The Israeli Foreign Affairs Ministry has paved the way for digital diplomacy by introducing an AI-powered avatar capable of producing content in up to eight languages. Developed by the Israeli company Hour One, this technology makes the Israeli Ministry the first in the world to utilize such a tool.
The avatar is programmed to speak eight languages, including English, French, German, Spanish, Hindi, Italian, Polish, and Portuguese. By leveraging this technology, the Ministry can generate informative videos based on messages and texts generated by their professional diplomats. This initiative is aimed at enhancing the credibility of the Ministry’s content, particularly in an era where video creation using artificial intelligence has become increasingly accessible.
Currently, the first avatar is modeled after David Saranga, the head of the division for digital diplomacy. However, the Ministry plans to expand this project by creating avatars for more diplomats, including those serving in countries where the dominant language might pose a challenge for communication.
Foreign Minister Eli Cohen highlights that embracing AI technology as part of diplomatic work is a natural and essential step to adapt to a modernizing world. The Ministry believes that this avatar will enhance their capabilities, enabling them to effectively reach a wide range of audiences in a short amount of time, particularly when time is of the essence in shaping global public opinion.
While the avatar is a remarkable tool for multilingual communication, it is important to note that its messages are still dictated by professional diplomats who possess in-depth knowledge of international issues and nuances. The Ministry envisions a future where avatars could be employed in television studios worldwide, engaging in political discussions and providing accurate and eloquent responses to interviewers in various languages.
This innovative endeavor by the Israeli Foreign Affairs Ministry exemplifies their commitment to leveraging technology and innovation to promote Israeli innovation globally.
Pre ruske invazije na Ukrajinu, tehnologija je već bila sve veći deo ukrajinske ekonomije i bila je centralna za viziju vlade da ponovo zamisli način na koji građani i preduzeća komuniciraju sa državom u digitalnoj eri: bez papira, bez gotovine i bez birokratije. Čak i pre konikta, mi u vladi smo verovali da tehnologija drži obećanje da će učiniti vladu transparentnijom, ushićenijom i odgovornijom, osnažiti građane, povećati učešće i boriti se protiv korupcije.
Međutim, tehnologija je postala još centralnija za pomoć zemlji u odbrani i ublažavanju eect ruskih napada na civile. Kao rezultat toga, Ukrajina se pojavila kao vodeći primer digitalnih inovacija i elastičnosti suočena sa izazovima, posebno kroz svoja gov-tech rešenja, koristeći kapacitete digitalnog upravljanja za održavanje osnovnih funkcija upravljanja u kriznim situacijama i pokazivanje snažnog slučaja za digitalne javne inovacije za podršku svom narodu. Digitalna vlada igra centralnu ulogu u sposobnosti Ukrajine da nastavi da se bori za svoje postojanje i odgovori agresoru.
Liderstvo za digitalnu transformaciju
Promene počinju vođstvom. Mnogo pre invazije, predsednik Zelenskyy je vodio kampanju o izgradnji “države u pametnom telefonu”, sa ciljem da se smanje papirologija, birokratija i korupcija emuliranjem modela isporuke poslovnih usluga tehnološkim kompanijama kao što su Uber i Airbnb. Važna institucionalna mera u osvesti ove vizije bila je stvaranje Ministarstva za digitalnu transformaciju, samostalnog ministarstva na čelu sa vicepremijerom Mihailom Fedorovim. Mikhailo je ušao u vladu iz marketinga bez političkog ili vladinog iskustva i sa sobom doveo tim mladih, tehnološki savitljivih ljudi motivisanih da naprave promene (oko 50 procenata ministarstva sta nije imalo iskustva u državnim službama). Pored toga, napravljen je i sistem glavnih ocera digitalne transformacije (CDTOs) sa imenovanjima u svakoj agenciji na svim nivoima, od nacionalnih do regionalnih, odgovornih za digitalnu transformaciju na terenu.
Uvođenje platforme za e-upravljanje “Diia” 2020. godine označilo je značajnu prekretnicu u određivanju prioriteta u isporuci javnih servisa po principima digitalnog-rst i mobilnog-rst. Diia, što znači “Akcija” na ukrajinskom, predstavljala je sveobuhvatan digitalni ekosistem, omogućavajući građanima pristup digitalnim verzijama osnovnih dokumenata: nacionalnoj ličnoj karti, pasošu, studentskoj ličnoj karti, vozačkoj dozvoli, certikatu za registraciju vozila, polisi osiguranja vozila, poreskom broju, migrantskom certikatu, COVID certikatu i penzionom certikatu. Ukrajina je postala zemlja RST u svetu sa digitalnim pasošem koji je služio kao puna pravna analogija običnih fizičkih dokumenata i tek četvrta zemlja u Evropi sa digitalnom vozačkom dozvolom. U Ukrajini je od 2019. godine uvedeno skoro 120 digitalnih servisa (od kojih 52 tokom rata),i broj nastavlja da raste. Skoro 19 miliona Ukrajinaca, odnosno oko polovine stanovništva Ukrajine, koristi Diju.
Javna digitalna infrastruktura
Izgradnja digitalnih kapaciteta i razvoj javne digitalne infrastrukture unapred ne samo da je pomogla da društvo nastavi da funkcioniše, već je omogućila građanima da doprinesu odbrambenom eortu.
U prvim mesecima rata raseljeno je oko 12 miliona ljudi, a glavna većina su žene koje štite svoju decu. S obzirom na okolnosti, postojala je hitna potreba za prenosivim i međunarodno priznatim rešenjima digitalnog identiteta kako bi se pomoglo pojedincima da utvrde svoj identitet uprkos gubitku fizičke dokumentacije. Diia je odigrala ključnu ulogu u tom pogledu, a neke susedne zemlje priznale su validnost digitalnih dokumenata iz Diie na ad hok osnovi. Da bi olakšala razumevanje i integraciju, Ukrajina je sarađivala sa tim zemljama kako bi objasnila funkcionalnost ukrajinskih digitalnih dokumenata i istražila scenarije za validaciju i deljenje. Kao privremena mera, Ukrajina je dozvolila svima da provere digitalne vozačke dozvole direktno preko vladine internet stranice unošenjem serije licenci, broja i datuma rođenja vlasnika, čime je osiguran brz pristup informacijama.
Stalni napadi Rusije na domaću digitalnu infrastrukturu zemlje — telekomunikacione stanice, vladine centre podataka i emitovane tornjeve — podstakli su korišćenje međunarodne infrastrukture. Na primer, ukrajinski zakoni o zaštiti podataka su izmenjeni kako bi se vladi omogućilo da obrađuje podatke u oblaku u inostranstvu, a Vlada je blisko sarađivala sa tehnološkim kompanijama kao što su Majkrosoft i Amazon na prenosu osetljivih vladinih podataka van zemlje. Pored toga, ukrajinska vlada je prešla na satelitsku internet tehnologiju kako bi osigurala stabilan internet povezivanje za kritičnu infrastrukturu i važne objekte, uključujući medicinske, energetske, obrazovne i poslovne. Ukrajina ima najveći broj Starlink terminala, sa više od 30.000 terminala, od kojih su većinu donirali kompanija SpaceX, zemlje EU i partneri. Posle njihove de-okupacije, vlada je takođe pomogla da se obnovi komunikacija u Irpinu, Buhi, Borodjanki i drugim regionima.
Uprkos izazovima koje predstavlja rat, ukrajinska vlada je proširila svoje eorte u pružanju digitalnih javnih usluga kao način da nadoknadi ograničenja izazvana uništavanjem fizičke infrastrukture i raseljavanjem građana. Diia se pojavila kao vitalni instrument: ubrzo nakon početka rata, vlada je posegnula za raseljenim Ukrajincima preko Diie, omogućavajući skoro pola miliona ljudi da se samostalno registruju kao interno raseljeni i pristupe onlajn uslugama za transfer gotovine i druge oblike pomoći. Ovo digitalno rešenje korišćeno je za registrovanje raseljenih lica i olakšavanje direktnih zahteva za mesečnu novčanu pomoć kako bi se zadovoljile humanitarne potrebe njihovih porodica. Dostupnost višenamenskih novčanih sredstava smanjila je ozbiljnost njihovih neposrednih zahteva, rešavajući zajedničko pitanje u kriznim situacijama u kojima raseljena lica često nemaju potrebnu dokumentaciju da bi se kvalifikovala za državnu podršku.
Raspon e-službi nastavio je da se povećava tokom rata, sa mnoštvom novih usluga uvedenih na Dii: mogućnosti kupovine vojnih obveznica ili doprinos vladinoj inicijativi za prikupljanje sredstava za vojnu i medicinsku opremu, programom nancialne pomoći preduzetnicima i zaposlenima iz regiona u kojima su se odigrala neprijateljstva, usluge pomoći za raseljena lica, podnošenje zahteva za naknadu štete imovine, pristup vestima, eDokumenti za identikaciju za one koji su napustili dom bez ikakvih dokumenata, e-penzioni certikt, pristup registracionom certiktu automobila za prenos prava na vožnju vozila, obnavljanje vozačke dozvole, primanje sudske odluke, promenu staža i drugo. Vlada je takođe iskoristila digitalna rešenja za efikasnije odbrambene eorte. Zapažen primer je eEnemy Telegram chatbot, koji je razvijen korišćenjem postojeće digitalne infrastrukture i ekskluzivno dostupan proverenim ukrajinskim državljanima. Sa skoro 500.000 pojedinačnih korisnika, ovaj inovativni alat omogućio je građanima da podele ključne informacije kao što su podaci o geolokaciji, fotografije i video snimci opreme ruske vojske. Pored toga, korisnici su imali priliku da daju tekstualne opise kako bi dodatno poboljšali prijavljene informacije. Podaci prikupljeni putem eEnemy chatbot-a se odmah prenose na ukrajinsku vojsku, olakšavajući ekijentniji odgovor na situaciju koja se razvija. Prijavljivanje eksplozivnih objekata kasnije je integrisano u chatbot, što je znakovno ubrzalo proces lociranja i neutralisanja mina i bombi koje su za sobom ostavile okupacione snage. Štaviše, chatbot služi kao dragoceno sredstvo za građane da se okupe, sastave i podele dokaze o ratnim zločinima koje su počinili osvajači u oblastima kao što su Bucha, Irpin i Hostomel. Ove okupirane teritorije predstavljaju značajan izazov kada je reč o prikupljanju podataka, čineći chatbot suštinskim resursom u dokumentovanju i podizanju svesti o zločinima koji se dešavaju na ovim prostorima.
Digitalna diplomatija i saradnja
Tehnologija je sredstvo za promene, ali brzina njene primene je dierentna u dierent zemljama; ponekad će je mlade demokratije i zemlje u razvoju prihvatiti brže nego zrele zemlje. U slučaju Ukrajine, rat je dodao dodatni osećaj hitnosti, tako da je kriza još više ubrzala brzu digitalnu transformaciju. Ali u svetu koji se suočava sa klimatskim katastrofama, masovnom nejednakošću i drugim nepravdama, tek počinjemo da shvatamo kako digitalna elastičnost može pomoći vladama da reaguju na krize.
Ukrajinski primer će biti dragocen za druge da slede. Iz tog razloga, USAID podržava Diiu, naglašavajući njen veliki uticaj na živote miliona i njenu skalabilnost na bilo koju zemlju spreman da prihvati pozitivne radikalne promene uz pomoć tehnologije. Već je Estonija, najje digitalnija država na svetu, pokrenula vladinu aplikaciju mRiik, zasnovanu na ukrajinskoj Dii. U početnoj probnoj fazi, mRiik će omogućiti Estoncima da digitalno skladište kritična dokumenta kao što su lične karte, pasoši i vozačke dozvole i pristup nekim javnim službama. Verujemo da će još mnogo zemalja slediti naš primer.
Digitalna revolucija je stigla kasno za stolovima ministarstava spoljnih poslova širom sveta. Ministarstva su se fokusirala na društvene medije i ‘Tviter-diplomatiju’ u vreme Trga Tahrir i Zelene revolucije u Iranu 2009. Bili su očarani tehnologijom koja je stvorila umreženi razvoj ka liberalnijim društvima.
Na dnevnoj bazi duboki društveni i politički uticaji odvijaju se širom sveta. Pa ipak, većina ministarstava inostranih poslova i diplomata nema e ciency i još uvek su komparativno nedovoljno opremljeni da identifikuju, analiziraju i deluju prema talasima informacija koje se kotrljaju kroz digitalno carstvo.
Digitalna diplomatija se stalno menjala i transformisala. Međutim, postoji digitalni de cit koji bi mogao da postane prava Ahilova peta s obzirom da tehnološki napredak nastavlja da teče konstantno napred. Upotreba 5G sistema i kapaciteta za pokretanje Velikih podataka preko njih, za razvoj veće primene za articialnu inteligenciju (AI) zajedno sa pretnjama sajber bezbednosti, stvoriće duboko remetilačno diplomatsko okruženje sa uticajem na naša društva i način na koji radimo. Takođe će se osporiti način na koji birokratija upravlja velikim podacima i kako koriste kapacitete za anticipatorno vođenje spoljne politike.
Za osnovni i svakodnevni rad diplomatije – pregovaranje – mogućnost da se uključite u analitiku velikih podataka i proveru isečaka vesti mogu pomoći u uklanjanju pristrasnosti, prikupljanju podataka o mogućim efektima pregovora (odnosno o velikim grupama nacionalnih ili stranih državljana ili kompanija) i prikupljanju geospatialnih i senzornih podataka. U tom smislu, oni mogu da prikupe više činjeničnih i objektivnih informacija, bolje uvide i često podrže i poboljšaju odluku zasnovanu na dokazima. Da bi se realizao bene ts ovih podataka, podaci će morati da se prikupljaju preko internet i društvenih medijskih kanala, miniranih i tumačenih od strane obučenih analitičara i diplomata.
Kao takvi na digitalnom frontu, ministarstvima će biti potrebni sistemi koji su bezbedni i t sa svrhom ali i pravo osoblje koje zna da rukuje informacijama i pomaže u diplomatiji. Diplomatske karijere sada su izgrađene uz odgovarajuću obuku sa stručnjacima za različite teme, kao što su društveni mediji i sajber bezbednost, kao i kako su one povezane sa digitalnom diplomatijom. To bi uglavnom trebalo da se fokusira na pravu transformaciju tradicionalne diplomatije u digitalnu.
Tada će digitalne diplomate biti opremljene pravim znanjem za rukovanje i prevazilaženje bilo kakvih kulturnih, jezičkih i istorijskih barijera.
Konačno jedno od glavnih pitanja na koje ministarstva spoljnih poslova treba da odgovore i počnu da razmišljaju, jeste kako stvoriti spoljnopolitičke oS-ove u sedištu i u ambasadama u inostranstvu kako bi se na najbolji način iskoristile promenljive veštine različitih generacija diplomata. I onda ono što treba da postignu digitalnom diplomatijom i ako diplomate imaju pravo znanje i iskustvo da uspeju. Potrebna je nova filozofija javnog servisa širom ministarstava u digitalnom svetu i sada je vreme da se ta filozofija integriše.
Mada je premijerka Kaja Kalas (Reforma) možda upletena u aktuelni skandal vezan za prošle poslovne aktivnosti njenog supruga, ona se i dalje ističe na pozitivan način zbog svoje sposobnosti da koristi onlajn komunikacije, društvene medije i posebno Tviter, primećuje novinarka Hanes Rum u komadu za nedeljnik Maaleht.
Estonski novinar koji radi u Švedskoj jednom je primetio inverznu proporcionalnost između spoljnopolitičke sposobnosti švedskog premijera i njegovog domaćeg učinka, poređenja radi, tvrdi Rum, koji se danas može primeniti na Kaju Kalas – čija spoljnopolitička dostignuća mogu biti na drugom mestu, odmah iza onih Marta Laara, premijera od 1992. do 1994. i ponovo od 1999. do 2002. godine, ali čije su domaće nedaće delimično bile njegova propast.
Jedna stvar koju Laar nije imao dok je bio premijer bio je Tviter, ili X kao što je sada poznato, i prateća “Tviplomacy”, odnosno diplomatija preko tog kanala na društvenim mrežama – i do koje mere osoba obraća pažnju na društvene medije, njihovo prisustvo tamo, i koliko je to prisustvo i prateća slika efikasna.
Kvalitativno govoreći, autentičnost je ključna u “Tviplomaciji” Rum, navodeći kao dobre primere to što su američki predsednik Džo Bajden i ukrajinski Volodimir Zelenski.
Takođe je korisna sposobnost da se razgovara sa narodom – o tome je dokazano tvitom koji je poslala bivša SAD. Prva dama i predsednička kandidatkinja Hilari Klinton u iscrpljivanju tadašnje premijerke Finske Sane Marin da “nastavi da pleše”, u vreme kada se ova druga suočavala sa pritiskom kod kuće zbog percepcije javnosti o komparativno događajnom društvenom životu.
U međuvremenu, uspešna digitalna diplomatija Kaje Kalas svodi se na činjenicu da prvo, često ima nešto važno da kaže, a drugo, ume da izrazi svoje misli na način koji privlači pažnju – o čemu dokazu i brojni veliki naslovi svetskih medija na čijim veb stranicama je od tada uvek prisutna, pa čak i ranije, aktuelni rat je počeo.
To je smešta uz dva bivša predsednika Estonije, Kersti Kaljulaid i Tomasa Hendrika Ilvesa, kaže Ramm.
Pored toga, tvitovanje se prirodno može uraditi u bilo koje doba dana ili noći po praktično nikakvoj ceni – to liderima malih zemalja posebno pruža mogućnost kako da se oponašaju i da utiču na lidere većih nacija, tvrdi se u delu Maalehta.
Suprotno tome, šefovi država i Kine i Rusije nisu prošle godine napravili neke liste od 50 najuticajnijih ljudi širom sveta, uprkos veličini i budžetu država koje vode i verovatno delimično zbog sasvim drugačijeg prelama na PR i onlajn komunikacije.
U delu se takođe razmišlja o tome da li će se i u kojoj meri Kalasov naslednik, ko god to bio i kad god se pojavi, takođe poklopiti sa njenim nousom za digitalnu diplomatiju.
A pro-Kremlin activist standing by his mock Russian missile reading “Let’s program it again to target Washington”, in St. Petersburg, Russia, Friday, April 14, 2023 – Copyright Dmitri Lovetsky/Copyright 2023 The AP. All rights reserved
By Euronews
‘Soviet Book Syndrome’ – How the Kremlin is playing on the past to exploit citizens’ fears and sell its justification for the invasion of Ukraine
In the West, the war in Ukraine is perceived as aggressive, invasive and accompanied by numerous crimes against humanity and initially, some Russians openly shared similar sentiments.
Anti-war protests in the country were relatively prominent in the first months after the full-scale invasion began but then died down rather quickly. Many citizens see what is happening as a just war against the ‘collective West’ which is exactly what Putin wants them to think.
“The Soviet era played a huge role in ‘unteaching’ people how to think for themselves and be critical,” explained Evgeniya Pyatovskaya, a doctoral student at the University of South Florida. “So people didn’t have time to learn how to be critical thinkers, how to be independent thinkers. They didn’t have time to realise that you can question those in power and that this is normal.”
In addition, contemporary Russian propaganda is strikingly different from Soviet propaganda. Although it uses much of the same traditional ideology, the technical approach is completely different – so even if there is experience of countering Soviet propaganda, it doesn’t necessarily work against the current Kremlin narrative.
“Modern propaganda in Russia is in many ways more effective than Soviet propaganda,” Anton Shirikov, a Political Scientist at Columbia University told Euronews. “Among other things, it takes into account that people can get information from different sources, and it tries to present a picture, not the one that would necessarily benefit the authorities, but the one that the citizens themselves would like to see.”
The Soviet era played a huge role in ‘unteaching’ people how to think for themselves and be critical
Evgeniya Pyatovskaya doctoral student at the University of South Florida
Doctoral student at the University of South Florida
According to experts Euronews spoke to, it’s possible many Russians don’t fall for the state propaganda, they simply fear to express their position because they’re scared of repercussions and persecution.
But it is not only fear that is preventing Russian citizens from speaking out. It’s also disappointment and apathy. Disillusionment with the Soviet regime as well as the so-called democracy in the 1990s has shaped Russia’s apoliticism, especially as many think the war doesn’t affect them.
“The situation appears to be that a significant part of the citizens – majority or not, it’s hard to say – don’t want war,” explained Shirikov.
“But at the same time, they don’t care enough about the war that they actively oppose it.”
Soviet Book Syndrome
The 1990s were a huge disappointment for the citizens of Russia (as well as many other former Soviet republics). Many found themselves on the brink of poverty, while a few openly demonstrated wealth and status in society.
This is where the ‘Soviet Book Syndrome’ manifested itself: Russian citizens, who had until recently been Soviet, saw in their surroundings the real embodiment of the image of ‘decadent capitalism’ that Soviet propaganda had been presenting to them for decades, something they had read about in Soviet books and newspapers: ‘unscrupulous businessmen’, ‘corrupt police’, ‘corrupt media’, ‘stolen wealth’, the enormous gap between the rich and the poor – all clichés that people had only recently stopped believing, considering them Soviet fabrications, suddenly became, in their minds, harsh realities.
when people keep repeating this to each other for years, hearing it from each other, then, of course, they start to believe it themselves
Anton Shirikov Political Scientist at Columbia University
Political Scientist at Columbia University
Do the Russian leaders themselves believe what the propaganda is so actively ingraining in the minds of their citizens? Experts say that, at least for now, they do: years of repeating the same ideologies could not go unnoticed.
“It’s hard to imagine that a man who served in the KGB and fought against the West and capitalism, didn’t take anything out of it,” says Shirikov. “It seems to me that other people close to Putin had similar ideas as well,” he continued.
“But, of course, initially, when Putin’s reign began, they had a very pragmatic approach, and these ideas, if there were any, were not on the surface. But gradually, when people keep repeating this to each other for years, hearing it from each other, then, of course, they start to believe it themselves.”
After participating in the Summit on Digital Diplomacy and Governance organized by DiploFoundation (see my blog post here), I realized that today’s diplomats need to not only know about the current trends in technology and their impacts on diplomacy but also need to be able to actively participate in the discussions, such as the UN’s Global Digital Compact. Therefore, in the coming months, I will work on a special project titled “Digital Diplomacy 4.0.”The well-known digital diplomacy scholar Corneliu Bjola explains that we are now in the fourth iteration of digital diplomacy. The first occurred with the Arab Spring, showcasing social media’s impact on the real world. The second wave happened in 2015 and 2016, with the appearance of the “dark side” of technology and its effects on the U.S. presidential election and the Brexit vote (Bjola, 2022).
The COVID-19 pandemic launched digital diplomacy 3.0, with the ubiquitous use of Zoom and other platforms that allowed continuous interactions among diplomats and other international actors when the world shut down (Bjola, 2022).
Prof. Bjola indicates that today digital diplomacy has moved forward to a new phase, what I call 4.0, due to the arrival of disruptive innovations such as Artificial Intelligence and the Metaverse (Bjola, 2022). As their predecessors, these new technologies will considerably impact the digital and real worlds. The idea is consistent with the Highlights from the Summit on Digital Diplomacy and Governance that took place in November 2022.
Since then, the arrival of ChatGPT has turned the world upside down. It is amazing the speed that things are happening. In the last months, there has been a tremendous number of events to discuss the impact of AI on everything. Here are some of them:
Will AI take over diplomatic reporting? (WebDebate #56). Here are the Video, the Human-made summary, and the AI-generated report. (February 7, 2023). The DiploFoundation.
Diplomats worldwide cannot wait until these new technologies mature to embrace them, and they need to take the bull by the horns and start learning these disruptive inventions. The DiploFoundation is an excellent resource, and it is ahead of most capacity-building institutions that perfectly combine courses on technology and internet governance, and diplomacy.
Besides, governments need to work on their digital strategies, and the ministries of foreign affairs need to incorporate them into their foreign policy and diplomatic efforts. Some countries, like Switzerland, have already are working on them and in late 2020 presented its digital foreign policy strategy.
Here are some resources that I found extremely useful to start diving into the realm of digital diplomacy 4.0:
In the coming days, I will discuss Technology Diplomacy or TechPlomacy. Here is my previous blog post about the subject.
Reference:
Bjola, C. (2022). Stratcom-Talks, Episode 29 (podcast interview).
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed on this blog are that of the author and do not represent the opinions of any other authority, agency, organization, employer or company.
A new battleground has emerged in the digital age, where bytes and pixels move faster than bullets. And it has dramatically reshaped the landscape of modern conflict. No longer confined to trenches or open fields, today’s wars often play out on the screens of our smartphones and the timelines of our social media feeds.
It is the realm of information warfare, a space where nations, organizations, and even individuals wield information as both a weapon and a shield. But what exactly is information warfare?
Journey with us as we dive into the intricate web of digital espionage, propaganda, and cyber strategies that define our era’s most silent yet profoundly impactful form of combat.
The New Age of Battles: Information at the Helm
In this era, the minds of the masses have become the primary battlefield. Rather than physical territories, the space of perceptions, beliefs, and public opinions is being contested and conquered.
It isn’t a mere subplot of some sci-fi thriller. It’s our reality. Information warfare isn’t just about cyberattacks or hacking email servers, as vital as those elements are.
Just as the invention of gunpowder, the airplane, or the nuclear bomb changed the fabric of warfare, so is information altering the landscape. While our cities remain intact and our landscapes unscarred, nations’ socio-political frameworks and psyches are molded, twisted, and sometimes fractured.
From Propaganda to Deepfakes: Tools of Information Warfare
The journey from old-school propaganda to today’s high-tech disinformation is as fascinating as it is alarming. Think back to the era when the reach of a message was mostly the distance a radio wave could travel or how many hands a newspaper passed through.
Governments and organizations masterfully crafted tales, often dripping with bias. They fed them to the public through mediums like roaring radios in living rooms, black-and-white films in packed theaters, and morning newspaper headlines. Every message had a purpose, every tale a tailored spin.
But the digital age? It’s a different beast altogether.
The Deepfake Era
With today’s technology, not only has the spread of information exponentially accelerated, but the very nature of its fabrication has evolved. Enter deepfakes.
Leveraging the prowess of artificial intelligence, these aren’t your run-of-the-mill photoshopped images. They’re videos and audios that replicate the nuances of a human—be it their voice, gestures, or facial expressions—with unnerving precision.
The unsettling reality? They can make anyone say or do anything. Picture a clip where a prominent figure spouts dangerous ideologies or declares actions they never intended. The ramifications are not just misleading—they’re potentially catastrophic.
Social Media: The Double-Edged Sword
In the grand coliseum of the internet, social media stands as a gladiator wielding power and influence, often with unpredictable outcomes.
Read Next: Modern Espionage: Information Warfare in the Digital Age
Platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and TikTok, originally designed to bring us closer, are now intricately woven into the tapestry of information warfare. The rapid-fire dissemination of factual and fabricated content has had profound implications on global events and individual perceptions.
Remember the 2016 U.S. presidential elections? Reports later revealed a vast network of fake accounts and trolls, traced back to a Russian agency, aimed at inflaming political tensions. These accounts strategically shared and amplified divisive content, sowing seeds of discord among voters.
Or consider the case of the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar. In 2018, Facebook admitted its platform became a tool to fuel hatred and violence against the Rohingya Muslim minority. A surge of inflammatory posts, false rumors, and conspiracy theories often emanated from fake accounts and organized trolls.
Behind each post and share, there’s an undercurrent, sometimes benign but occasionally malevolent. They carry real-world consequences, shaping narratives, influencing decisions, and sometimes instigating chaos.
The Global Impact: Real Consequences in a Virtual World
It’s easy to dismiss information warfare as mere online spats. However, its consequences ripple through the real world.
From influencing election outcomes to instigating civil unrest, the manipulation of information can topple governments and destabilize regions.
The challenge lies in discerning truth from fiction, a task increasingly complicated in our age of digital abundance.
Safeguarding Ourselves in the Age of Information Warfare
Fact-checking, diversifying our information sources, and questioning sensational narratives are all essential steps in guarding ourselves against the covert manipulations of the digital age.
As the lines between the real and virtual worlds blur, understanding and navigating the murky waters of information warfare is imperative. The battle for our minds is ongoing, but we can ensure that truth and transparency triumph with awareness and vigilance.
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Američki Stejt department obezbedio je nagradu do deset miliona dolara za informacije koje mogu pomoći u rasvetljavanju sajber napada počinjenih protiv interesa Sjedinjenih Američkih Država, a kako navode, posebno za napade u Crnoj Gori avgusta prošle godine.
Bilbordi, koji oglašavaju nagradu za informacije koje mogu dovesti do identifikovanja ili lokacije bilo koje osobe koja je učestvovala u zlonamernim sajber aktivnostima, Ambasada SAD postavila je na više lokacija u Podgorici, pišu Vijesti.me.
Tekst oglasa je na crnogorskom i ruskom jeziku, a navodi se da je isplata moguća i u kriptovaluti.
Kako su rekli u Ambasadi za Radio Slobodna Evropa, cilj oglasa je da prikupi informacije od tehnološki sposobnih pojedinaca koji trenutno žive u Crnoj Gori i koji bi mogli znati više o napadima.
„Ponuda nagrada je neograničena u smislu traženih informacija, a nagrade se isplaćuju srazmerno kvalitetu pruženih informacija.“
Napadi na informacionu mrežu Vlade Crne Gore su počeli avgusta prošle godine, nakon čega je mesecima bio onemogućen pristup njihovim sajtovima i imejlovima, ali i na druge institucije kao što su tužilaštava, sudovi, katastar, Uprava prihoda i carina.
Na bilbordima se navodi da zlonamerne sajber aktivnost ukazuje na potrebu zaštite digitalnog ekosistema.
„Informacije o ransomware napadima na državne informacione sisteme, mešanje u izbore ili zlonamerne sajber aktivnosti protiv ključne američke infrastrukture, mogu se prijaviti dolaskom u američku ambasadu u Podgorici.“
Program Stejt departmenta „Nagrade za postizanje pravde“ je globalne prirode u cilju generisanja korisnih informacija koje štite Amerikance.
Celokupni program nudi nagrade za informacije o terorizmu, stranom mešanju u američke izbore i stranim zlonamernim sajber aktivnostima protiv SAD.
U prevazilaženju posledica sajber napada na državne institucije Crne Gore prošle godine, pomagali su stručnjaci američkog Federalnog istražnog biroa (FBI).
The platform has taken it upon itself to decide who has the right to have their voices heard, based on Russophobia alone.
Scott Ritter is a former US Marine Corps intelligence officer and author of ‘Disarmament in the Time of Perestroika: Arms Control and the End of the Soviet Union.’ He served in the Soviet Union as an inspector implementing the INF Treaty, in General Schwarzkopf’s staff during the Gulf War, and from 1991-1998 as a UN weapons inspector.
There’s a scene near the end of Elem Klimov’s classic 1985 Soviet anti-war film ‘Come and See’, where a member of a Nazi unit that had just burned alive hundreds of Belarusian villagers issues a hate-filled diatribe against the Soviet partisans who held him and his fellow murderers captive.
“You’ve got no right to be,” the Nazi says, generating an angry roar from the partisans who have him surrounded.
“Listen!” Kosach, the commander of the partisan unit hisses. “Everyone, listen!”
The partisans fell silent.
“Inferior races spread the contagion of communism,” the Nazi continued. “You have no right to be here. And our mission will be accomplished. If not today, tomorrow.”
Listen. Everyone, Listen.
In July 2022, Peter Ermolin, a producer with the Russian RuTube channel ‘Solovyov Live!’ reached out to see if I might be interested in a collaboration that would take advantage of their existing studio infrastructure to create a podcast where I served as host. My job would be to interview Russian personalities – academics, military and intelligence professionals, politicians, and journalists. These interviews would be posted on YouTube so that they might become accessible to American and Western audiences who otherwise, largely because of the Russophobic cancel culture in place in the West, would be denied the opportunity to hear them. The interviews would be streamed live on RuTube and YouTube, to both Russian and non-Russian audiences. Although I am not, by training or ambition, a media host, I agreed, if for no other reason than I, as a long-time Russia analyst, would benefit intellectually from such interaction. If others could benefit from the same, so much the better.
Read more
YouTube bans Scott Ritter
I had few expectations from what became ‘The Scott Ritter Show’. (I argued in vain for a less ostentatious-sounding name, but Peter pushed back, saying that my name was the best entrée into the Russian market and, by extension, the non-Russian market.) I should point out that I did not receive any compensation from ‘Solovyov Live!’ for my involvement in this project, and the YouTube channel set up to air ‘The Scott Ritter Show’ was not, to the best of my knowledge, monetized; I know I derived no income from this project whatsoever. I participated in this effort because I felt it was the right thing to do. Knowledge, I’m fond of saying, is power, and ‘The Scott Ritter Show’ had the potential to be a unique source of knowledge for those interested in hearing a Russian perspective on complex and controversial issues.
In all honesty, I did not see the show succeeding. As I previously noted, I am not a school-trained interviewer (my past experiences were linked to interactions that could be more likened to interrogations), and the impersonal nature of the project, with myself and my guest speaking using a Skype video link, often communicating through the use of a simultaneous interpreter, only added to the awkwardness of the experience. Our first guest was Leonid Reshetnikov, the director of the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies and a retired lieutenant-general of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service. Our 40th episode saw me interview Akhra Avidzba, the commander of the Pyatnashka volunteer brigade fighting on the side of Russia in the Donbass. In the interim, the YouTube channel that aired ‘The Scott Ritter Show’ grew to a modest yet respectable 86,000 subscribers.
While I enjoyed every interview I did, the most joy I got from the process was reading the comments after each episode. Repeatedly, people thanked me for helping bring a Russian voice to the Western audience. For non-Russians, the show was everything I had hoped it could be – a vehicle for bringing Russian voices into their lives. And for Russians, my show proved that their voices mattered, that they did, in fact, have a right to be here.
And then YouTube shut down the channel.
There was no warning given, no indication that a rule had been broken by me or one of my guests. All YouTube did is claim that the channel had violated its rules regarding ‘hate speech’, without providing any indication of how that conclusion had been reached.
Within YouTube there is a division known as Trust and Safety, which is responsible for determining which content is allowed on YouTube. It should come as no surprise that many of the personnel who staff this division are former employees of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The CIA specializes in what is known as ‘information operations’, the art of manipulating data to achieve an intended result. The CIA has a close and continuous relationship with the Ukrainian intelligence service, the SBU, which is responsible for countering what it calls “disinformation” from foreign media outlets. The SBU has, in the past, asked the FBI to intervene to block the Twitter accounts of journalists and persons deemed to be engaged in disseminating narratives that run counter to the official line coming out of Kiev. One can assume that similar connectivity exists regarding the SBU, the CIA, and YouTube.
By cancelling ‘The Scott Ritter Show’, YouTube demonstrated that it was beholden to politicized pressure from ideologically motivated sources to eliminate and/or suppress the ability of Western audiences to access critical Russian voices on issues of relevance. Knowledge is power, and the YouTube/CIA partnership, to better control the population of the collective West, is determined to prevent the accumulation of such power by controlling the content of information in a manner which perpetuates the very fear-based ignorance that Western governments then exploit to achieve their policy objectives. ‘The Scott Ritter Show’ empowered its audience with information that was unavailable anywhere else, and as such posed a threat to those who used ignorance as a weapon.
Read more
A world without Russia: How hundreds of thousands of citizens have become convinced that their country doesn’t really exist
But the YouTube/CIA partnership is about far more than perpetuating politicized ignorance. It is the embodiment of organizational ‘hate speech’ facilitation, a poster child for Russophobia and the hate-motivated suppression of all things Russian. By shutting down ‘The Scott Ritter Show’, YouTube has become the modern-day manifestation of the Nazi from ‘Come and See’, proclaiming to the world that Russia and Russians have no right to be here. Shutting down the show was a hate-filled action intended to silence hundreds of voices forever.
Listen. Everyone, listen.
“By hearing ye shall hear, and shall not understand; and seeing ye shall see, and shall not perceive.” These words, taken from Scripture (Matthew 13:14), serve as a lesson to all who have watched YouTube strike down ‘The Scott Ritter Show’, and others like it, for the simple ‘crime’ of daring to shine a light on topics the powers that be who guide YouTube decision-making about content find inconvenient.
As an American, I take umbrage at what is a blatant violation of my First Amendment right of free speech. For all of you would-be Constitution scholars out there shouting that YouTube is a private entity, and as such is not required to adhere to the First Amendment, understand this – if YouTube has in any way enabled the US government, directly or indirectly, to influence what content is permissible, then that is a First Amendment violation.
But the YouTube decision impacts many persons who are not US citizens, including Russians. The YouTube/CIA partnership has undertaken measures designed to erase Russians and Russian thinking from the minds of Americans. Not only do these actions ‘dumb down’ American and Western audiences alike, but they belittle and dehumanize the Russian people by effectively saying “you have no right to be here.”
The antidote to Russophobia is information, especially that which gives voice to a Russian perspective. Russia does have a right to be here, and be heard, just as I have a right to speak freely in a manner which brings a Russian voice to American and Western audiences. I may no longer stream ‘The Scott Ritter Show’ on YouTube. However, I will not be silenced – ‘The Scott Ritter Show’ will continue its mission of bringing Russian voices to non-Russian audiences by streaming on Rumble, an online platform which adheres to free-speech practices, and my work is also still available on Telegram, Twitter/X and my website.
Russian voices must be heard, especially today. Americans must be given the opportunity to hear and understand, and to see and perceive.
Knowledge is power. Listen! Everyone, listen! And you just might learn.