing digital inclusion

How we do user research in agile teams

Iterating the trade tariff tool with HMRC

As with most of our work at the Government Digital Service, we release things early for review and comment. The digital inclusion team, set up last year, would like to share and get your feedback on an alpha version of a checklist for digital inclusion.

We first mentioned a set of principles (we’re now calling it a checklist) when we published action 15 of the Government Digital Strategy. Over the last three months, this checklist has been developed in collaboration with partners from across government, private, voluntary and public sectors.

The intention is for the checklist to act as a guide for any organisation involved in helping people go online. In other words, if you do these things, you’re doing digital inclusion. Alongside each of the six checklist items, we have included an illustrative example of what works and a potential action that could be included in the upcoming digital inclusion strategy.

Checklist Overview

1.  Start with user needs – not our own
2.  Improve access – stop making things difficult
3.  Motivate people – find something they care about
4.  Keep it safe – build trust
5.  Work with others – don’t do it alone
6.  Focus on wider outcomes – measure performance

We want to hear from you

We are looking for feedback on the checklist from organisations and individuals who are involved in helping people, small businesses and small charities go online. We are keen to hear other examples from you  that illustrate great digital inclusion in action. We also want to know what actions we should be taking. Like those we have identified from the examples here, please let us know what you would do.

Your comments

Feedback is great and we want to hear everyone’s thoughts and advice as we develop the digital inclusion strategy. As well as the feedback we’ve asked you for on the checklist above, we have 4 other specific questions that we would really appreciate your help with:

1.  There a number of different roles that government could play. From your experience of digital exclusion, how should the government help tackle this issue?

2.  Getting funding to the those who can help people take the first steps to go online is really difficult and complex. How can we make it easier for support and funding to reach organisations who can offer the best support to people offline?

3.  We need new ways of inspiring and helping people go online – not just laptops and slideshows. How can we foster and promote innovation within digital inclusion?

4.  Everyone we have spoken to says that we all need to work together better to tackle digital exclusion. What is stopping this? How to we support greater collaboration, partnerships and joint working?

We are really keen to hear any and all of your feedback via comments below or you can email them to the team at digital-inclusion@digital.cabinet-office.gov.uk. If we could ask for your comments, feedback and ideas by the end of January that would be great*.

Your feedback and advice will help to shape a digital inclusion strategy to be published in early Spring and set out how we can all collectively tackle digital exclusion.

We can’t wait to hear from you.

Join the conversation on Twitter: @GDSTeam

*Of course, if you want to get involved, work with us or simply pass on an idea we are always willing to talk. So get in touch!

Checklist

1.  Start with user needs – not our own

Lambeth Digital Buddies will support 50,000 Lambeth Council residents go online. Many residents are without access to the internet or lack the skills to confidently complete online transactions, and at the same time are heavily reliant on essential services that are migrating to online-only provision.

Digital Buddies are volunteers in the local community that will give their time to help people learn basic online skills, based around a mix of things that interest them, as well as using online government services. As many of those learning digital skills do not have regular access to the internet they can also receive text alerts advising them of important emails (for example from the Department for Work and Pensions) so they can log in knowing that there is something for them to attend to. The scheme also provides tangible benefits to buddies; for example, voluntary work experience helps improve job prospects by building experience and providing references for job applications.

Building on this example, a potential action could be to:

• Empower local digital buddy networks within a national community of volunteers

2.  Improve access – stop making things difficult

The Glasgow Housing Association (GHA), Scottish Government and BT have joined together to provide affordable broadband to a tower block in central Glasgow. With only 37% of those people living in social housing being online, support through housing providers is hugely important.

At £5 per month, not only does the service provide residents with simple and affordable connectivity and hardware, but the additional ongoing training and support they receive allows them to feel confident to use it.

By working together, all partners benefit from the scheme: reducing costs for GHA through online rent payments, fault reporting and communications with tenants; residents are now able to take advantage of the financial and social benefits that the internet can offer; for BT, increased market share and a new customer base; and, the scheme supports the government’s priorities by preparing for changes to universal credit.

Building on this example, potential actions could be to:

• Establish a national model to provide housing association residents with connectivity, hardware and training

• Define common standards across service providers, not just government, for basic online transactions e.g. paying rent online

3.  Motivate people – find something they care about

The E-mentoring initiative for the Rehabilitation of Prolific and Priority Offenders gives ex-offenders access to support, advice and guidance across a range of issues. When integrating back into society, priorities for ex-offenders include getting a job, finding secure accommodation and easily keeping in contact with their probation officers.

Through a ‘Virtual Home’, members can store vital personal information such as proof of ID, qualifications, CV and employment history which are not easy to maintain due to the transient and uncertain lifestyle that many are faced with.

By making ex-offenders’ lives better and focusing on the things that they care about, digital becomes part of their everyday lives. This innovative project was led in Leicestershire and Rutland with the support of the Brightside Trust.

Building on this example, a potential action could be to:

• Make digital skills a central component of all rehabilitation

4.  Keep it safe – build trust

Go ON UK  are developing a single place called digitalskills.com for those helping individuals, small businesses and small charities learn to be proficient, confident and safe online.

digitalskills.com is a repository of local resources and opportunities for accessing, learning and sharing digital skills. Still in its beta phase, the website has been created with a group of highly regarded and reputable national brands and will, over time, be developed to assure the quality of the resources and advice that is made available.

As well as links to useful information and services, there are maps to direct people to where local physical resources and advice are located. Go ON UK’s ambition and intent is to to create a single, trusted, and evolving source for online services that will help instill confidence and trust amongst new users and those supporting them.

Building on this example, a potential action could be to:

• Build and promote digitalskills.com to be a UK wide trusted source of tools, advice and opportunities

5.  Work with others – don’t do it alone

Liverpool’s Race Online 2012 (Go ON it’s Liverpool) brought together some 5,000 digital champions to help people go online by promoting a wide range of activities across the city – for example, encouraging people to ‘Give an hour’ to help those off-line to go online. This was a highly successful campaign brought about by a collaborative model involving everyone from; politicians, to community groups, the police, local businesses and volunteers to help the people of Liverpool go online.

This multi-faceted partnership and high profile initiative helped 104,000 people in Liverpool who had never been online (July 2011) and reduced those digitally excluded by 58,000 over the year. The success of the Liverpool Race has led to this model being replicated in the first of Go ON UK’s regional programmes in the North East.

Building on this example, a potential action could be to:

• Partners in the public, private and voluntary sectors to work together to roll-out Go ON UK’s regional partnership programme nationally

6.  Focus on wider outcomes – measure performance

Citizens Online and BT have been running a series of training sessions as part of their Get IT Together initiative. Learners receive 4 sessions of training and are then contacted after 3, 6, 12, and 24 months. Understanding ongoing user-confidence, types of devices owned and services being used, as well as the reasons for being online and offline allows Citizens Online and BT to iterate and make changes to their approaches when delivering training, support and developing new services.

Building on this example, a potential action could be to:

• Establish a common measure of digital inclusion across national, local, public and private surveys

Return to the top

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Introducing the new digital inclusion team

Digital inclusion for the homeless

Getting started on assisted digital

The Digital by Default Service Standard has been running as a beta for almost a year now, but formally comes into force in April. Now that we’ve run over 40 assessments, we thought it was time to summarise what we’ve learned so far.

The Service Standard is what we believe ‘good’ looks like for government digital services. The standard consists of 26 criteria that cover a range of areas essential for building new or redesigning existing digital services. The purpose is to improve the quality of government digital services and support the Cabinet Office spending controls.

Government committed in the Government Digital Strategy that by April 2014 all new or redesigned digital services will meet the Service Standard before they can go live. From April 2014, services going through an assessment will be assessed against all 26 points of the standard.

Getting ready …

In preparation for April, we’ve been assessing services against the standard at the end of their alpha and beta phases, before they launch in public or move to the next phase. In the year before the standard formally comes into effect, rather than expecting them to meet all 26 criteria, we’ve primarily focussed on whether services meet user needs, can be rapidly improved, and are safe and secure. The reason for this has been to give the teams building services time to get up to speed with working in a new way. But, by April this year, we’ll expect services seeking to move from beta to live to meet all 26 criteria.

We’ve been really impressed with the great work that is going on across government to improve digital services, and we hope that the process has been as helpful for departments as it has been for us. By running assessments against the standard before it comes into full force in April 2014, we’ve been able to learn and improve the process. I want to explain a little bit about what we’ve learnt so far and how we’ve changed the process in response.

Who is involved?

Last year, assessments were led by an experienced product owner with support from a technical architect and an analyst from GDS. This worked well because the people in these roles have a good understanding of government services and the Service Standard – after all they are already building or running digital services to meet the service standard in their day jobs. They were sometimes joined by an analyst and/or a designer on a service by service basis. Since then, we’ve realised just how valuable the support of a designer is to ensure we cover all elements of each service in sufficient detail.

What we’ve learned

We’ve found that it’s really difficult to know beforehand how long an assessment is going to take. This isn’t surprising since we know that services across government can be very different, some are more complex than others. So, we’ve extended the length of the assessments from 2 hours to 3 hours – this works much better because the services that don’t need all 3 hours finish early but the others don’t overrun.

We’ve learnt that the assessment meetings run much more smoothly when the assessors understand a bit more about the service before the assessment meeting. That’s why we now ask for a description of the service before each assessment including who its users are, what user needs the service is aiming to meet, and a working link to the service.

For services themselves, we’ve found that that there is a real benefit to sharing learning from one service to the next. For example, this might be by sharing code and design from a service that has passed an assessment or by avoiding common pitfalls from services that haven’t passed. To help this learning across different services, we are going to start publishing assessment reports soon.

There may be a few more improvements that we’ll make ahead of April. If you have suggestions, please do comment below.

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Beta testing the Service Standard

Setting open standards for government documents

First open standards selected

This morning we moved the GDS blog over to the GOV.UK blogging platform. You might notice a few changes to the way the site looks and works, including a new URL.

The move is an important one for us, as it give us more control over the design and functionality of the blog, and makes things like searching by topic and author much easier for you.

The move does also mean some changes that we wanted to make you aware of.

Unfortunately most of the comments made during the last couple of weeks on the old platform will not be moved over, so they won’t show up on the new blog.

Also, if you subscribe to email updates to this blog, you’ll notice that the emails will change.

As with everything here at GDS, we really value your feedback. Please let us know what you think of the new platform, and how we could improve on it. You can comment below, send us a tweet or find our contact ethos and email information here.

However you want to get in touch, we are keen to hear from you.

“The world cannot be at peace unless people have security in their daily lives”[1]

UN Human Development Report, 1994

Understanding human security as “safety from chronic threats and protection from the sudden hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life,” this paper proposes that while it could be argued that human security as a concept and framework for practices has largely disappeared from the international agenda, such a viewpoint ignores the work done by various agencies in the name of human security and the relatively recent resurgence of interest internationally in human security. The reasons for the apparent decline of human security are examined—namely conceptual ambiguities, framework difficulties, and the apparent misuse and failure of human security interventions by international institutions. However, the advances of the human security approach and the recent resurgence of interest in human security in the UN are examined to argue that the ideals of human security remain and are active.

When discussing human security’s conceptual problems, the most contentious issue surrounds its definition. While this paper uses a simple definition, scholars and policymakers rarely agree on what constitutes human security.[2] Human security’s 1994 inception by the UN Human Development Report divided human security into several categories ranging from economic to environmental security.[3] Such a sweeping definition caused problems for scholars. Khong argued that by prioritizing everything, human security has prioritised nothing due to the difficultly it creates in dealing specific issues.[4] Once an issue is ‘securitized,’ it gains priority among policymakers.[5] If everything is prioritised, what gets preference?

In response to criticism, human security advocates have grouped the original definition into two categories: namely, a ‘narrow’ view, constituting ‘freedom from fear’ (violence), and a ‘broad’ view, constituting ‘freedom from want’ (economic and personal).[6] Whilst significant convergence between these two groupings exist, scholars are still faced with difficultly prioritising ‘freedom from fear’ or ‘freedom from want.’[7] Human security’s conceptual difficulty has perhaps contributed to its apparent decline, as agents are unsure of its meaning. Brahimi, a former UN official, allegedly told Martin and Owen, “I don’t use the term human security because I don’t know exactly what I mean, and I worry that someone will come up and contradict me.”[8]

Another conceptual issue related to human security’s apparent decline is its radical nature. Throughout the Cold War, the international community’s security conception was embedded within the Nation-State model, wherein the primary security objective was related to defending State sovereignty. States exercised a dual role as internal provider of citizens’ security and as an external source of security threats to others. In line with this approach, the international community adhered resolutely to the principles of sovereignty when approaching intra-State conflicts where ‘even in cases of severe human rights abuses, most states formally rejected the idea that states could intervene in other states.’[9] Alternatively, human security aimed to empower individuals by providing a two-part support system, comprised of both the State and, should individual security be compromised, the international community.[10] In effect, State security became one option among many others, and State sovereignty became flexible.[11]

This concept has provoked the ire of commentators, such as Chappuis, who argued that taking human security seriously would require a total change in the international community’s structure.[12] Others have argued that human security violates national sovereignty. It could be postulated that human security makes intervention following human security abuses seem apolitical, when intervening in another State’s affairs is fundamentally a political act. In his dismissive review of human security as ‘The Dog that Didn’t Bark’, Chandler argued that human security provides stronger States an excuse to intervene in the sovereignty of others.[13] Thus, critics of human security have presented the concept as a neo-imperial tool and attempted to tarnish it, thereby contributing to the apparent decline of human security. Whether this is the case will be examined, but firstly this paper deals with framework disagreements stemming from the conceptual difficulties.

Understanding framework as “a set of ideas or facts that provide support for something,” this paper examines human security frameworks in international relations and how they have contributed to its apparent disappearance.[14] There are two frameworks of note: frameworks built on ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want.’ Frameworks built on ‘freedom from fear’ have perhaps been the most effective and popular approach among States. Historically, Canada has been at the forefront of such an approach, but in 2005, a UN initiative labelled ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) was established, which broadened its advocacy base. The essence of R2P is that sovereignty is not a right, but entails responsibilities for States to provide protection and security for their citizens.[15] In many senses, therefore, R2P replaced human security as a framework based on ‘freedom from fear.’ The gross misuse of R2P, which will discussed later, perhaps led to a growing uneasiness about using such a framework.

The second policy framework adopted by States has been based on ‘freedom from want.’ Traditionally, Norway and Japan have been great proponents of such an approach, but the EU and the UN have also been involved.[16] This framework attempts to extend the ‘threat’ agenda to include hunger, disease, and natural disasters, as they are seen as inseparable concepts in addressing human insecurity.[17] However, such a framework suffers from many of human security’s conceptual weaknesses. Where do States intervene first? What takes precedence, a famine or tsunami? Compared to R2P, a framework based on ‘freedom from want’ appears, at first glance, to be much more abstract and fluid a concept, something which is of little use to policymakers. Another issue for many commentators is that a great deal of funding is required for ‘freedom from want’ frameworks. Indeed, a UN initiative to develop regions has been primarily funded only by Japan for over a decade.[18] This perhaps makes such a framework at times unattractive for States.

Implementation of both frameworks by international institutions has, unfortunately, left much to be desired. The current UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti, which began in 2004, elucidates many of the problems of human security frameworks in international relations.[19] The mission was mandated with a comparatively narrow interpretation of human security, primarily based on ensuring ‘freedom from fear.’[20] Emphasis was on creating a secure domestic environment, explicitly for the purpose of enabling human rights, preventing “the loss of human life,” and restoring national “peace and security.” Yet the mission was also tasked with improving Haitian economic conditions. [21]  Thus, the mission exemplifies a neat combination of a narrow ‘freedom from fear’ framework influenced by ‘freedom from want’ concerns.

The results to the framework were mixed. Muggah argued that the mission’s beginning was seen by some to represent a ‘new reality’ based on human security peacekeeping.[22] Unfortunately, the UN’s human security concept appeared to be well ahead of the realities on the ground. Haiti’s security situation deteriorated after UN intervention and, eventually, it was decided that a human security framework was not sufficient to deal with on the ground violence.[23] Put simply, a more traditional peacekeeping method was needed. While the Haitian mission was not a complete failure for human security, it did expose its weakness i.e. that it could not stand alone without a traditional security force.

While the UN human security intervention in Haiti is seen as benign in intent, NATO’s 2011 Libyan incursion was viewed as anything but. NATO undertook military intervention in terms of human security (‘R2P’), citing Libyan dictator Gaddafi’s planned air attacks upon civilians.[24] Thus, it was a ‘freedom from fear’ concern. However, “having crippled Libyan air capabilities,” NATO continued targeting Gaddafi’s compound, prompting critics to note, “the boundaries between protecting civilians and pursuing regime change became increasingly blurred.”[25]  Depicting human security as a neo-imperialist tool, critics alleged that, contrary to the principles of human security, diplomatic means had not been exhausted prior to NATO’s deployment.[26] Whilst Gaddafi’s genocide language prior to intervention indicated that mass violence against civilians was imminent, sustained NATO attacks against Gaddafi cast human security interventions in a negative light, as it appeared that the West used human security as a smokescreen for intervention.[27] Perhaps, most damaging were reports that NATO was responsible for twice as many civilian deaths as Gaddafi.[28] This was not the first time human security language had been used to overstep boundaries. Gilmore noted that the US employed human security language in its ‘War on Terror’ even though the ‘War’ was anathema to human security.[29] Human security as a concept has, perhaps ‘disappeared’ from political discourse because it has been manipulated to serve specific personal agendas. Interestingly, in 2010 the Canadian Government effectively blacklisted ‘human security’ from its communications, perhaps indicating the tarnished image of the concept.[30]

Has human security – ‘The Dog that Didn’t Bark’ – disappeared? The answer appears to be no. Those who argue otherwise ignore the vast advances made in peacekeeping, thanks to human security such as: the Ottawa Treaty (banning anti-personnel mines), the Rome Treaty (creating the International Criminal Court), the UN Security Council resolutions on Children and Armed Conflict and Women, Peace and Security, and, of course, R2P.[31] While human security is not as popular a concept as in its heyday in the early 1990s, its essence has continued through a number of political institutions. Dealing with ‘freedom from want,’ the UN Trust Fund for Human Security has funded over 200 projects since 1999.[32] This has included a vast array of issues from Cambodian drug counselling to supporting Sudanese agricultural investment. Dealing with ‘freedom from fear,’ the EU has largely built its common foreign policy around issues of human security.[33] And, while discourses on human security in the UN were scarce for many years, a 2012 debate in the UN focused on coming to agreement over what human security constitutes.[34] Whether this will be successful is yet unknown, however, its presence indicates that human security has not disappeared from the international agenda.

The Syrian Crisis and debates over intervention during 2013 marked an interesting example of the longevity of human security. In late August and September 2013, Western military strikes were contemplated in response to allege chemical weapons use against civilians near Damascus i.e. a violation of human security. While negotiations over military intervention were eventually vetoed, the Syrian Regime cooperated with the international community to destroy its chemical weapons. This may seem like a small victory, until one recalls McCormack’s assertion that previously ‘even in cases of severe human rights abuses, most states formally rejected the idea that states could intervene in other states.’[35] It appears human security has allowed at least some cooperation between States in trying to lessen the damage of internal strife. This is progress. While human security was not invoked as a concept during the Syrian Crisis, its ideals certainly were.

This paper proposed that while it could be argued that human security as a concept and framework for practices has largely disappeared from the international agenda, such a viewpoint ignores the work done by various agencies in the name of human security and the relatively recent resurgence of interest in human security. The reasons for the apparent decline of human security were examined before the paper went on to examine the advances of the human security approach, along with recent resurgence of interest in human security internationally. While critics such as Chandler may view the relative disappearance of the term human security as a victory, the victory appears to have been pyrrhic. The ideals of human security appear prevalent in the intentions of many international actors.

Bibliography

Chandler, David, “Human Security: The Dog that Didn’t Bark”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 39, No. 4 (2008), pp. 427-438.

Chappuis, F., “Human Security and Security Sector Reform: Conceptual Convergences in Theory and Practice”, in Benedek, W., Kettemann, M. C., Mostl, M. (Eds.) Mainstreaming Human Security in Peace Operations and Crisis Management,  (Abingdon: Routledge), 2011, pp. 99-122.

Dembinski, Matthias, and Reinold Theresa, “Libya and the Future of the Responsibility to Protect: African and European Perspectives”, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, (Frankfurt: PRIF, 2011).

“Framework”, Merriam-Webster (http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/framework) [accessed 6 December 2013].

Gilmore, Jonathan, “A Kinder, Gentler Counter-Terrorism Counterinsurgency, Human Security and the War on Terror”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2011), pp.   21-37.

Kaldor, Mary, A decade of the ‘War on Terror’ and the ‘Responsibility To Protect’: The global debate about military intervention, 10 Years After September 11, 2011    (http://essays.ssrc.org/10yearsafter911/a-decade-of-the-%E2%80%9Cwar-onterror%E2%80%9D-and-the-%E2%80%9Cresponsibility-to-   protect%E2%80%9D-theglobal-debate-about-military-intervention-2)  [Accessed 4 December 2013]

Khong, Yuen, “Human security: A Shotgun Approach to Alleviating Human Misery?”, Global Governance, Vol. 7, No. 3 (2001), pp. 231-236.

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[1] United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report: Annual Report  (New York: UNDP, 1994), p. 17.

[2] Roland Paris, “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?”, International Security, Vol. 26, No. 2 (2001), p. 88.

[3] UNDP, Human Development, p. 24.

[4] Yuen Khong, “Human security: A Shotgun Approach to Alleviating Human Misery?”, Global Governance, Vol. 7, No. 3 (2001), p. 232.

[5] Edward Newman, “Critical Human Security Studies”, Review of International Studies, Vol. 36, No. 1 (2010), p. 85.

[6] Taylor Owen, “Human Security-Conflict, Critique and Consensus: Colloquium Remarks and a Proposal for a Threshold-Based Definition”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 35, No. 3 (2004), p. 375.

[7] Ibid., p. 376.

[8] Mary Martin and Taylor Owen, “The Second Generation of Human Security: Lessons from the UN and EU Experience”, International Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 1 (2010), p. 216.

[9] Tara McCormack, “Power and Agency in the Human Security Framework”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 21, No. 1 (2008), p. 115.

[10] Ibid., p. 116.

[11] Gerd Oberleitner, “Human Security: A Challenge to International Law?”, Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2005), p. 186.

[12] F. Chappuis, “Human Security and Security Sector Reform: Conceptual Convergences in Theory and Practice”, in W.Benedek , M. C. Kettemann, M. Mostl, (Eds.) Mainstreaming Human Security in Peace Operations and Crisis Management, (Abingdon: Routledge), 2011, p. 109.

[13] David Chandler, “Human Security: The Dog that Didn’t Bark”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 39, No. 4 (2008), p. 429.

[14] “Framework”, Merriam-Webster (http://bit.ly/1bpktVk) [accessed 6 December 2013].

[15] McCormack, “Power and Agency”, p. 116.

[16] Mary Martin, “Back to the Future for ‘Human Security’”, OpenDemocracy, 13 July 2013 (http://bit.ly/1geryLV) [accessed 6 December 2013].

[17] UNDP, Human Development, p. 20.

[18] Sadako Ogata, “Human Security – A New Response to Complex Threats”, The Huffington Post, 01 May 2013 (http://huff.to/1bOp98M) [accessed 5 December 2013].

[19] United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, Haiti Moving Forward Step by Step, (New York: UN, 2012), p. 2.

[20] Robert Muggah and Keith Krause, “True Measure of Success-The Discourse and Practice of Human Security in Haiti”, Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy International Relations, Vol. 7 (2006), p. 134.

[21] Ibid., p. 134.

[22] Ibid., p 136.

[23] Chandler, “Human Security”, p. 432.

[24] Mary Kaldor, “A decade of the ‘War on Terror’ and the ‘Responsibility To Protect’: The global debate about military intervention”, 10 Years After September 11, 2011 (http://bit.ly/18KbdN2)  [Accessed 4 December 2013].

[25] Lawrence Modeme, “The Libya Humanitarian Intervention: Is It Lawful In International Law?”, Academia, 2011 (http://bit.ly/196UuS5)  [Accessed 2 December 2013], p. 20.

[26] Ibid., p. 13.

[27] Matthias Dembinski and Theresa Reinold, “Libya and the Future of the Responsibility to Protect: African and European Perspectives”, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, (Frankfurt: PRIF, 2011), p. 6.

[28] Elena Ostroumova, “Price of ‘Freedom’: Libya’s Annus Horribilis”, RT News.  Last updated 12 February 2012 (http://bit.ly/1bOpdWa) [Accessed 24 November 2013].

[29] Jonathan Gilmore, “A Kinder, Gentler Counter-Terrorism Counterinsurgency, Human Security and the War on Terror”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2011), p. 29.

[30] Martin and Owen, “The Second Generation”, p. 211.

[31] Allan Rock, “The Human Security Network, Fifteen Years On”, Centre for International Policy Studies, 21 May 2013 (http://bit.ly/18rtBV2) [accessed 4 December 2013].

[32] Ogata, “Human Security”.

[33] Martin and Owen, “The Second Generation”, p. 218.

[34] U.N. General Assembly,  “General Assembly Calls for Accelerated Efforts to Eliminate Malaria in Developing Countries, Particularly Africa, by 2015, in Consensus Resolution. Also Adopts Consensus Text on Human Security, Holds Dialogue on Macroeconomic Policy, Sustainable Development”, United Nations, 10 September, 2012 (http://bit.ly/1f5FLI2) [accessed 2 December 2013].

[35] Carsten Stahn, “On’ Red Lines’ and ‘Blurred Lines’: Syria and the Semantics of Intervention, Aggression and Punishment”, Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 11, (2013), p. 955.

—
Written by: Conor Heffernan 
Written at: Trinity College Dublin
Written for: Professor Haine
Date written: December 2013